DD-483 U.S.S. AARON WARD
| Destroyer Class: |
Bristol |
| Commissioned |
03/04/1942 |
| Length Overall |
348' 4" |
| Extreme Beam: |
36' 1" |
| