Make your own free website on Tripod.com



AK-28 USS BETELGEUSE


Class: Arcturus
Commissioned 06/14/41
Length Overall 459' "
Extreme Beam: 63' 0"
Limiting Draft: 26' 5"
Trial Displacement tons: 13,910
Ships Company: Off. 35;  Enl.: 524
Cargo Capacity: 4,785 tons
(8) LCM;  (10) LCVP
Armament: Primary:  (1) 5"/38 cal. DP
Armament: Secondary:  (4) 3/50 cal.
(4) 40mm twin
(14) 20mm
Designed Speed: 15.5 knots
Designed Shaft Horse Power: 6,000
Screws: 1
Type: Geared turbine
Fuel (oil) tons 1,202



WAR DIARY of the USS BETELGEUSE Nov.1 to 30, 1942


Action Report on the Night of Nov. 11-12, 1942" of USS BETELGEUSE


DAILY WAR DIARY USS BETELGEUSE AK-28 NOVEMBER 1942.

ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 1, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM WHITE POPPY TO BUTTON CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- PC 476. ZEILIN BETELGEUSE. Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.4 Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC. (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: ZEILIN Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT STORES AND SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. 19-27 S. (Lat. 18-32 S. (Lat. 16-53 S. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long.170-28 E. (Long.170-16 E. (Long.169-49 E. Course VAR. and distance 326 miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 2, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM WHITE POPPY TO BUTTON CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- PC 476. ZEILIN BETELGEUSE. Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.4 Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC. (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: ZEILIN Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- 1000 - BUTTON. (Lat. 15-51 S. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long.167-45 E. (Long. (Long. Course VAR. and distance 300 miles made good from noon to ARRIVAL. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 3, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT BUTTON TO CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit:- SHIPS PRESENT. CURTESS (SOPA) ZANE LIBRA TREVOR ZEILIN GAMBLE STRARDFORD GUADALUPE DELPHINUS LACKAWANNA TANGIER Designation of the unit:- NONE Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC. (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: CURTISS Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES TO CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 4, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT BUTTON TO CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SAME AS FOR 3rd. Designation of the unit:- NONE Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: CURTISS. Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES TO CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 5, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED SANTOS ISLAND TO NEW HEBRIDES CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SAME AS FOR 3rd. Designation of the unit:- NONE Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: CURTISS. Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES TO CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 6, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT BUTTON TO CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIP PRESENT: CURTISS (SOPA) ZEILIN LIBRA NAVAJO STRADFORD PC 476 GUADALUPE PC 477 LACKAWANNA BALLARD DELPHENNIUS MEADE TANGIER SHAW MACKINAC FULLER ZANE CONYINGHAM TREVOR GAMBLE Designation of the unit:- NONE Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: CURTISS. Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES TO BUTTON. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 7, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT BUTTON TO CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIP PRESENT: SAME AS FOR 6th Designation of the unit:- NONE Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: CURTISS. Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES TO CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 8, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT BUTTON TO CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIP PRESENT: SAME AS FOR 6th Designation of the unit:- NONE Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: CURTISS. Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES TO CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 9, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT BUTTON TO CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIP PRESENT: SAME AS FOR 6th Designation of the unit:- NONE Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: CURTISS. Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES TO CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. (Lat. 15-20 S. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. 167-13 E. (Long. Course VAR. and distance 22 miles made good from noon DEP. to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 10, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM BUTTON TO CACTUS CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIP PRESENT: FLETCHER ATLANTA AARON WARD LARDNER ZEILIN MC CALLA LIBRA BETELGEUSE Designation of the unit:- TASK GROUP 62.4 Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: ZEILIN. Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. 11-43 (Lat. 11-04 S. (Lat. 9-59 S. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long.163-45 E. (Long. 163-15 E. (Long. 161-49 E. Course 313 and distance 367 miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 11, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED CACTUS TO CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIP PRESENT: ATLANTA MC CALLA ZEILIN LARDNER LIBRA FLETCHER BETELGEUSE ARRON WARD Designation of the unit:- TASK GROUP 62.4 Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: U.S.S. ZEILIN. Brief of Mission or Task:- UNLOADING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- 0530 - ARRIVAL. (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - UNLOADING SUPPLIES AT CACTUS. 0940 ATTACKRD BY DIVE BOMBERS. THREE (3) NEAR MISSES. NO SERIOUS DAMAGE. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE ACTION REPORT HAS BEEN FORWARDED. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 12, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED CACTUS TO CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIP PRESENT: ATLANTA TASK DROUP 67.1 BETELGEUSE MC CAWLEY LIBRA CRESCENT CITY LARDNER PRES. ADAMS MC CALLA PRES. JACKSON ARRON WARD SAN FRANCISCO PORTLAND HELENA JUNEAU AND VARIOUS DESTROYERS Designation of the unit:- TASK GROUP 62.4 Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: U.S.S. MC CAWLEY. Brief of Mission or Task:- UNLOADING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- 1900 - DEPARTURE. (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - UNLOADING SUPPLIES AT CACTUS. 1410 ATTACKRD BY TORPEDO PLANES. NO DAMAGE. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE ACTION REPORT HAS BEEN FORWARDED. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 13, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM CACTUS TO BUTTON CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIP PRESENT: MC CAWLEY CRESCENT CITY PRES. ADAMS PRES. JACKSON BETELGEUSE LIBRA AND VARIOUS DESTROYERS Designation of the unit:- TASK GROUP 67.1 Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 67. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: U.S.S. MC CAWLEY. Brief of Mission or Task:- RETURNING TO BUTTON FOR MORE CARGO. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. 11-22 S. (Lat. 12-00 S. (Lat. 13-03 S. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long.162-01 E. (Long.162-37 E. (Long.163-41 E. Course VAR. and distance 238. miles made good from noon DEP. to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 14, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM CACTUS TO BUTTON CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIP PRESENT: MC CAWLEY ESCORT PRES. ADAMS BUCHANAN PRES. JACKSON SOUTHARD CRESCENT CITY MC CALLA BETELGEUSE SHAW LIBRA HOVEY Designation of the unit:- TASK GROUP 67.1 Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 67. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: U.S.S. MC CAWLEY. Brief of Mission or Task:- RETURNING TO BUTTON FOR MORE CARGO. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. 14-05 S. (Lat. 14-20 S. (Lat. 14-33 S. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long.164-53 E. (Long.166-35 E. (Long.167-48 E. Course VAR. and distance 288. miles made good from noon DEP. to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 15, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM CACTUS TO BUTTON CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SAME AS FOR THE 14TH. Designation of the unit:- TASK GROUP 67.1 Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 67. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: U.S.S. MC CAWLEY. Brief of Mission or Task:- RETURNING TO BUTTON FOR MORE CARGO. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- 0530 - ARRIVED BUTTON. (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course VAR. and distance 206. miles made good from noon to ARRIVAL. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 16, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT BUTTON TO CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIP'S PRESENT: CURTISS(SOPA) PRES. JACKSON SHAW SOUTHARD SAN FRANCISCO PRES. ADAMS STACK ELLET HELENA CRESCENT CITY FLETCHER PENSACOLA HEYWOOD BUCHANAN NORTH HAMPTON LIBRA LARDNER ANDERSON GUADALUPE MC CALLA RUSSEL LAPPAHANNOCK O'BANNAN MORRIS SABINE MUSTIN TANGIER VESTAL NASSAU DALE NICHOLAS MC CAWLEY AYLWIN HOVEY Designation of the unit:- NONE. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: CURTISS. Brief of Mission or Task:- LOADING SUPPLIES FOR CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- 0530 - ARRIVED BUTTON. (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 17, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM BUTTON TO CACTUS. CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- BETELGEUSE LIBRA MC CALLA MUSTIN Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.2. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- 1830 - DEPARTURE. (Lat. (Lat. (Lat.15-36 S. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long.167-21 E. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - LIBRA TOWING P.A.B. LOADED WITH EQUIPMENT FOR CACTUS. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 18, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM BUTTON TO CACTUS. CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SAME AS FOR 17TH. Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.2. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. 14-41 S. (Lat. 14-36 S. (Lat.14-06 S. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long.167-00 E. (Long.166-55 E. (Long.166-14 E. Course VAR and distance 81 miles made good from DEP. to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - 0045 LIBRA'S TOW BROKE LOOSE, STANDING BY AT REDUCED SPEED. 0555 TOW SECURED. PROCEEDED. 0850 TOW BROKE LOOSE. STANDING BY AT REDUCED SPEED. 1400 TOW SECURED. PROCEEDED. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 19, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM BUTTON TO CACTUS. CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SAME AS FOR 17TH. Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.2. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. 12-39 S. (Lat. 12-03 S. (Lat.11-20 S. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long.164-48 E. (Long.164-39 E. (Long.164-13 E. Course VAR and distance 198 miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 20, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM BUTTON TO CACTUS. CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SAME AS FOR 17TH. Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.2. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- TRANSPORT SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT TO CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. 10-25 S. (Lat. 10-21 S. (Lat. 9-49 S. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long.163-03 E. (Long.162-24 E. (Long.161-28 E. Course VAR and distance 236 miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 21, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT CACTUS. TO CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIPS PRESENT BETELGEUSE (SOPA) LIBRA MCCALLA MUSTIN ZANE TREVOR NAVAJO BOBOLINK Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.2. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHIB FOR SOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- UNLOADING CARGO AT CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- 0600 - ARRIVED CACTUS (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - Unloading supplies at cactus. Anchored in Tulagi harbor during night. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 22, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT CACTUS. TO RINGBOLT CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SAME AS 21ST Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.2. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHIB FOR SOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- UNLOADING CARGO AT CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - Same as 21st. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 23, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT CACTUS. TO RINGBOLT CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SAME AS 21ST Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.2. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHIB FOR SOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- UNLOADING CARGO AT CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - Same as 21st. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 24, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT CACTUS. TO RINGBOLT CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIPS PRESENT BETELGEUSE BOBOLINK YP 239 LIBRA Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.2. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHIB FOR SOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- UNLOADING CARGO AT CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - Same as 21st. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 25, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT CACTUS. TO CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIPS PRESENT BETELGEUSE LIBRA MUSTIN MCCALLA ZANE TREVOR Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.2. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHIB FOR SOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- UNLOADING CARGO AT CACTUS. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- 1830 - DEPARTRERE. (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 90-22' S. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long.160-30 E. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - Unloading cargo at Cactus. Departed Enroute BUTTON. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 26, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM CACTUS. TO BUTTON CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1 (a) Composition of unit- SHIPS PRESENT BETELGEUSE MUSTIN ZANE Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.2. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHIB FOR SOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- RETURN TO WHITE POPPY FOR SUPPLIES. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- 1830 - DEPARTRERE. (Lat. 10-37 S. (Lat. 11-12 S. (Lat. 12-24 S. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long.163-07 E. (Long.163-42 E. (Long.165-05 E. Course VAR and distance 262 miles made good from DEPARTURE to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 27, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM CACTUS. TO BUTTON CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SAME AS 26TH Designation of the unit:- TASK UNIT 62.4.2. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHIB FOR SOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- RETURN TO WHITE POPPY FOR SUPPLIES. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- 1400 - ARRIVED BUTTON. (Lat. 14-20 S. (Lat. 15-08 S. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long.166-49 E. (Long.167-17 E. (Long. Course VAR and distance 324 miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 28, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM CACTUS. TO BUTTON CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIPS PRESENT PENSACOLA SOUTHARD KAPARA NORTH HAMPTON ZANE NEW ORLEANS GAMBLE MINNEAPOLIS CURTISS(SOPA) HONOLULU TANGIER MAURY SABINE MUSTIN GUADALUPE FLETCHER VESTAL AARON WARD RIGEL DRAYTON ZEILIN Designation of the unit:- NONE. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- RETURN TO WHITE POPPY FOR SUPPLIES. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. (Lat. (Lat. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long. (Long. Course and distance miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE. ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 29, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM ANCHORED AT BUTTON TO CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- SHIPS PRESENT SAME AS FOR THE 28TH Designation of the unit:- NONE. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- RETURN TO WHITE POPPY FOR SUPPLIES. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- 0900 - DEPARTURE (Lat. (Lat. 16-08 S. (Lat. 17-49 S. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long. (Long.167-44 E. (Long.167-28 E. Course VAR. and distance 43 miles made good from DEP. to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - NONE. (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE ZONE DESCRIPTION MINUS 11 DATE NOVEMBER 30, 1942. CHANGED TO Z.T. AT ENROUTE FROM BUTTON TO WHITE POPPY CONVOY NO. MOVEMENT CODE NAME OR NUMBER 1. (a) Composition of unit- BETELGEUSE MUSTIN AARON WARD Designation of the unit:- NONE. Designation of next higher echelon:- COMTASKFOR 62. Major Task Force, Fleet or Sea Frontier to which attached:- AMPHFORSOPAC (b) The identifying designation of the operation plan or order of the ISIC: NONE. Brief of Mission or Task:- RETURN TO WHITE POPPY FOR SUPPLIES. (c) Changes in the task of the unit since 1 (b) was issued - NONE (d) Positions At:- (Lat. 20-35 S. (Lat. 21-28 S. (Lat. 22-58 S. 0800 LCT( 1200 LCT( 2000 LCT( (Long.168-14 E. (Long.168-27 E. (Long.167-57 E. Course 165 and distance 289 miles made good from noon to noon. Meteorological and sea information which may have directly affected Operation between and :- WIND CLOUDS SEA FOG PRECIPITATION AMT AIR TEMP. BAROMETER CURRENTS WATER TEMP. CEILING VISIBILITY STATE OF WEATHER MOTION OF VESSEL DEPTH OF WATER MOON RISE MOON SET SUNRISE SUNSET MOON BRG MOON GLARE SUN BRG SUNGLARE PHASE OF MOON OTHER CONDITIONS: (e) A brief of the Day's Operations - - DIST. STEAMED IN NOVEMBER - 4,100 MILES TOTAL MILEAGE - 51,085 " (f) Summary of important orders received and decisions reached - - NONE. (g) Copy of BATTLE or ACTION REPORT. NONE.


ACTION REPORT
ACTION REPORT

USS BETELGEUSE                                               AK 28

NO SERIAL                                                    15 NOVEMBER 1942

    ACTIONS OFF GUADALCANAL 11/12 NOVEMBER 1942, REPORT
    OF.


           Covers three air attacks by Japanese
           on shipping in the Guadalcanal Area
           11/12 November 1942.  USS BETELGEUSE
           in Task Force 67 as part of Reinforcement
           Operations for Guadalcanal Operation.


AK28/A16-3	                     U.S.S. BETELGEUSE                    (SD/TS133)

CONFIDENTIAL                                        15 November, 1942.


From:          Commanding Officer.
To  :          The Commander in Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.
Via :          Commander Task Force SIXTY-TWO (and SIXTY-SEVEN). 
               The Commander, South Pacific Force.

Subject:       Report of Actions off Guadalcanal Island, Solomon 
               Islands on 11 and 12 November 1942.
               A - Dive Bombing Attack about 0940, 11 November 1942. 
               B - High Level Bombing Attack about 1125, 11 November, 1942.
               C - Aerial Torpedo attack about 1410, 12 November 1942.

Reference:     (a) Articles 712 and 874, Navy Regulations 1920.

Enclosure:     (A) Statement of Executive Officer, Commander H. BYE, 
                   USN, concerning Action "A". 
               (B) Statement of Executive Officer, Commander H. BYE, 
                   USN, concerning Action "B".  
               (C) Statement of Executive Officer, Commander H. BYE, 
                   USN, concerning Action "C". 

    1.     There follows a narrative report on the subject actions of the 
           U.S.S. BETELGEUSE.  All times are - 11 Z.T. All three actions took 
           place in the waters lying between Guadalcanal Island on the South, 
           Savo Island on the West and Florida, Tulagi and Gavutu Islands on 
           the North The approximate location of the center of the actions is 
           Lat 9° 15' South and 160° 00' East.

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES

    Action "A" and "B" - U.S.S. ZEILIN, BETELGEUSE and LIBRA screened by 
           U.S.S. ATLANTA, FLETCHER, LARDNER, AARON WARD and MC CALLA.  This 
           comprised Task Group 62.4 which merged with Task Force 67 on the 
           night of 11-12 November 1942.  The ZEILIN was hit by a bomb in 
           action "A" and departed after action "B" on the afternoon of 11 
           November escorted by one DD.

    Action "C" - Task Force 67 consisting of Transports - U.S.S. MC CAWLEY, 
           CRESCENT CITY, PRESIDENT JACKSON and PRESIDENT ADAMS plus
           BETELGEUSE and LIBRA and screened by various cruisers and 
           destroyers.

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD

- Wednesday, 11 November 1942 -
ACTION "A" 0900: Task Force 62.4 unloading in area off Lunga Lagoon about 4,000 yards to the Eastward of Lunga Point Guadalcanal Island. Ships in unloading area ZEILIN, BETELGEUSE and LIBRA. Screened by ATLANTA, FLETCHER, LARDNER, AARON WARD and MC CALLA. 0905: Received report that 21 enemy planes consisting of 9 dive bombers and 12 fighters were approaching and expected in area in 30 minutes. 0915: Anti-submarine screen reported sighting a submarine off Lunga Point. Received signal to get underway. Side cleared of all boats. 0920: Ship underway and took station in column - order of ships ATLANTA, ZEILIN, BETELGEUSE and LIBRA screened by the 4 destroyers. Sounded General Quarters. Stering on various courses at 15 knots being maneuvered by Turn signals. DIVE BOMBING ATTACKS - ACTION "A" 0940: The formation was attacked by planes identified as AICHI - 99 DIVE BOMBERS. 0941: DIVE BOMBING ATTACK NO.1 Enemy plane started dive from about 8000 feet leveled off at about 1500 feet and dropped two(2) bombs. These bombs landed on the port side of the ship at distances of about 20 feet and 40 feet. Both these bombs splashed water on the ship and appeared to fragment upon contact with the water as numerous fragments of the bomb were picked up on board. Plane veered to port with no apparent damage from our AA fire. All four 3"/23's and all 20 mm, 50 cal and 30 cal MGS which bore fired at the plane. Full magazines were placed on guns. Observed bomb strike glancing blow on starboard quarter of ZEILIN which was next adjacent ship to port. These near misses on the port side temporarily placed our Rudder Angle Indicator out of commission and there was a temporary uncertainty as to where the rudder was. The hit on the ZEILIN caused her to lose control and head for us so we gave emergency full speed ahead and pulled clear of the ZEILIN'S bow and regained our position in formation. By this time the steering system was functioning normally. 0943: ATTACK NO.2 Enemy plane started a shallow dive from about 8000 feet, leveled off at about 800 to 1000 feet and dropped one(1) bomb which landed about 20 feet off the port quarter. This near miss put No.3 and 4 guns temporarily out of commission due to the upward jar jamming the guns. This plane was definitely hit many times by our 20 mm guns as plane was seen to catch fire, veer to port and crash in flames about 300 yards from the ship. 0945: ATTACK NO.3 Enemy plane observed diving at ship from port quarter toward starboard bow. Plane released bomb at a height of about 1200 feet. The Commanding Officer personally observed this bomb during its entire flight as it crossed the ship diagonally and cleared the bow, landing about 20 feet sharp off the starboard bow. This plane was hit repeatedly by our 20 mm and fire was seen to break out in the lower part of the fuselage directly between the wheels. The plane flew parallel to the ship, vertically overhead for the full length of the ship, then veered to starboard, then made a large circle to port and crashed in flames about 2000 yards off the starboard bow. The plane was showing increasing flame and smoke from the time it was hit by our guns until it crashed into the sea. 0946: Ceased firing and checked damage to personnel and material listed later. 1000: Returning to anchorage in unloading area. 1018: Secured from General Quarters and set unloading conditions. 1020: Anchored in unloading area. Sent two electric submersible pumps with attendants to assist ZEILIN. MATERIEL DAMAGE DURING ACTION "A" A. Rudder angle indicator ceased functioning due to control relay for A.C. converter burning out. 1. Damage repaired in two hours. 2. Casualty caused by arc resulting from relay being jarred open by heavy shock. B. Main engine fuel pump control lever bent. 1. Repaired immediately. 2. Casualty caused by rod whipping due to shock. 3. Brackets to be installed to prevent recurrence. C. Revolution counter stopped due to fuse burning out on emergency switch. 1. Renewed fuse immediately. D. Several fuses burnt out in emergency switchboard. 1. Renewed fuses immediately. Fuses were retained by clips. No reasonable explanation as to cause. E. Various switchbox covers jarred completely loose due to shock, shearing bolts on box. 1. No electrical damage. F. Waste heat boiler sustained heavy shock. 1. Insulating material came adrift falling throughout engine room. 2. Lower nipple on gauge glass line cracked. 3. Bottom blow split at overboard discharge valve. Closed valve to prevent inrush of water. 4. The fact that the waste heat boiler was not steaming undoubtedly prevented a major casualty from occurring. 5. On entering combat zones, the practice on this vessel is to drain the waste heat boiler and its fuel tank in the stack. Failure to do so would make boiler a hazard to personnel and vessel. PERSONNEL CASUALTY REPORT DIVE BOMBING ATTACKS - ACTION "A" (a) BARRIGER, Melvin H., 311 64 08, EM2c, USN (Ship's company) punctured nose, returned to duty. (b) JONES, Jesse H., 660 11 46, RM3c, V-6 USNR (Ship's company) punctured nose, returned to duty. (c) WOODWORTH, Vern L., 662 14 49, F.1c, V-6 USNR (Ship's company) punctured wound left side, returned to duty. (d) FIORVANT, J.F., Pvt. USMC, puncture wound, left shoulder, returned to duty. (e) BURTON, S.C., Pvt. USMC, burn, lst degree, neck, returned to duty. (f) SLATTERY, T.D., Pvt. USMC, lacerated left arm and wrist, serious, retained on sick list. All the above wounds are believed to have been caused by flying bomb fragments when the near misses apparently exploded and fragmented upon contact with the water. HIGH LEVEL BOIMING ATTACK - ACTION "B" After having been anchored in the unloading area to the Eastward of Lunga Point for a period of 40 minutes, at 1100: Received warning that a number of unidentified planes were in the area. Made preparations for getting underway immediately. 1102: Underway. Headed for open water and formed up astern of ATLANTA and ZEILIN and followed by LIBRA. Submarines (enemy) reported as being in the area. 1103: A destroyer in our A/S screen let go a depth charge barrage about one mile to the Eastward toward KOLI POINT. No submarine was sighted by this ship. 1107: Sounded General Quarters for the entire ship as all cargo booms and gear were now secured and after lowering gas drums on the sling the deep tank covers lowered on the gasoline drums. 1110: Steaming on various courses off the unloading area. 1120: While steaming toward the anchorage, received report, that enemy planes were in the vicinity. 1125: Sighted 29 enemy high level heavy bombers flying Eastward over the unloading area at the beach and over the flying field inshore from the beach. The planes were disposed in a shallow V with the sides sloping slightly to the West of North and South. There is differing opinion as to the type of planes sighted - Mitsubishi 97, Mikado 98, and Mitsubishi 96. 1126: Although the planes were obviously out of range of our 3"/23 guns, we opened fire with the other ships to put up a barrage so the planes would not turn over the formation. No 20 mm guns were fired. 1130: Ceased firing. No hits on enemy observed. Observed heavy bomb bursts in water near beach, where we had been unloading, on beach and inland toward the airfield. Observed about 6 enemy planes burning and crashing into the sea. One plane was seen to be falling, levelled off and then crashed into the sea on fire. Two other enemy bombers appeared to be getting away when suddenly they burst into flames and crashed into the sea. 1140: Headed toward the anchorage in the unloading area. 1147: Set unloading conditions. 1200: Anchored close off shore with anchor under foot and continued unloading. No personnel or materiel casualties. TORPEDO ATTACK - ACTION "C" Thursday, 12 November 1942 1327: While anchored with anchor under foot in unloading area, two miles East of Lunga Point, Guadalcanal Island, BSI, word was received over the CACTUS. CONTROL CIRCUIT that enemy planes were expected in the area. A general signal was made by the Task Unit Commander (Rear Admiral Turner, CTF 67) in MC CAWLEY to get under way immediately and form up. 1328: Under way at various speeds and on various courses forming up. Sounded General Quarters. The AP's and AK's formed up as follows: LEFT COLUMN RIGHT COLUMN MC CAWLEY (SOPA) PRESIDENT JACKSON CRESCENT CITY PRESIDENT ADAMS BETELGEUSE LIBRA The formation was screened by the cruisers SAN FRANCISCO, ATLANTA, HELENA, JUNEAU and PORTLAND and the destroyers BUCHANAN, SHAW, O'BANNON, CUSHING, BARTON, AARON WARD, MC CALLA STERRETT, HOVEY, FLETCHER, SOUTHARD and MONSSEN. 1335: All ships formed up and steaming on a Northerly base course heading for open water. The formation was maneuvered by ComTaskFor 67 (ComamphforSoPac) in the MC CAWLEY by the use of Turn signals. Information was received over the fighter circuit that a large flight of enemy high level bombers (23) escorted by fighters was approaching from the Northwest. The bearings and distances on this flight kept coming in. It is possible that this flight was turned back by our own planes as this ship did not see this flight of enemy planes. 1405: About this time word was received over the TBY that one of our destroyers in the screen had some low flying torpedo planes on the Radar Screen. These enemy planes were reported to be coming in around the Eastern end of Florida Island and flying low. 1408: Sighted about 12 enemy torpedo planes bearing 060° - 120° true at a distance of about 8 miles. These planes were divided into two groups. One group bearing 060° headed Westward to hit our starboard bow and the other group bearing 120° headed to the Southward apparently to make a simultaneous attack from different angles. Our formation seemed to be turned toward the Northeastern group to force their torpedo attack before the Southeastern group could get into position and the Task Force Commander could turn to meet each attack in succession. This we were able to do, taking the Southern attack on our tail. Our screen had opened fire by this time. This ship's attention was held by the southern group as we were the rear ship in the left hand column. TORPEDO PLANE ATTACK NO.1 1412: A single plane was observed heading for our port quarter. Fire was held on the 20 mm guns until he was within range and then intense fire was opened on this plane which sheered away to the left at a distance of about 300 yards. Flames were observed to break out in the wings as the plane passed the ship and the plane crashed into the water about 1000 yards broad on the port bow. Full magazines were immediately placed on all machine guns. TORPEDO PLANE ATTACK NO.2 1415: Two torpedo planes were observed directly astern making a torpedo run at the ship. The point of aim was steady and the planes were headed directly for the ship and flying low (about 60 feet). The stern gun (5"/51) fired one round of shrapnel which burst near the two planes and was undoubtedly a contributing factor in causing an erratic torpedo attack. At a range of about 1500 yards, the planes dropped their torpedoes which did not make a successful run. The Commanding Officer observed the starboard plane's drop. The torpedo appeared to hang by the tail and entered the water in a plunging motion at an angle of about 60° and when it struck the water it bounced back out clear of the water like a pole which has been plunged end first into the water. The torpedo then plunged back into the water nose first and was not seen again. The planes then divided and came up each side of the ship at a height of about 50 feet and the wing tips about 75 feet from the side of the ship. The fire of the 20 mm guns was held until the planes were within effective firing range. The planes were on a steady run up the side of the ship and made a perfect point of aim until they came up abreast of the ship when the rate of change of bearing increased rapidly. All guns got numerous hits on the plane on their side. It was suicidal for planes to fly into such intense point blank fire. Our gunners couldn't miss. In addition to having 10 - 20 mm guns firing on these 2 planes, all members of the crew and embarked - construction battalion not otherwise engaged were firing .30 cal BAR's, rifles, machine guns and .45 cal pistols at the planes. The fire power was terrific and must have amazed the Japanese pilots who evidently thought that they were attacking a defenseless looking AK and that they would have easy pickings. Two of our ship's officers who were on the beach head and witnessed the whole action were watching the BETELGEUSE particularly. They said that it appeared as if the ship was not going to defend herself at first as the guns were silent and the two planes were closing rapidly. Then when the planes came within close range it looked as if the entire ship was surrounded by a sheet of fire from all of the smaller calibre guns. Hits were obtained almost immediately and by the time the plane on the starboard side was opposite No.4 hatch, fire broke out. By the time the plane was burning briskly at a distance of about 75 feet and at the level of the flying bridge. This plane (No. 318 was painted on its tail) burst into full flame and crashed in to the sea about 100 yards sharp on the starboard bow. The rudder was immediately put hard left and then hard right to keep the bow and stern from running into the burning plane the flames of which reached higher than the masts. The heat was intense as the shi passed close aboard. Simultaneously, the second plane was passing up the port side about the same distance off as the first plane. It had No. 817 on its tail. Machine gun fire was pouring into it and it started to burn under the starboard wing. The plane appeared to lose control either from damage or injury to the pilot. Tracers could be seen going into the fuselage all around the pilot. This plane swerved across the bow from port to starboard and pancaked into the sea. The plane sank to the top of the fuselage and when last sighted was still floating. No survivors got out of the plane and no signs of life were observed. 1418: Ceased fire. During this attack, the enemy planes raked the exposed positions with their machine gun fire and did considerable minor damage both to personnel and materiel. There was some damage apparently done by stray projectiles from planes over head (which were not observed) or from other ships in the formation. This was deduced from the angle of entry being above the planes which flew alongside the ship. PERSONNEL INJURIES LUSA, Peter J., 207 23 90, GM1c, USN, gunshot wound, left shoulder, serious. FERNAS, William M., 404 92 43, SM2c, 0-1 USNR, gunshot wound, chest and left shoulder. Not serious. FRANK, Herbert A., 40492 99, Cox., 0-1 USNR, gunshot wound in the back. Not serious. ROGOWSKI, Leon (n), 405 04 73, Bkr3c, 0-1 USNR, gunshot wound in left arm. Not serious. DOMBROW, Robert P., 300 64 06, A.S., USN, gunshot wound in back and side. Not serious. ROSS, Walter 0., 296 11 68, S2c, USN, bruise, left, arm caused by recoil of 3"/23 gun. Not serious. MERLO, Vito T., 399371, Pfc., USMCR, gunshot wound in right leg. Not serious. WHARTON, John J., 386167, Pvt., USMCR, gunshot wound in left arm. Not serious. BROWN, Victor R., Jr., 377481, Pvt., USMCR, gunshot wound in left leg. Not serious. HICE, George A., 382220, Pvt., USMCR, gunshot wounds. neck and back. Not serious. SNELGROVE, Robert E., 348837, Pfc., USMCR, gunshot wound in right chest. Not serious. ANDERSON, Constant R., 351462, Pvt., USMC, gunshot wounds in neck and chest. Not serious. CASE, Charles R., 394110, Pvt., USMCR, gunshot wound In jaw. Not serious. MATERIEL DAMAGE Franklin Life Buoy on port side of bridge wrecked with an explosive bullet. Bullet holes and dents in inumerable places on the ship one small projectile passing through the hull of the ship and into the paint locker aft. Topmast stay leading to the port king post head hit and wire stranded. Topping lift, after starboard boom on Number 2 hold stranded. Topping lift on the forward port boom Number 3 hold nicked and the port guy pendant shot through. The double luff purchase on the port boom Number 5 hold was shot away. The topping lift and both wire guy pendants on the starboard boom Number 5 hold badly stranded. All damaged rigging was immediately repaired. AMMUNITION EXPENDED ACTION "A" (Dive Bombing) .30 MG 4 .50 MG 2 20mm MG 10 3" 4 5" 1 265 rds 500 rds 1200 rds 54 rds 0 rds 1 % 4 % 4 % 6.7 % 0 % ACTION "B" (High Level) 75 rds 9.3 % ACTION "C" (Torpedo Attack) 195 rds 560 rds 1900 rds 29rds 1 rd -5 % 4 % 6 % 3.6 % -1 % Small Arms - 200 rds. TYPE EXPENDED COST ON HAND ALLOWANCE .30 Cal. Ball (Rifle) 200 9.00 9,920 12,000 .30 Cal. A.P.(M.G.) 460 22.80 27,848 20,000 .50 Cal. A.P. 700 92.40 14,610 12,000 .50 Cal. Tr. 360 39.60 7,735 6,000 20 mm H.E. 1550 1550.00 8,637 30,000 20 mm Tr. 1550 1007.50 6,615 30,000 0/23 Shr. 157 1119.41 708 800 5"/51 Com. 1 11.65 249 250 5"/51 Chg. 1 9.39 291 292 5"/51 Primer 1 .58 471 500 Total - - $3,862.33 BATTERY PERFORMANCE ACTION "A" (Dive Bombing) The battery performed excellently except for the after 3" guns jumping up and jamming temporarily due to the near misses at the stern. The 3"/23 cal. battery as now installed is of very doubtful value in a dive bombing attack due to its slowness of fire and its antiquted sights, training and pointing gear. This will be some-what improved when the 3"/50 cal. battery which has already been authorized is installed at the next availability. It is submitted that a battery of 40mm guns would be of great assistance to the 20mm which do yeoman service at short ranges. The commanding officer cannot speak too highly of the performance of the 20mm guns and he would like to single out some gun in order that the General Motors Corp. Pontiac, Michigan and workers could be complimented on the performance of a particular gun but as the saying goes, "when you back into a buzz saw, you can't tell which tooth hits you first". All guns fired, all got hits and todate have contributed to the destruction of 7 Japanese planes. This ship has installed a number of BAR mounts at the rails around the ship. The mount consists of a vertical pipe attached to the rail. In the open end of the pipe is inserted a pivoting holding clamp with collar and set screw in pipe. The clamp is so manufactured that the BAR can be elevated and depressed in the clamp and trained in the vertical pipe socket. This ship has placed a baffle of sand bags about the flying bridge and these undoubtedly cut down the number of casualties caused by flying projectiles from the enemy planes and adjacent ships striking personnel in the back. This is very effective as several sand bags were torn by flying missies but the sand lags add considerable weight to the topside and could well be replaced with splinter baffles. In regard to the splinter protection, it appears very effective and neither the 20mm explosive or the 25 cal. hard sharp pointed projectiles from the enemy planes penetrated the splinter shields. One splinter plate on a 20 mm gun was hit squarely by an explosive 20 mini and shattered only causing minor injury to personnel standing around while the gunner who was standing directly behind the shield was not harmed. Since the action of August 7 - 9, 1942, when it was found that the 20mm guns could not depress low enough to fire effectively at low flying planes close aboard, the ship has moved the 20mm mounts outboard a distance of 22 inches and has cut 4 inches off the top of the splinter shield in the way of the arc of fire of each gun. This leaves 48" of protection except where the cut-away has reduced it to 44 inches. The splinter plate brackets on the 20mm were "jogged" at right angles so that the plates were spread apart and brought back nearer to the gunner yet still parallel to their original setting. This wider opening allowed the gunner to lead the fast low flying planes sufficiently to get hits. The 20mm guns now have a maximum depression of -5° below the horizontal which it is strongly recommended should be increased to take care of very low flying planes close aboard or PT boats which might get in close at night before being discovered. A depression line of 5° from a height of 60 feet (20 yards) will strike the water at a distance of about 230 yards. The performance of the ammunition was excellent but if there is a satisfactory 20mm incendiary projectile being produced, it is believed that it would be most effective against the fragile and poorly armored Jap planes. Some tracers could be seen to pass thru the wings and fuselage without apparent damage. It is believed that an incendiary projectile would start a fire without necessarily hitting gasoline. BuShips letter AA/S78-3(817); EN28/A2-11 of April 10, 1942 requires ready service ammunition chests for 20mm to provide 2400 rounds per gun or 40 magazines. The Betelgeuse has a capacity of 960 rounds per gun or 16 magazines. In five aerial attacks the maximum expenditure on any one gun was 3 magazines, 25% of the ready service magazines. Before the engagement was completed an efficient reloading crew had the expended magazines reloaded and back at the gun. It is the opinion of the Commanding Officer that the present stowage space, 16 magazines per gun is entirely adequate and has proved sufficient under enemy action. SHIP TACTICS The tactics of the ship's holding their position in the unloading area by keeping the anchor just under foot appears sound as it reduces the movements of the engines to maintain position with the inherent interference with unloading operations. With the main engines and steering gear in readiness for instant use, the anchor can be hove up clear of the bottom or dragged into deeper water by the time the boats are clear. Also with the anchor down, it can be used as a drag on the bow to quickly turn the ship's head toward the open sea with a single screw ship. The tactics used for maneuvering the formation by Commander Task Force SIXTY-TWO in two separate torpedo attacks seem to be proven. On both occasions a simultaneous torpedo attack by two parts of the enemy flight was spoiled by heading toward one section and forcing a drop before the other section was in position to launch its attack. Then the OTC was free to turn the sterns of his ships toward the second (delayed) attack. This ship has on several occasions, when the Task Unit Commander, directed all ships out of the unloading area and has headed at high speed to seek the cover of a friendly low hanging cloud. While under this cloud, zigzagging, this ship has never been attacked and on the other hand while remaining near the anchorage the shin has been attacked. It is believed that the planes and submarines make for the unloading area and if the ships pull out about 25 or 30 minutes before the estimated time of arrival, the planes will make a "dry" run over the unloading area. UNLOADING OPERATIONS Since the report of August 7-9, 1942, this ship has increased greatly in its efficiency, gear and ability to handle more and more cargo expeditiously. On the other hand the beach and boating facilities have improved very little. In the opinion of the Commanding Officer based on observation from the water side only this is due in part to the following factors: (a) The beach working parties are not effective. This may possibly be because the soldier feels that he is a fighting man and not a laborer. This must be overcome by some means before we can have an effective supply system. The solution might be a complete and definite understanding prior to a landing that certain troops will definitely attend to the unloading of the ship in the most expeditious manner, or that a labor battalion be brought in whose sole duty is to unload the ships. The Commanding Officer has never experienced any difficulty on board ship with the working parties but has observed a slow down or lack of personnel to unload the boats promptly. (b) There has never been an adequate number of operable boats engaged in the unloading operation when more than two cargo ships are unloading at the same time. This is most probably due to inadequate repair facilities and spare parts on the beach rather than a shortage of boats. This opinion is based on repeatedly seeing boats anchored off shore and beached which were not operating. (c) Some mechanical means will have to be devised for quickly unloading the boats at the beach and immediately transporting the cargo to the dumps rather than allowing it to clutter up the beach head. Specific recommendations were made in this regard in the Commanding Officer's report of August 7-9, 1942. (d) This ship can handle cargo at an average rate of 150 Tons an hour into boats alongside if there is a steady flow of boats. Thus we could discharge a cargo of 3600 Tons in two 12 hour days. However, it now takes 5 or 6 days to discharge this amount of cargo. There is a waiting time of over 50%. (e) The boats are not loaded to half capacity because of the grounding of the boats before they reach the shore line. It seems that slips could be dredged out so that the boats could come well in to the beach. 2. The conduct of all the officers and men deserves the highest praise. This series of actions marks the fifth visit into enemy waters and they having had their baptism of fire acted like veterans even though some of them were hit by enemy bullets. Their one main object was to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy. Not one flinched from his gun or station even though the decks were being strafed at very close range. The willingness of the entire crew to give battle and shift quickly from cargo unloading conditions to battle stations is to be commended. The entire engineering force is to be commended for their coolness and efficiency in carrying on when bombs were exploding close aboard and lagging was flying all around the engine room. The signal force to a man stood by their stations and carried on as if it were a drill. G. R. BARRON, CQM(PA), 0-1, USNR and J.N.P. MARCOUX, QM1c, USN, manned their steering station in an exposed position and quickly and correctly carried out all orders-from corn while under fire. The following officers who came under ray immediate notice during the actions are commended: (a) Commander Harold Bye, USN, Executive Officer and in direct ship control by his skill and careful handling of the ship control contributed in a great degree to the evasion of enemy bombs and torpedoes. His fearlessness and calmness in an exposed position which was being raked by enemy fire from planes at very close range was an inspiration to all hands. (b) Lieutenant Commander Ernest J. Youngjohns, D-V(G), USNR, Gunnery Officer, by his fearlessness, skill and careful control of the ship's battery was instrumental in the destruction of several enemy planes. His fearlessness and calmness in an exposed position which was being raked by enemy planes at very close range was an inspiring example to all the gun crews. (c) Lieutenant Ernest A. Rattray, D-M, USNR, Navigator, by his careful and accurate navigation of the ship and station keeping while maneuvering under intense enemy machine gun strafing and in an exposed position, without thought for his personal safety, contributed greatly to the safety of the ship. (d) Ensign Louis Smutny, USN, Signal Officer, while in an exposed position under intense enemy fire and without any thought for his personal safety handled all the tactical signals, remained at the side of the Commanding Officer and kept him fully informed of the complete tactical situation and the where abouts of the enemy. (e) The entire crew of officers and men are deserving of the highest praise for the manner in which they performed their duties. They have all proven that they are veterans in every sense of the word. There was no apparent fear or concern for one's personal safety. Every officer and man was intent on utterly destroying the enemy. 3. The statement of the Executive Officer required by Article 712 (1), Navy Regulations is enclosed as Enclosure (A). 4. A copy of this report to the Secretary of the Navy will be forwarded under separate cover as required by Article 712 (1), Navy Regulations. 5. As required by Article 874 (6), Navy Regulations, it is stated in amplification of the above detailed report that Action "A" took place on Wednesday, 11 November, 1942 between 0905 and 0946 Action "B" took place on Wednesday, 11 November, 1942 between 1106 and 1130 Action "C" took place on Thursday, 12 November, 1942 between 1323 and 1418. All times and dates are local. Zone Description is -11 (LOVE). The ship was being maneuvered in actions "A" and "B" by Commander Task Group 62.4 in ATLANTA (Rear Admiral Scott) and in Action "C" by Commander Task Force 67 in MC CAWLEY (Rear Admiral Turner). The wind was from the Southeast in all actions about force two and the sea was calm. The ships were maneuvered by simultaneous turns from a Northerly base course. The average speed was about 14 knots. No sketch is included showing maneuvers or land. 6. As required by Article 874 (6), Navy Regulations, it is stated that the ship, her armament, munitions, officers and men performed efficiently. 7. In conclusion, the Commanding Officer desires to state that it was a pleasure to go into battle and fight with this ship, officers and men. They acquitted themselves with honor and distinction. Harry D. Power. Copy to: Secnav Cominch BuOrd BuShips
U.S.S. BETELGEUSE AK28/Al6-3 (11:FL) November 14, 1942. From: Executive Officer. To : Commanding Officer. Subject: Action off Guadalcanal November 11, 1942; Report of. Reference: (a) Article 948, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920. 1. In compliance with the requirements of reference (a) the following report is submitted. (1) At 0905 November 11, 1942, while at anchor (anchor under forefoot with five fathom of chain over depth of water out) two miles to the eastward of Lunga Point Guadalcanal, unloading various types of Marine equipment and provisions, a fleet signal was received, reporting that nine Japanese bombers and twelve fighters were approaching. At 0915 anti-submarine patrol reported sighting a submarine (unidentified) off Lunga Point. A fleet signal was then received directing all vessels to get underway immediately. Ship's side was cleared of all boats, anchor hove in, annunciators tested, main engine turned over steering engine tested and ship reported to be in all respects ready to get underway. At 0920 the ship was underway, Captain conning. (2) This vessel immediately took station astern of the ZEILIN, the formation being ATLANTA, ZEILIN BETELGEUSE and LIBRA. At 0920 sounded General Quarters. Our Force formed column very rapidly and headed for open water, steering evasive courses (45°-60° and 90°) left and right, using Gensigs. (3) At 0940 Jap bombers (Aichi 99) were observed wheeling into position to attack, they immediately commenced dive bombing our force which in the mean time had opened fire, with all guns that could be brought to bear on the enemy. The air was filled with shrapnel bursts. The following bomb splashes were observed; first bomb, near miss, along port side of our #4 hatch about ten yards from ship's side; second bomb landed near the ZEILINS starboard quarter; third bomb landed about ten yards forward of our starboard bow; fourth bomb landed along the port side of the LIBRA'S #2 hatch the plane that dropped this bomb seemed to be about one hundred feet above the LIBRA'S main top mast when he opened his bomb release; fifth bomb landed astern of our ship. Every ship appeared to be firing all their guns, and bombers seemed to be disorganized, some high and some low, flying in all directions, some bombs were released at altitudes from 200 feet to 2000 feet. Although there were geysers of water all over the battle area I failed to observe any direct hits. (4) Our ten twenty millimeter guns and four three inch twenty-three cal: guns, poured a steady stream of fire into all bombers that came within range and we definitely knocked down two of the Aichi 99's. (5) At one time I counted four burning planes toward Tulagi, two toward Savo Island and one toward Guadalcanal. (6) When the first bomb landed it knocked our rudder angle indicator out of order, also temporarily placing our steering gear out of control. The above failures happened at a time when the ZEILIN (slightly aft of our port beam) was having steering difficulty, she came charging towards us, her bow lined with our amidships section, I immediately jumped over and gave the annunciators the double throw full ahead, the engine room force immediately responded, by this time the steering gear was functioning satisfactorily. During the firing it was learned that the helmsman on the lower bridge had difficulty hearing the orders from the upper control bridge. This will be corrected by shifting the helmsman to the upper bridge. Additional damage sustained during the attack: (a) Fuel control lever bent. (b) Revolution counter out of order: (Repaired immediately). (c) Alarm circuit generator on fire. (Due to a ground). (d) Various switch boa covers jarred. off bulkhead. (No electrical damage): (e) Several fuses burnt out in emergency switchboard. (f) On waste heat boiler, bottom blow line sprung a leak at joint next to skin valve. Valve was shut off. Boiler was not in use. (g) Control relay for A.C. converters burnt out (Can be repaired). Personnel casualty report; (a) BARRIGER, Melvin H., 311 64 08, EM2c, USN (Ship s company) punctured nose, returned to duty. (b) JONES, Jesse H., 660 11 46, RM3c, V-6 USNR (Ship's company) punctured nose returned to duty. (c) WOODWORTH, Vern L., 662 14 49, F.1c V-6 USNR (Ship's company) puncture wound left side, returned to duty. (d) FIORVANT, J.F., Pvt. USMC puncture wound, left shoulder, returned to duty. (e) BURTON, S.C., Pvt. USMC, burn, 1st degree, neck, returned to duty. (f) SLATTERY, T.D. Pvt., USMC, lacerated left arm and wrist, serious, retained on sick list. All the above wounds were caused by shrapnel. (7) Ships control was handled from the Flying Bridge by relaying steering and engineroom orders through a voice tube to the Navigating Bridge, where the helmsman and the annuniciator man were stationed. The officer personnel on the Flying Bridge consisted of the Captain (conning), the Executive Officer (asst. conn.), the Gunnery Officer (fire-control), the Navigator (asst. ship. control), the Communication Officer (communications) and Boatswain SMUTNY (signal officer). The Captain had complete control of all activities on the Flying Bridge during the entire action carefully checking turn and speed signals orders and fire-control and was fully aware of every move that was made. At no time did he show the slightest indication of nervousness. The Gunnery Officer, Lieut. Comdr., E. J. YOUNJOHNS, controlled the fire of the battery, issuing his orders coolly, distinctly and firmly. The Navigator, Lieut. E. A. RATTRAY, constantly on the alert, checking the various ship control orders as they were received. The Communication Officer relayed all communications as soon as received and set a fine example of calmness during the engagement. The Signal Officer, Boatswain L. SMUTNY was indispensable, he promptly and correctly interpreted and relayed all signals in a clear and understandable manner. On the lower bridge, BARRON, G.R., CQM(PA), 0-1 USNR and MARCOUX, J.N.P., QM1c, USN were at the wheel and all orders given them were immediately executed. The action of all the officers and men coming under my observation during the engagement was of the very highest order. After the near miss on our port side during a lull in the battle I telephoned the Chief Engineer, Lieut. Comdr. R. F. PEDERSEN, USNR, and inquired as to whether or not we had sustained any damage below, his reply "no damage, give them the works up there." There was a general feeling of elation throughout the entire engagement, whenever a plane came down in flames you could hear a burst of cheers. HAROLD BYE, Commander, USN.
AK28/A16-3 U.S.S. BETELGEUSE (11 :FL) November 11, 1942. From: Executive Officer: To : Commanding Officer. Subject: Second action off Guadalcanal, November 11, 1942; Report of. Reference: (a) Article 948, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920. 1. In compliance with the requirements of reference (a) the following report is submitted. (1) At 1020 anchored at short stay and commenced unloading Marine equipage, two miles to the eastward of Lunga Point, Guadalcanal. At 1100 received warning of unidentified planes in the area. All ships received signal to get underway, hove up the anchor and headed for open water, taking station astern of the ATLANTA, later on dropping aft to permit the ZEILIN to take station between he ATLANTA and BETELGEUSE, submarines (enemy) reported as being sighted in this area. At 1103 a destroyer let go a string of depth charges approximately one mile to the eastward of our position. (2) At 1107 sounded General Quarters. Steaming on various diversion courses. At 1125 enemy bombers sighted overhead I counted twenty nine Mitsu Bishi's 97 (heavy bombers). At 1126 commenced firing, ceased firing at 1130 as the bombers were too high for our twenty millimeter guns to inflict any damage, observed heavy bomb bursts in unloading area. At 1131 enemy planes being engaged by our planes. Observed several enemy bombers falling, burning fiercely two of which appeared to getting away when suddenly both panes burst into flames and crashed into the sea. At 1140 returned to unloading zone and anchored at short stay. At 1147 set unloading plan and commenced unloading. No damage or personnel casualties were received on this run. (3) The officer personnel on the Flying Bridge consisted of the Captain (conning), the Executive Officer (asst. corn.), the Gunnery Officer (fire-control), the Navigator (asst. ship control), the Communication Officer (communications), and Boatswain SMUTNY (signal officer). The Captain had complete control of all activities on the Flying Bridge during the action, constantly and carefully checking turn and speed signals, orders and fire-control, and was cognizant at all times of every move that was made. The Gunnery Officer Lieut. Comdr. E. J. YOUNGJOHNS controlled the fire of the battery, issuing his orders in a clear, understandable and decisive manner. The Navigator, Lieut. E. A. RATTRAY, constantly on the alert, checking the various ship control orders as they were received. The Communication Officer relayed all communications as soon as received. The Signal Officer, Boatswain L. SMUTNY was as usual a very valuable aid in relaying all visual signals, clear and promptly. The entire signal force functioned at all times, speedily and smoothly and are deserving of great deal of credit. On the lower bridge, BARRON, G.R., CQM(PA), 0-1 USNR and MARCOUX, J.N.P. QMIc, USN worked reliefs on wheel and executed all orders promptly as did all the ship control personnel. The ship's company has now been under close fire on several occasions and not one of them show the slightest indication of panic or fear, their one ambition is to pour the fire into the enemy.
AK28/A16-3 U.S.S. BETELGEUSE (11:FL) November 15, 1942. From: Executive Officer. To : Commanding Officer. Subject: Action off Guadalcanal, November 12, 1942, Report of. Reference: (a) Article 948, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920. 1. In compliance with the requirements of reference (a) the following report is submitted. (1) at 1327 while anchored two miles to the eastward of Lunga Point, Guadalcanal, unloading Marine equipment, a general signal went up ordering all ships present to get underway. At 1328 underway, sounded General Quarters, all ship's forming columns and heading for open water. Disposition of ships as follows: First Column; BUCHANAN, SHAW, ATLANTA, O'BANNON, CUSHING, BARTON and HELENA. Second Column; SAN FRANCISCO, MC CAWLEY (SOPA), CRESENT CITY and BETELGEUSE. Third Column; JUNEAU, JACKSON, ADAMS and LIBRA. Fourth Column; AARON WARD, PORTLAND, MC CALLA, STERRITT, HOVEY, FLETCHER, SOUTHARD and MONSSEN. (2) Steaming on various diversion courses (30° - 45° - 60° - 90°)left and right. At 1335 signals commenced coming through reporting that eight enemy fighters and 23 enemy torpedo bombers were approaching. At 1408 sighted the torpedo bombers coming in from the north eastward, they were flying very low, approximately sixty feet above the surface of the water. They appeared to be loafing along and making their approach very deliberately. At 1412 our force opened fire, from this time on the bombers commenced closing more rapidly, the bombers were the Mitsu Bishi 97 heavy twin engine type. By this time the air appeared to be full of bombers which were traveling up and down the columns some of them hedge-hopping over the ships, flying about fifty feet above the water. As we soon discovered the air was also full of missiles, first FERNAS, WM. M., SM2c 0-1 USNR, in the starboard wing of the bridge tipped over with gun shot wounds in the chest and shoulder, next I saw LUSA, P.J., GM1c USN on the other side of me crumple and fall with a deep wound in the left shoulder, shortly after this DOMBROW, R. P., A.S. V-6 USNR (who was servicing a gun near LUSA) was wounded in the side and although bleeding profusely he continued on his battle station until cease firing sounded. At the time LUSA was wounded there were two bombers coming up from dead astern, we could see them release their torpedoes then they continued coming toward us, when very near the stern they separated slightly and one plane came up each side flying a little below the level of the flying bridge, our twenty millimeter gunners were pouring solid streams of gun fire into these bombers, as the bomber on the starboard side passed the bridge it was seen that a fire was starting, when he came abrest of Number 1 hold, he dove into the water bursting into flames at the same time, the flames shot up into the air considerably higher than the bridge, which is sixty feet high. In order to keep the ship from running into the burning plane, the rudder was put over hard left, then as soon as the ships pivot point was abrest the flaming plane the rudder was shifted to hard right. In the meantime the bomber coming up on the port side was receiving heavy fire from several of our twenty millimeters (this fire, he was returning with everything he had) he was seen to catch on fire when he was near Number 1 hold, this fire was on his right wing close to the fuselage, the fire spread rapidly he sheered slightly to port and crashed in a mass of flames. During this period we shot down a third bomber, this one being on the port side. It was gratifying to note that since our twenty millimeter guns were moved outboard and the splinter shield partially cut down permitting a lower depressing of the guns than previously, there was no difficulty in getting on the low flying planes and pouring the fire into them. At 1417 ceased firing. (3) At one time I counted ten burning planes in various parts of the operating area. It is understood that only one plane out of 31 escaped. (4) Considerable damage to material and personnel was sustained as listed below: Franklin Life Buoy on port side of bridge wrecked with an explosive bullet. Bullet holes and dents in inumerable places on the ship, one small projectile passing through the hull of the ship and into the paint locker aft. Topmast stay leading to the port king post head hit and wire stranded. Topping lift, after starboard boom on Number 2 hold stranded. Topping lift on the forward port boom Number 3 hold nicked and the port guy pendant shot through. The double luff purchase on the port boom Number 5 hold was shot away. The topping lift and both wire guy pendants on the starboard boom number 5 hold badly stranded. All damaged rigging was immediately repaired. LUSA, Peter J., 207 23 90, GM1c USN gunshot wound, left shoulder. Serious. FERNAS, William M., 404 92 43, SM2c 0-1 USNR gunshot wound, chest and left shoulder. Not serious. FRANK, Herbert A., 404 92 99, Cox. 0-1 USNR gunshot wound in the back. Not serious. ROGOWSKI, Leon (n), 405 04 73, Bkr.3c 0-1 USNR gunshot wound in left arm. Not serious. DOMBROW, Robert P., 300 64 06, A.S. USN gunshot wound in back and side. Not serious. ROSS, Walter 0., 296 11 68, Sea.2c USN bruise, left arm caused by recoil of 3"/23 gun. Not serious. MERL0, Vito T. 399371, Pfc. USMCR gunshot wound in right leg. Not serious. WHARTON, John J., 386167, Pvt. USMCR gunshot wound in left arm. Not serious. BROWN, Victor R. Jr., 377481, Pvt. USMCR gunshot wound in left leg. Not serious. HICE, George A., 382220, Pvt. USMCR gunshot wounds in neck and back. Not serious. SNELGROVE, Robert E., 34883?, Pfc. USMCR gunshot wound in right chest. Not serious. ANDERSON, Constant R., 351462, Pvt. USMC gunshot wounds in neck and chest. Not serious. CASE, Charles R., 394110, Pvt. USMCR gunshot wound in jaw. Not serious. (5) During the engagement ship control including steering was handled from the Flying Bridge. The officer personnel on the Flying Bridge consisted of the Captain (conning), the Executive Officer (asst conn.), the Gunnery Officer (fire control), the Navigator (asst ship control), the Communication Officer (communications) and Boatswain SMUTNY as (signal officer). The Captain as usual seemed to have the uncanny faculty of seeing everything and rendering a quick and correct decision in all instances where immediate action was necessary. His cool, calm and confident manner during the entire engagement contributed no end to steadying influence on all hands. His station was on the Flying Bridge in an exposed position with men falling on both sides of him, he personally directed the proper care to be taken of LUSA, Peter J., GM1c who was bleeding excessively. The Gunnery Officer Lieut. Comdr. E. J. YOUNGJOHNS had complete fire control at all times, with a minimum amount of confusion, the Gunnery Department functioned efficiently and smoothly during the entire engagement. When casualties occured to the personnel the next man moved up. Great credit is due the Gunnery Officer. The Navigator, E. A. RATTRAY's pleasing personality and accurate estimate of the ship control situation at all times proved invaluable during the emergency. The Communication Officer G. J. HARDING relayed all messages promptly and clearly. The Signal Officer Boatswain L. SMUTNY, was continuously on the alert, reading and interpreting the flag hoists as soon as run up by the Flag ship, coaching the signal force, there-by speeding up the execution of all signal hoists. The leadership displayed by the Signal Officer was a great influence on the performance of the entire signal force. The CQM G. R. BARRON, and J.N.P. MARCOUX, QM1c were used on the wheel, they never failed to carry out their instructions speedily and accurately. The ship's company have now participated in several major engagements against the best the enemy can produce, their morale is of the very highest order and their ambition is to wipe out the enemy completely as quickly as possible. HARLOD BYE, Commander, USN.
File No. A16-3
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

