ACTION REPORT
USS BETELGEUSE AK 28
NO SERIAL 15 NOVEMBER 1942
ACTIONS OFF GUADALCANAL 11/12 NOVEMBER 1942, REPORT
OF.
Covers three air attacks by Japanese
on shipping in the Guadalcanal Area
11/12 November 1942. USS BETELGEUSE
in Task Force 67 as part of Reinforcement
Operations for Guadalcanal Operation.
AK28/A16-3 U.S.S. BETELGEUSE (SD/TS133)
CONFIDENTIAL 15 November, 1942.
From: Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander in Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.
Via : Commander Task Force SIXTY-TWO (and SIXTY-SEVEN).
The Commander, South Pacific Force.
Subject: Report of Actions off Guadalcanal Island, Solomon
Islands on 11 and 12 November 1942.
A - Dive Bombing Attack about 0940, 11 November 1942.
B - High Level Bombing Attack about 1125, 11 November, 1942.
C - Aerial Torpedo attack about 1410, 12 November 1942.
Reference: (a) Articles 712 and 874, Navy Regulations 1920.
Enclosure: (A) Statement of Executive Officer, Commander H. BYE,
USN, concerning Action "A".
(B) Statement of Executive Officer, Commander H. BYE,
USN, concerning Action "B".
(C) Statement of Executive Officer, Commander H. BYE,
USN, concerning Action "C".
1. There follows a narrative report on the subject actions of the
U.S.S. BETELGEUSE. All times are - 11 Z.T. All three actions took
place in the waters lying between Guadalcanal Island on the South,
Savo Island on the West and Florida, Tulagi and Gavutu Islands on
the North The approximate location of the center of the actions is
Lat 9° 15' South and 160° 00' East.
COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES
Action "A" and "B" - U.S.S. ZEILIN, BETELGEUSE and LIBRA screened by
U.S.S. ATLANTA, FLETCHER, LARDNER, AARON WARD and MC CALLA. This
comprised Task Group 62.4 which merged with Task Force 67 on the
night of 11-12 November 1942. The ZEILIN was hit by a bomb in
action "A" and departed after action "B" on the afternoon of 11
November escorted by one DD.
Action "C" - Task Force 67 consisting of Transports - U.S.S. MC CAWLEY,
CRESCENT CITY, PRESIDENT JACKSON and PRESIDENT ADAMS plus
BETELGEUSE and LIBRA and screened by various cruisers and
destroyers.
CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD
- Wednesday, 11 November 1942 -
ACTION "A"
0900: Task Force 62.4 unloading in area off Lunga Lagoon about 4,000
yards to the Eastward of Lunga Point Guadalcanal Island. Ships in
unloading area ZEILIN, BETELGEUSE and LIBRA. Screened by ATLANTA,
FLETCHER, LARDNER, AARON WARD and MC CALLA.
0905: Received report that 21 enemy planes consisting of 9 dive bombers
and 12 fighters were approaching and expected in area in 30
minutes.
0915: Anti-submarine screen reported sighting a submarine off Lunga
Point.
Received signal to get underway. Side cleared of all boats.
0920: Ship underway and took station in column - order of ships ATLANTA,
ZEILIN, BETELGEUSE and LIBRA screened by the 4 destroyers.
Sounded General Quarters.
Stering on various courses at 15 knots being maneuvered by Turn
signals.
DIVE BOMBING ATTACKS - ACTION "A"
0940: The formation was attacked by planes identified as AICHI - 99 DIVE
BOMBERS.
0941: DIVE BOMBING ATTACK NO.1
Enemy plane started dive from about 8000 feet leveled off at about
1500 feet and dropped two(2) bombs. These bombs landed on the
port side of the ship at distances of about 20 feet and 40 feet.
Both these bombs splashed water on the ship and appeared to
fragment upon contact with the water as numerous fragments of the
bomb were picked up on board. Plane veered to port with no
apparent damage from our AA fire. All four 3"/23's and all 20
mm, 50 cal and 30 cal MGS which bore fired at the plane. Full
magazines were placed on guns. Observed bomb strike glancing blow
on starboard quarter of ZEILIN which was next adjacent ship to
port. These near misses on the port side temporarily placed our
Rudder Angle Indicator out of commission and there was a temporary
uncertainty as to where the rudder was. The hit on the ZEILIN
caused her to lose control and head for us so we gave emergency
full speed ahead and pulled clear of the ZEILIN'S bow and regained
our position in formation. By this time the steering system was
functioning normally.
0943: ATTACK NO.2
Enemy plane started a shallow dive from about 8000 feet, leveled
off at about 800 to 1000 feet and dropped one(1) bomb which landed
about 20 feet off the port quarter.
This near miss put No.3 and 4 guns temporarily out of commission
due to the upward jar jamming the guns. This plane was definitely
hit many times by our 20 mm guns as plane was seen to catch fire,
veer to port and crash in flames about 300 yards from the ship.
0945: ATTACK NO.3
Enemy plane observed diving at ship from port quarter toward
starboard bow. Plane released bomb at a height of about 1200
feet. The Commanding Officer personally observed this bomb during
its entire flight as it crossed the ship diagonally and cleared
the bow, landing about 20 feet sharp off the starboard bow.
This plane was hit repeatedly by our 20 mm and fire was seen to
break out in the lower part of the fuselage directly between the
wheels.
The plane flew parallel to the ship, vertically overhead for the
full length of the ship, then veered to starboard, then made a
large circle to port and crashed in flames about 2000 yards off
the starboard bow. The plane was showing increasing flame and
smoke from the time it was hit by our guns until it crashed into
the sea.
0946: Ceased firing and checked damage to personnel and material listed
later.
1000: Returning to anchorage in unloading area.
1018: Secured from General Quarters and set unloading conditions.
1020: Anchored in unloading area. Sent two electric submersible pumps
with attendants to assist ZEILIN.
MATERIEL DAMAGE DURING ACTION "A"
A. Rudder angle indicator ceased functioning due to control relay for
A.C. converter burning out.
1. Damage repaired in two hours.
2. Casualty caused by arc resulting from relay being jarred open
by heavy shock.
B. Main engine fuel pump control lever bent.
1. Repaired immediately.
2. Casualty caused by rod whipping due to shock.
3. Brackets to be installed to prevent recurrence.
C. Revolution counter stopped due to fuse burning out on emergency
switch.
1. Renewed fuse immediately.
D. Several fuses burnt out in emergency switchboard.
1. Renewed fuses immediately. Fuses were retained by clips. No
reasonable explanation as to cause.
E. Various switchbox covers jarred completely loose due to shock,
shearing bolts on box.
1. No electrical damage.
F. Waste heat boiler sustained heavy shock.
1. Insulating material came adrift falling throughout engine
room.
2. Lower nipple on gauge glass line cracked.
3. Bottom blow split at overboard discharge valve.
Closed valve to prevent inrush of water.
4. The fact that the waste heat boiler was not steaming
undoubtedly prevented a major casualty from occurring.
5. On entering combat zones, the practice on this vessel is to
drain the waste heat boiler and its fuel tank in the stack.
Failure to do so would make boiler a hazard to personnel and
vessel.
PERSONNEL CASUALTY REPORT DIVE BOMBING ATTACKS - ACTION "A"
(a) BARRIGER, Melvin H., 311 64 08, EM2c, USN (Ship's company)
punctured nose, returned to duty.
(b) JONES, Jesse H., 660 11 46, RM3c, V-6 USNR (Ship's company)
punctured nose, returned to duty.
(c) WOODWORTH, Vern L., 662 14 49, F.1c, V-6 USNR (Ship's company)
punctured wound left side, returned to duty.
(d) FIORVANT, J.F., Pvt. USMC, puncture wound, left shoulder,
returned to duty.
(e) BURTON, S.C., Pvt. USMC, burn, lst degree, neck, returned to
duty.
(f) SLATTERY, T.D., Pvt. USMC, lacerated left arm and wrist,
serious, retained on sick list.
All the above wounds are believed to have been caused by flying
bomb fragments when the near misses apparently exploded and
fragmented upon contact with the water.
HIGH LEVEL BOIMING ATTACK - ACTION "B"
After having been anchored in the unloading area to the
Eastward of Lunga Point for a period of 40 minutes, at
1100: Received warning that a number of unidentified planes were in
the area. Made preparations for getting underway immediately.
1102: Underway. Headed for open water and formed up astern of
ATLANTA and ZEILIN and followed by LIBRA.
Submarines (enemy) reported as being in the area.
1103: A destroyer in our A/S screen let go a depth charge barrage
about one mile to the Eastward toward KOLI POINT. No submarine
was sighted by this ship.
1107: Sounded General Quarters for the entire ship as all cargo booms
and gear were now secured and after lowering gas drums on the
sling the deep tank covers lowered on the gasoline drums.
1110: Steaming on various courses off the unloading area.
1120: While steaming toward the anchorage, received report, that
enemy planes were in the vicinity.
1125: Sighted 29 enemy high level heavy bombers flying Eastward over
the unloading area at the beach and over the flying field
inshore from the beach. The planes were disposed in a shallow
V with the sides sloping slightly to the West of North and
South. There is differing opinion as to the type of planes
sighted - Mitsubishi 97, Mikado 98, and Mitsubishi 96.
1126: Although the planes were obviously out of range of our 3"/23
guns, we opened fire with the other ships to put up a barrage
so the planes would not turn over the formation. No 20 mm guns
were fired.
1130: Ceased firing. No hits on enemy observed.
Observed heavy bomb bursts in water near beach, where we had been
unloading, on beach and inland toward the airfield. Observed
about 6 enemy planes burning and crashing into the sea. One plane
was seen to be falling, levelled off and then crashed into the
sea on fire. Two other enemy bombers appeared to be getting away
when suddenly they burst into flames and crashed into the sea.
1140: Headed toward the anchorage in the unloading area.
1147: Set unloading conditions.
1200: Anchored close off shore with anchor under foot and
continued unloading.
No personnel or materiel casualties.
TORPEDO ATTACK - ACTION "C"
Thursday, 12 November 1942
1327: While anchored with anchor under foot in unloading area, two
miles East of Lunga Point, Guadalcanal Island, BSI, word was
received over the CACTUS. CONTROL CIRCUIT that enemy planes were
expected in the area. A general signal was made by the Task Unit
Commander (Rear Admiral Turner, CTF 67) in MC CAWLEY to get under
way immediately and form up.
1328: Under way at various speeds and on various courses forming up.
Sounded General Quarters.
The AP's and AK's formed up as follows:
LEFT COLUMN RIGHT COLUMN
MC CAWLEY (SOPA) PRESIDENT JACKSON
CRESCENT CITY PRESIDENT ADAMS
BETELGEUSE LIBRA
The formation was screened by the cruisers
SAN FRANCISCO, ATLANTA, HELENA, JUNEAU and PORTLAND and the
destroyers BUCHANAN, SHAW, O'BANNON, CUSHING, BARTON, AARON WARD,
MC CALLA STERRETT, HOVEY, FLETCHER, SOUTHARD and MONSSEN.
1335: All ships formed up and steaming on a Northerly base course
heading for open water. The formation was maneuvered by
ComTaskFor 67 (ComamphforSoPac) in the MC CAWLEY by the use of
Turn signals.
Information was received over the fighter circuit that a large
flight of enemy high level bombers (23) escorted by fighters was
approaching from the Northwest. The bearings and distances on
this flight kept coming in.
It is possible that this flight was turned back by our own planes
as this ship did not see this flight of enemy planes.
1405: About this time word was received over the TBY that one of our
destroyers in the screen had some low flying torpedo planes on the
Radar Screen. These enemy planes were reported to be coming in
around the Eastern end of Florida Island and flying low.
1408: Sighted about 12 enemy torpedo planes bearing 060° - 120° true at a
distance of about 8 miles. These planes were divided into two
groups. One group bearing 060° headed Westward to hit our
starboard bow and the other group bearing 120° headed to the
Southward apparently to make a simultaneous attack from different
angles.
Our formation seemed to be turned toward the Northeastern group to
force their torpedo attack before the Southeastern group could get
into position and the Task Force Commander could turn to meet each
attack in succession. This we were able to do, taking the
Southern attack on our tail.
Our screen had opened fire by this time. This ship's attention
was held by the southern group as we were the rear ship in the
left hand column.
TORPEDO PLANE ATTACK NO.1
1412: A single plane was observed heading for our port quarter. Fire
was held on the 20 mm guns until he was within range and then
intense fire was opened on this plane which sheered away to the
left at a distance of about 300 yards. Flames were observed to
break out in the wings as the plane passed the ship and the plane
crashed into the water about 1000 yards broad on the port bow.
Full magazines were immediately placed on all machine guns.
TORPEDO PLANE ATTACK NO.2
1415: Two torpedo planes were observed directly astern making a torpedo
run at the ship. The point of aim was steady and the planes were
headed directly for the ship and flying low (about 60 feet).
The stern gun (5"/51) fired one round of shrapnel which burst
near the two planes and was undoubtedly a contributing factor in
causing an erratic torpedo attack.
At a range of about 1500 yards, the planes dropped their torpedoes
which did not make a successful run.
The Commanding Officer observed the starboard plane's drop. The
torpedo appeared to hang by the tail and entered the water in a
plunging motion at an angle of about 60° and when it struck the
water it bounced back out clear of the water like a pole which has
been plunged end first into the water. The torpedo then plunged
back into the water nose first and was not seen again.
The planes then divided and came up each side of the ship at a
height of about 50 feet and the wing tips about 75 feet from the
side of the ship.
The fire of the 20 mm guns was held until the planes were within
effective firing range. The planes were on a steady run up the
side of the ship and made a perfect point of aim until they came
up abreast of the ship when the rate of change of bearing
increased rapidly.
All guns got numerous hits on the plane on their side.
It was suicidal for planes to fly into such intense point blank
fire. Our gunners couldn't miss.
In addition to having 10 - 20 mm guns firing on these 2 planes,
all members of the crew and embarked - construction battalion not
otherwise engaged were firing .30 cal BAR's, rifles, machine guns
and .45 cal pistols at the planes.
The fire power was terrific and must have amazed the Japanese
pilots who evidently thought that they were attacking a
defenseless looking AK and that they would have easy pickings.
Two of our ship's officers who were on the beach head and
witnessed the whole action were watching the BETELGEUSE
particularly.
They said that it appeared as if the ship was not going to defend
herself at first as the guns were silent and the two planes were
closing rapidly.
Then when the planes came within close range it looked as if the
entire ship was surrounded by a sheet of fire from all of the
smaller calibre guns.
Hits were obtained almost immediately and by the time the plane on
the starboard side was opposite No.4 hatch, fire broke out. By
the time the plane was burning briskly at a distance of about 75
feet and at the level of the flying bridge.
This plane (No. 318 was painted on its tail) burst into full flame
and crashed in to the sea about 100 yards sharp on the starboard
bow.
The rudder was immediately put hard left and then hard right to
keep the bow and stern from running into the burning plane the
flames of which reached higher than the masts. The heat was
intense as the shi passed close aboard.
Simultaneously, the second plane was passing up the port side
about the same distance off as the first plane. It had No. 817 on
its tail.
Machine gun fire was pouring into it and it started to burn under
the starboard wing. The plane appeared to lose control either
from damage or injury to the pilot. Tracers could be seen going
into the fuselage all around the pilot.
This plane swerved across the bow from port to starboard and
pancaked into the sea. The plane sank to the top of the fuselage
and when last sighted was still floating.
No survivors got out of the plane and no signs of life were
observed.
1418: Ceased fire.
During this attack, the enemy planes raked the exposed positions
with their machine gun fire and did considerable minor damage both
to personnel and materiel. There was some damage apparently done
by stray projectiles from planes over head (which were not
observed) or from other ships in the formation. This was deduced
from the angle of entry being above the planes which flew
alongside the ship.
PERSONNEL INJURIES
LUSA, Peter J., 207 23 90, GM1c, USN, gunshot wound, left
shoulder, serious.
FERNAS, William M., 404 92 43, SM2c, 0-1 USNR, gunshot wound,
chest and left shoulder. Not serious.
FRANK, Herbert A., 40492 99, Cox., 0-1 USNR, gunshot wound in
the back. Not serious.
ROGOWSKI, Leon (n), 405 04 73, Bkr3c, 0-1 USNR, gunshot
wound in left arm. Not serious.
DOMBROW, Robert P., 300 64 06, A.S., USN, gunshot wound in
back and side. Not serious.
ROSS, Walter 0., 296 11 68, S2c, USN, bruise, left, arm caused
by recoil of 3"/23 gun. Not serious.
MERLO, Vito T., 399371, Pfc., USMCR, gunshot wound in right
leg. Not serious.
WHARTON, John J., 386167, Pvt., USMCR, gunshot wound in left
arm. Not serious.
BROWN, Victor R., Jr., 377481, Pvt., USMCR, gunshot wound in
left leg. Not serious.
HICE, George A., 382220, Pvt., USMCR, gunshot wounds. neck and
back. Not serious.
SNELGROVE, Robert E., 348837, Pfc., USMCR, gunshot
wound in right chest. Not serious.
ANDERSON, Constant R., 351462, Pvt., USMC, gunshot wounds in
neck and chest. Not serious.
CASE, Charles R., 394110, Pvt., USMCR, gunshot wound In jaw.
Not serious.
MATERIEL DAMAGE
Franklin Life Buoy on port side of bridge wrecked with an
explosive bullet.
Bullet holes and dents in inumerable places on the ship one small
projectile passing through the hull of the ship and into the paint
locker aft.
Topmast stay leading to the port king post head hit and wire
stranded.
Topping lift, after starboard boom on Number 2 hold stranded.
Topping lift on the forward port boom Number 3 hold nicked and the
port guy pendant shot through.
The double luff purchase on the port boom Number 5 hold was shot
away.
The topping lift and both wire guy pendants on the starboard boom
Number 5 hold badly stranded.
All damaged rigging was immediately repaired.
AMMUNITION EXPENDED
ACTION "A" (Dive Bombing)
.30 MG 4 .50 MG 2 20mm MG 10 3" 4 5" 1
265 rds 500 rds 1200 rds 54 rds 0 rds
1 % 4 % 4 % 6.7 % 0 %
ACTION "B" (High Level)
75 rds
9.3 %
ACTION "C" (Torpedo Attack)
195 rds 560 rds 1900 rds 29rds 1 rd
-5 % 4 % 6 % 3.6 % -1 %
Small Arms - 200 rds.