05/ejc

FE25/0260

SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE
Serial
Office of the Commander
CONFIDENTIAL U.S.S. ARGONNE, Flagship, December 27, 1942 From: Commander Task Force SIXTY-TWO (and SIXTY-SEVEN). To: The Commander in Chief, U.S.S. PACIFIC FLEET. Via: Commander South Pacific Force. Subject: Report of Actions off Guadalcanal Island, Solomon Islands on 11 and 12 November, 1942. A - Dive Bombing Attack about 0940, 11 NOV. 1942. B - High Level Bombing Attack about 1125, 11 Nov.1942. C - Aerial Torpedo Attack about 1410, 12 Nov. 1942, 1. Forwarded. R.K. TURNER
COMSOPAC FILE
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE
A16-3/(90)
OF THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
Serial 0059
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER
S-E-C-R-E-T SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO BETELGEUSE Conf.Ltr. AK28/AI6-3 (10:ST) of November 15, 1942. From: The Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force. To : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Subject: Report of Actions off Guadalcanal Island, Solomon Islands on 11 and 12 November, 1942. A - Dive Bombing Attack about 0940, 11 Nov.1942. B - High Level Bombing Attack about 1125, 11 Nov.1942. C - Aerial Torpedo Attack about 1410, 12 Nov.1942. 1. Forwarded. 2. This is an excellent report of a splendid performance. A high state of training, organization and morale is indicated. 3. Specific comments are as follows: (a) It is recommended that all 3" guns on this type of vessel be replaced as soon as practicable by 40mm quadruple mounts with Mk.51 directors. (b) It is recommended that splinter shields be installed around the flying bridge. (c) The 20mm high explosive incendiary projectile is now in production. (d) BuOrd Circular Letter G13-42 modifies 20mm, magazine allowances. The allowance for an AK is now 12 magazines per gun. (e) The ship tactics employed by BETELGEUSE and maneuvers ordered by CTF 62 are believed to have been thoroughly proved by practice. (f) It is believed that unloading conditions have been improved materially since this report was originated. (g) All ships South Pacific area have been directed to modify gun splinter shields to permit firing on small craft at a range of 300 yards when the firing vessel is on an even keel. 4. Classification of this correspondence has been changed from "Confidential" to "Secret", and by copy of this endorsement the originator is directed to change his copy accordingly. W.F. HALSEY Copy to: CTF 62 CO USS BETELGEUSE

Back to the top



History of the USS BETELGEUSE AK-28




Links to other web-sites with information on the
U.S.S. BETELGEUSE


NavSource Online  Has photos of AK-28
Naval Historical Center  Has info. and photos of the U.S.S. BETELGEUSE


Home


Mail any comments or questions to Scott Davis All right reserved Copyright 1997 - 2010