TYPE EXPENDED COST ON HAND ALLOWANCE
.30 Cal. Ball (Rifle) 200 9.00 9,920 12,000
.30 Cal. A.P.(M.G.) 460 22.80 27,848 20,000
.50 Cal. A.P. 700 92.40 14,610 12,000
.50 Cal. Tr. 360 39.60 7,735 6,000
20 mm H.E. 1550 1550.00 8,637 30,000
20 mm Tr. 1550 1007.50 6,615 30,000
0/23 Shr. 157 1119.41 708 800
5"/51 Com. 1 11.65 249 250
5"/51 Chg. 1 9.39 291 292
5"/51 Primer 1 .58 471 500
Total - - $3,862.33
BATTERY PERFORMANCE
ACTION "A" (Dive Bombing)
The battery performed excellently except for the after 3" guns
jumping up and jamming temporarily due to the near misses at the
stern.
The 3"/23 cal. battery as now installed is of very doubtful value
in a dive bombing attack due to its slowness of fire and its
antiquted sights, training and pointing gear.
This will be some-what improved when the 3"/50 cal. battery which
has already been authorized is installed at the next availability.
It is submitted that a battery of 40mm guns would be of great
assistance to the 20mm which do yeoman service at short ranges.
The commanding officer cannot speak too highly of the performance
of the 20mm guns and he would like to single out some gun in order
that the General Motors Corp. Pontiac, Michigan and workers could
be complimented on the performance of a particular gun but as the
saying goes, "when you back into a buzz saw, you can't tell which
tooth hits you first". All guns fired, all got hits and todate
have contributed to the destruction of 7 Japanese planes.
This ship has installed a number of BAR mounts at the rails around
the ship. The mount consists of a vertical pipe attached to the
rail. In the open end of the pipe is inserted a pivoting holding
clamp with collar and set screw in pipe.
The clamp is so manufactured that the BAR can be elevated and
depressed in the clamp and trained in the vertical pipe socket.
This ship has placed a baffle of sand bags about the flying bridge
and these undoubtedly cut down the number of casualties caused by
flying projectiles from the enemy planes and adjacent ships
striking personnel in the back.
This is very effective as several sand bags were torn by flying
missies but the sand lags add considerable weight to the topside
and could well be replaced with splinter baffles.
In regard to the splinter protection, it appears very effective
and neither the 20mm explosive or the 25 cal. hard sharp pointed
projectiles from the enemy planes penetrated the splinter shields.
One splinter plate on a 20 mm gun was hit squarely by an explosive
20 mini and shattered only causing minor injury to personnel
standing around while the gunner who was standing directly behind
the shield was not harmed.
Since the action of August 7 - 9, 1942, when it was found that the
20mm guns could not depress low enough to fire effectively at low
flying planes close aboard, the ship has moved the 20mm mounts
outboard a distance of 22 inches and has cut 4 inches off the top
of the splinter shield in the way of the arc of fire of each gun.
This leaves 48" of protection except where the cut-away has
reduced it to 44 inches.
The splinter plate brackets on the 20mm were "jogged" at right
angles so that the plates were spread apart and brought back
nearer to the gunner yet still parallel to their original setting.
This wider opening allowed the gunner to lead the fast low flying
planes sufficiently to get hits.
The 20mm guns now have a maximum depression of -5° below the
horizontal which it is strongly recommended should be increased to
take care of very low flying planes close aboard or PT boats which
might get in close at night before being discovered. A depression
line of 5° from a height of 60 feet (20 yards) will strike the
water at a distance of about 230 yards.
The performance of the ammunition was excellent but if there is a
satisfactory 20mm incendiary projectile being produced, it is
believed that it would be most effective against the fragile
and poorly armored Jap planes. Some tracers could be seen to pass
thru the wings and fuselage without apparent damage. It is
believed that an incendiary projectile would start a fire without
necessarily hitting gasoline.
BuShips letter AA/S78-3(817); EN28/A2-11 of April 10, 1942
requires ready service ammunition chests for 20mm to provide 2400
rounds per gun or 40 magazines.
The Betelgeuse has a capacity of 960 rounds per gun or 16
magazines.
In five aerial attacks the maximum expenditure on any one gun was
3 magazines, 25% of the ready service magazines. Before the
engagement was completed an efficient reloading crew had the
expended magazines reloaded and back at the gun.
It is the opinion of the Commanding Officer that the present
stowage space, 16 magazines per gun is entirely adequate and has
proved sufficient under enemy action.
SHIP TACTICS
The tactics of the ship's holding their position in the unloading
area by keeping the anchor just under foot appears sound as it
reduces the movements of the engines to maintain position with the
inherent interference with unloading operations. With the main
engines and steering gear in readiness for instant use, the anchor
can be hove up clear of the bottom or dragged into deeper water by
the time the boats are clear.
Also with the anchor down, it can be used as a drag on the bow to
quickly turn the ship's head toward the open sea with a single
screw ship.
The tactics used for maneuvering the formation by Commander Task
Force SIXTY-TWO in two separate torpedo attacks seem to be proven.
On both occasions a simultaneous torpedo attack by two parts of
the enemy flight was spoiled by heading toward one section and
forcing a drop before the other section was in position to launch
its attack. Then the OTC was free to turn the sterns of his ships
toward the second (delayed) attack.
This ship has on several occasions, when the Task Unit Commander,
directed all ships out of the unloading area and has headed at
high speed to seek the cover of a friendly low hanging cloud.
While under this cloud, zigzagging, this ship has never been
attacked and on the other hand while remaining near the anchorage
the shin has been attacked.
It is believed that the planes and submarines make for the
unloading area and if the ships pull out about 25 or 30 minutes
before the estimated time of arrival, the planes will make a
"dry" run over the unloading area.
UNLOADING OPERATIONS
Since the report of August 7-9, 1942, this ship has increased
greatly in its efficiency, gear and ability to handle more and
more cargo expeditiously.
On the other hand the beach and boating facilities have improved
very little.
In the opinion of the Commanding Officer based on observation from
the water side only this is due in part to the following factors:
(a) The beach working parties are not effective. This may
possibly be because the soldier feels that he is a
fighting man and not a laborer. This must be overcome by
some means before we can have an effective supply system.
The solution might be a complete and definite
understanding prior to a landing that certain troops will
definitely attend to the unloading of the ship in the most
expeditious manner, or that a labor battalion be brought
in whose sole duty is to unload the ships.
The Commanding Officer has never experienced any
difficulty on board ship with the working parties but has
observed a slow down or lack of personnel to unload the
boats promptly.
(b) There has never been an adequate number of operable boats
engaged in the unloading operation when more than two
cargo ships are unloading at the same time. This is most
probably due to inadequate repair facilities and spare
parts on the beach rather than a shortage of boats. This
opinion is based on repeatedly seeing boats anchored off
shore and beached which were not operating.
(c) Some mechanical means will have to be devised for quickly
unloading the boats at the beach and immediately
transporting the cargo to the dumps rather than allowing
it to clutter up the beach head. Specific recommendations
were made in this regard in the Commanding Officer's
report of August 7-9, 1942.
(d) This ship can handle cargo at an average rate of 150 Tons
an hour into boats alongside if there is a steady flow of
boats.
Thus we could discharge a cargo of 3600 Tons in two 12
hour days. However, it now takes 5 or 6 days to discharge
this amount of cargo.
There is a waiting time of over 50%.
(e) The boats are not loaded to half capacity because of the
grounding of the boats before they reach the shore line.
It seems that slips could be dredged out so that the boats
could come well in to the beach.
2. The conduct of all the officers and men deserves the highest
praise. This series of actions marks the fifth visit into enemy
waters and they having had their baptism of fire acted like
veterans even though some of them were hit by enemy bullets.
Their one main object was to inflict the maximum damage on the
enemy. Not one flinched from his gun or station even though the
decks were being strafed at very close range.
The willingness of the entire crew to give battle and shift
quickly from cargo unloading conditions to battle stations is to
be commended.
The entire engineering force is to be commended for their coolness
and efficiency in carrying on when bombs were exploding close
aboard and lagging was flying all around the engine room.
The signal force to a man stood by their stations and carried on
as if it were a drill.
G. R. BARRON, CQM(PA), 0-1, USNR and J.N.P. MARCOUX, QM1c, USN,
manned their steering station in an exposed position and quickly
and correctly carried out all orders-from corn while under fire.
The following officers who came under ray immediate notice during
the actions are commended:
(a) Commander Harold Bye, USN, Executive Officer and in direct
ship control by his skill and careful handling of the ship
control contributed in a great degree to the evasion of
enemy bombs and torpedoes. His fearlessness and calmness
in an exposed position which was being raked by enemy fire
from planes at very close range was an inspiration to all
hands.
(b) Lieutenant Commander Ernest J. Youngjohns, D-V(G), USNR,
Gunnery Officer, by his fearlessness, skill and careful
control of the ship's battery was instrumental in the
destruction of several enemy planes. His fearlessness and
calmness in an exposed position which was being raked by
enemy planes at very close range was an inspiring example
to all the gun crews.
(c) Lieutenant Ernest A. Rattray, D-M, USNR, Navigator, by his
careful and accurate navigation of the ship and station
keeping while maneuvering under intense enemy machine gun
strafing and in an exposed position, without thought for
his personal safety, contributed greatly to the safety of
the ship.
(d) Ensign Louis Smutny, USN, Signal Officer, while in an
exposed position under intense enemy fire and without any
thought for his personal safety handled all the tactical
signals, remained at the side of the Commanding Officer
and kept him fully informed of the complete tactical
situation and the where abouts of the enemy.
(e) The entire crew of officers and men are deserving of the
highest praise for the manner in which they performed
their duties. They have all proven that they are veterans
in every sense of the word. There was no apparent fear or
concern for one's personal safety. Every officer and man
was intent on utterly destroying the enemy.
3. The statement of the Executive Officer required by Article 712
(1), Navy Regulations is enclosed as Enclosure (A).
4. A copy of this report to the Secretary of the Navy will be
forwarded under separate cover as required by Article 712 (1), Navy
Regulations.
5. As required by Article 874 (6), Navy Regulations, it is stated in
amplification of the above detailed report that
Action "A" took place on Wednesday, 11 November, 1942 between
0905 and 0946
Action "B" took place on Wednesday, 11 November, 1942 between
1106 and 1130
Action "C" took place on Thursday, 12 November, 1942 between
1323 and 1418.
All times and dates are local. Zone Description is -11 (LOVE).
The ship was being maneuvered in actions "A" and "B" by Commander
Task Group 62.4 in ATLANTA (Rear Admiral Scott) and in Action "C"
by Commander Task Force 67 in MC CAWLEY (Rear Admiral Turner).
The wind was from the Southeast in all actions about force two and
the sea was calm.
The ships were maneuvered by simultaneous turns from a Northerly
base course.
The average speed was about 14 knots.
No sketch is included showing maneuvers or land.
6. As required by Article 874 (6), Navy Regulations, it is stated
that the ship, her armament, munitions, officers and men performed
efficiently.
7. In conclusion, the Commanding Officer desires to state that it was
a pleasure to go into battle and fight with this ship, officers
and men. They acquitted themselves with honor and distinction.
Harry D. Power.
Copy to: Secnav
Cominch
BuOrd
BuShips
U.S.S. BETELGEUSE
AK28/Al6-3 (11:FL)
November 14, 1942.
From: Executive Officer.
To : Commanding Officer.
Subject: Action off Guadalcanal November 11, 1942; Report of.
Reference: (a) Article 948, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.
1. In compliance with the requirements of reference (a) the
following report is submitted.
(1) At 0905 November 11, 1942, while at anchor (anchor under
forefoot with five fathom of chain over depth of water out) two
miles to the eastward of Lunga Point Guadalcanal, unloading
various types of Marine equipment and provisions, a fleet
signal was received, reporting that nine Japanese bombers and
twelve fighters were approaching. At 0915 anti-submarine
patrol reported sighting a submarine (unidentified) off Lunga
Point. A fleet signal was then received directing all vessels
to get underway immediately. Ship's side was cleared of all
boats, anchor hove in, annunciators tested, main engine turned
over steering engine tested and ship reported to be in all
respects ready to get underway. At 0920 the ship was underway,
Captain conning.
(2) This vessel immediately took station astern of the ZEILIN, the
formation being ATLANTA, ZEILIN BETELGEUSE and LIBRA. At 0920
sounded General Quarters. Our Force formed column very
rapidly and headed for open water, steering evasive courses
(45°-60° and 90°) left and right, using Gensigs.
(3) At 0940 Jap bombers (Aichi 99) were observed wheeling into
position to attack, they immediately commenced dive bombing
our force which in the mean time had opened fire, with all
guns that could be brought to bear on the enemy. The air was
filled with shrapnel bursts. The following bomb splashes were
observed; first bomb, near miss, along port side of our #4
hatch about ten yards from ship's side; second bomb landed
near the ZEILINS starboard quarter; third bomb landed about
ten yards forward of our starboard bow; fourth bomb landed
along the port side of the LIBRA'S #2 hatch the plane that
dropped this bomb seemed to be about one hundred feet above the
LIBRA'S main top mast when he opened his bomb release; fifth
bomb landed astern of our ship. Every ship appeared to be
firing all their guns, and bombers seemed to be disorganized,
some high and some low, flying in all directions, some bombs
were released at altitudes from 200 feet to 2000 feet.
Although there were geysers of water all over the battle area I
failed to observe any direct hits.
(4) Our ten twenty millimeter guns and four three inch twenty-three
cal: guns, poured a steady stream of fire into all bombers
that came within range and we definitely knocked down two of
the Aichi 99's.
(5) At one time I counted four burning planes toward Tulagi, two
toward Savo Island and one toward Guadalcanal.
(6) When the first bomb landed it knocked our rudder angle
indicator out of order, also temporarily placing our steering
gear out of control. The above failures happened at a time
when the ZEILIN (slightly aft of our port beam) was having
steering difficulty, she came charging towards us, her bow
lined with our amidships section, I immediately jumped over
and gave the annunciators the double throw full ahead, the
engine room force immediately responded, by this time the
steering gear was functioning satisfactorily. During the
firing it was learned that the helmsman on the lower bridge
had difficulty hearing the orders from the upper control
bridge. This will be corrected by shifting the helmsman to
the upper bridge.
Additional damage sustained during the attack:
(a) Fuel control lever bent.
(b) Revolution counter out of order: (Repaired immediately).
(c) Alarm circuit generator on fire. (Due to a ground).
(d) Various switch boa covers jarred. off bulkhead.
(No electrical damage):
(e) Several fuses burnt out in emergency switchboard.
(f) On waste heat boiler, bottom blow line sprung a leak at
joint next to skin valve. Valve was shut off. Boiler was
not in use.
(g) Control relay for A.C. converters burnt out
(Can be repaired).
Personnel casualty report;
(a) BARRIGER, Melvin H., 311 64 08, EM2c, USN (Ship s company)
punctured nose, returned to duty.
(b) JONES, Jesse H., 660 11 46, RM3c, V-6 USNR (Ship's
company) punctured nose returned to duty.
(c) WOODWORTH, Vern L., 662 14 49, F.1c V-6 USNR (Ship's
company) puncture wound left side, returned to duty.
(d) FIORVANT, J.F., Pvt. USMC puncture wound, left shoulder,
returned to duty.
(e) BURTON, S.C., Pvt. USMC, burn, 1st degree, neck,
returned to duty.
(f) SLATTERY, T.D. Pvt., USMC, lacerated left arm and wrist,
serious, retained on sick list.
All the above wounds were caused by shrapnel.
(7) Ships control was handled from the Flying Bridge by relaying
steering and engineroom orders through a voice tube to the
Navigating Bridge, where the helmsman and the annuniciator man
were stationed.
The officer personnel on the Flying Bridge consisted of the
Captain (conning), the Executive Officer (asst. conn.), the
Gunnery Officer (fire-control), the Navigator (asst. ship.
control), the Communication Officer (communications) and
Boatswain SMUTNY (signal officer).
The Captain had complete control of all activities on the
Flying Bridge during the entire action carefully checking turn
and speed signals orders and fire-control and was fully aware
of every move that was made. At no time did he show the
slightest indication of nervousness.
The Gunnery Officer, Lieut. Comdr., E. J. YOUNJOHNS,
controlled the fire of the battery, issuing his orders coolly,
distinctly and firmly.
The Navigator, Lieut. E. A. RATTRAY, constantly on the alert,
checking the various ship control orders as they were
received.
The Communication Officer relayed all communications as soon
as received and set a fine example of calmness during the
engagement.
The Signal Officer, Boatswain L. SMUTNY was indispensable, he
promptly and correctly interpreted and relayed all signals in
a clear and understandable manner.
On the lower bridge, BARRON, G.R., CQM(PA), 0-1 USNR and
MARCOUX, J.N.P., QM1c, USN were at the wheel and all orders
given them were immediately executed. The action of all the
officers and men coming under my observation during the
engagement was of the very highest order. After the near miss
on our port side during a lull in the battle I telephoned the
Chief Engineer, Lieut. Comdr. R. F. PEDERSEN, USNR, and
inquired as to whether or not we had sustained any damage
below, his reply "no damage, give them the works up there."
There was a general feeling of elation throughout the entire
engagement, whenever a plane came down in flames you could
hear a burst of cheers.
HAROLD BYE,
Commander, USN.
AK28/A16-3 U.S.S. BETELGEUSE (11 :FL)
November 11, 1942.
From: Executive Officer:
To : Commanding Officer.
Subject: Second action off Guadalcanal, November 11, 1942; Report of.
Reference: (a) Article 948, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.
1. In compliance with the requirements of reference (a) the following
report is submitted.
(1) At 1020 anchored at short stay and commenced unloading Marine
equipage, two miles to the eastward of Lunga Point,
Guadalcanal. At 1100 received warning of unidentified planes
in the area. All ships received signal to get underway, hove
up the anchor and headed for open water, taking station astern
of the ATLANTA, later on dropping aft to permit the ZEILIN to
take station between he ATLANTA and BETELGEUSE, submarines
(enemy) reported as being sighted in this area. At 1103 a
destroyer let go a string of depth charges approximately one
mile to the eastward of our position.
(2) At 1107 sounded General Quarters. Steaming on various
diversion courses. At 1125 enemy bombers sighted overhead I
counted twenty nine Mitsu Bishi's 97 (heavy bombers). At 1126
commenced firing, ceased firing at 1130 as the bombers were
too high for our twenty millimeter guns to inflict any damage,
observed heavy bomb bursts in unloading area. At 1131 enemy
planes being engaged by our planes. Observed several enemy
bombers falling, burning fiercely two of which appeared to
getting away when suddenly both panes burst into flames and
crashed into the sea. At 1140 returned to unloading zone and
anchored at short stay. At 1147 set unloading plan and
commenced unloading. No damage or personnel casualties were
received on this run.
(3) The officer personnel on the Flying Bridge consisted of the
Captain (conning), the Executive Officer (asst. corn.), the
Gunnery Officer (fire-control), the Navigator (asst. ship
control), the Communication Officer (communications), and
Boatswain SMUTNY (signal officer).
The Captain had complete control of all activities on the
Flying Bridge during the action, constantly and carefully
checking turn and speed signals, orders and fire-control, and
was cognizant at all times of every move that was made.
The Gunnery Officer Lieut. Comdr. E. J. YOUNGJOHNS controlled
the fire of the battery, issuing his orders in a clear,
understandable and decisive manner.
The Navigator, Lieut. E. A. RATTRAY, constantly on the alert,
checking the various ship control orders as they were
received.
The Communication Officer relayed all communications as soon
as received.
The Signal Officer, Boatswain L. SMUTNY was as usual a very
valuable aid in relaying all visual signals, clear and
promptly.
The entire signal force functioned at all times, speedily and
smoothly and are deserving of great deal of credit.
On the lower bridge, BARRON, G.R., CQM(PA), 0-1 USNR and
MARCOUX, J.N.P. QMIc, USN worked reliefs on wheel and executed
all orders promptly as did all the ship control personnel.
The ship's company has now been under close fire on several
occasions and not one of them show the slightest indication of
panic or fear, their one ambition is to pour the fire into the
enemy.
AK28/A16-3 U.S.S. BETELGEUSE (11:FL)
November 15, 1942.
From: Executive Officer.
To : Commanding Officer.
Subject: Action off Guadalcanal, November 12, 1942, Report of.
Reference: (a) Article 948, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920.
1. In compliance with the requirements of reference (a) the following
report is submitted.
(1) at 1327 while anchored two miles to the eastward of Lunga
Point, Guadalcanal, unloading Marine equipment, a general
signal went up ordering all ships present to get underway. At
1328 underway, sounded General Quarters, all ship's forming
columns and heading for open water. Disposition of ships as
follows: First Column; BUCHANAN, SHAW, ATLANTA, O'BANNON,
CUSHING, BARTON and HELENA. Second Column; SAN FRANCISCO,
MC CAWLEY (SOPA), CRESENT CITY and BETELGEUSE. Third Column;
JUNEAU, JACKSON, ADAMS and LIBRA. Fourth Column; AARON WARD,
PORTLAND, MC CALLA, STERRITT, HOVEY, FLETCHER, SOUTHARD and
MONSSEN.
(2) Steaming on various diversion courses (30° - 45° - 60° -
90°)left and right. At 1335 signals commenced coming through
reporting that eight enemy fighters and 23 enemy torpedo
bombers were approaching. At 1408 sighted the torpedo bombers
coming in from the north eastward, they were flying very low,
approximately sixty feet above the surface of the water. They
appeared to be loafing along and making their approach very
deliberately. At 1412 our force opened fire, from this time
on the bombers commenced closing more rapidly, the bombers
were the Mitsu Bishi 97 heavy twin engine type. By this time
the air appeared to be full of bombers which were traveling up
and down the columns some of them hedge-hopping over the
ships, flying about fifty feet above the water. As we soon
discovered the air was also full of missiles, first FERNAS,
WM. M., SM2c 0-1 USNR, in the starboard wing of the bridge
tipped over with gun shot wounds in the chest and shoulder,
next I saw LUSA, P.J., GM1c USN on the other side of me
crumple and fall with a deep wound in the left shoulder,
shortly after this DOMBROW, R. P., A.S. V-6 USNR (who was
servicing a gun near LUSA) was wounded in the side and
although bleeding profusely he continued on his battle station
until cease firing sounded. At the time LUSA was wounded
there were two bombers coming up from dead astern, we could
see them release their torpedoes then they continued coming
toward us, when very near the stern they separated slightly
and one plane came up each side flying a little below the
level of the flying bridge, our twenty millimeter gunners were
pouring solid streams of gun fire into these bombers, as the
bomber on the starboard side passed the bridge it was seen
that a fire was starting, when he came abrest of Number 1
hold, he dove into the water bursting into flames at the same
time, the flames shot up into the air considerably higher than
the bridge, which is sixty feet high. In order to keep the
ship from running into the burning plane, the rudder was put
over hard left, then as soon as the ships pivot point was
abrest the flaming plane the rudder was shifted to hard right.
In the meantime the bomber coming up on the port side was
receiving heavy fire from several of our twenty millimeters
(this fire, he was returning with everything he had) he was
seen to catch on fire when he was near Number 1 hold, this
fire was on his right wing close to the fuselage, the fire
spread rapidly he sheered slightly to port and crashed in a
mass of flames. During this period we shot down a third
bomber, this one being on the port side. It was gratifying to
note that since our twenty millimeter guns were moved outboard
and the splinter shield partially cut down permitting a lower
depressing of the guns than previously, there was no
difficulty in getting on the low flying planes and pouring the
fire into them. At 1417 ceased firing.
(3) At one time I counted ten burning planes in various parts of
the operating area. It is understood that only one plane out
of 31 escaped.
(4) Considerable damage to material and personnel was sustained as
listed below:
Franklin Life Buoy on port side of bridge wrecked with an
explosive bullet.
Bullet holes and dents in inumerable places on the ship, one
small projectile passing through the hull of the ship and
into the paint locker aft.
Topmast stay leading to the port king post head hit and wire
stranded.
Topping lift, after starboard boom on Number 2 hold stranded.
Topping lift on the forward port boom Number 3 hold nicked and
the port guy pendant shot through.
The double luff purchase on the port boom Number 5 hold was
shot away.
The topping lift and both wire guy pendants on the starboard
boom number 5 hold badly stranded.
All damaged rigging was immediately repaired.
LUSA, Peter J., 207 23 90, GM1c USN gunshot wound, left
shoulder. Serious.
FERNAS, William M., 404 92 43, SM2c 0-1 USNR gunshot
wound, chest and left shoulder. Not serious.
FRANK, Herbert A., 404 92 99, Cox. 0-1 USNR gunshot wound in
the back. Not serious.
ROGOWSKI, Leon (n), 405 04 73, Bkr.3c 0-1 USNR gunshot wound
in left arm. Not serious.
DOMBROW, Robert P., 300 64 06, A.S. USN gunshot wound in back
and side. Not serious.
ROSS, Walter 0., 296 11 68, Sea.2c USN bruise, left arm caused
by recoil of 3"/23 gun. Not serious.
MERL0, Vito T. 399371, Pfc. USMCR gunshot wound in right leg.
Not serious.
WHARTON, John J., 386167, Pvt. USMCR gunshot wound in left
arm. Not serious.
BROWN, Victor R. Jr., 377481, Pvt. USMCR gunshot wound in
left leg. Not serious.
HICE, George A., 382220, Pvt. USMCR gunshot wounds in neck
and back. Not serious.
SNELGROVE, Robert E., 34883?, Pfc. USMCR gunshot wound in
right chest. Not serious.
ANDERSON, Constant R., 351462, Pvt. USMC gunshot wounds
in neck and chest. Not serious.
CASE, Charles R., 394110, Pvt. USMCR gunshot wound in jaw.
Not serious.
(5) During the engagement ship control including steering was
handled from the Flying Bridge.
The officer personnel on the Flying Bridge consisted of the
Captain (conning), the Executive Officer (asst conn.), the
Gunnery Officer (fire control), the Navigator (asst ship
control), the Communication Officer (communications) and
Boatswain SMUTNY as (signal officer).
The Captain as usual seemed to have the uncanny faculty of
seeing everything and rendering a quick and correct decision
in all instances where immediate action was necessary. His
cool, calm and confident manner during the entire engagement
contributed no end to steadying influence on all hands. His
station was on the Flying Bridge in an exposed position with
men falling on both sides of him, he personally directed the
proper care to be taken of LUSA, Peter J., GM1c who was
bleeding excessively.
The Gunnery Officer Lieut. Comdr. E. J. YOUNGJOHNS had
complete fire control at all times, with a minimum amount of
confusion, the Gunnery Department functioned efficiently and
smoothly during the entire engagement. When casualties
occured to the personnel the next man moved up. Great credit
is due the Gunnery Officer.
The Navigator, E. A. RATTRAY's pleasing personality and
accurate estimate of the ship control situation at all times
proved invaluable during the emergency.
The Communication Officer G. J. HARDING relayed all messages
promptly and clearly.
The Signal Officer Boatswain L. SMUTNY, was continuously on
the alert, reading and interpreting the flag hoists as soon as
run up by the Flag ship, coaching the signal force, there-by
speeding up the execution of all signal hoists. The
leadership displayed by the Signal Officer was a great
influence on the performance of the entire signal force.
The CQM G. R. BARRON, and J.N.P. MARCOUX, QM1c were used on
the wheel, they never failed to carry out their instructions
speedily and accurately.
The ship's company have now participated in several major
engagements against the best the enemy can produce, their
morale is of the very highest order and their ambition is to
wipe out the enemy completely as quickly as possible.
HARLOD BYE,
Commander, USN.
File No. A16-3 AMPHIBIOUS FORCE 05/ejc
FE25/0260
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE
Serial Office of the Commander
CONFIDENTIAL U.S.S. ARGONNE, Flagship,
December 27, 1942
From: Commander Task Force SIXTY-TWO (and SIXTY-SEVEN).
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S.S. PACIFIC FLEET.
Via: Commander South Pacific Force.
Subject: Report of Actions off Guadalcanal Island,
Solomon Islands on 11 and 12 November, 1942.
A - Dive Bombing Attack about 0940, 11 NOV. 1942.
B - High Level Bombing Attack about 1125, 11 Nov.1942.
C - Aerial Torpedo Attack about 1410, 12 Nov. 1942,
1. Forwarded.
R.K. TURNER
COMSOPAC FILE
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE
A16-3/(90) OF THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0059 HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER
S-E-C-R-E-T
SECOND ENDORSEMENT on
CO BETELGEUSE Conf.Ltr.
AK28/AI6-3 (10:ST) of
November 15, 1942.
From: The Commander South Pacific Area and
South Pacific Force.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Report of Actions off Guadalcanal Island,
Solomon Islands on 11 and 12 November, 1942.
A - Dive Bombing Attack about 0940, 11 Nov.1942.
B - High Level Bombing Attack about 1125, 11 Nov.1942.
C - Aerial Torpedo Attack about 1410, 12 Nov.1942.
1. Forwarded.
2. This is an excellent report of a splendid performance. A high
state of training, organization and morale is indicated.
3. Specific comments are as follows:
(a) It is recommended that all 3" guns on this type of vessel
be replaced as soon as practicable by 40mm quadruple
mounts with Mk.51 directors.
(b) It is recommended that splinter shields be installed
around the flying bridge.
(c) The 20mm high explosive incendiary projectile is now in
production.
(d) BuOrd Circular Letter G13-42 modifies 20mm, magazine
allowances. The allowance for an AK is now 12 magazines
per gun.
(e) The ship tactics employed by BETELGEUSE and maneuvers
ordered by CTF 62 are believed to have been thoroughly
proved by practice.
(f) It is believed that unloading conditions have been
improved materially since this report was originated.
(g) All ships South Pacific area have been directed to
modify gun splinter shields to permit firing on small
craft at a range of 300 yards when the firing vessel is
on an even keel.
4. Classification of this correspondence has been changed
from "Confidential" to "Secret", and by copy of this
endorsement the originator is directed to change his copy
accordingly.
W.F. HALSEY
Copy to:
CTF 62
CO USS BETELGEUSE
History of the USS BETELGEUSE AK-28
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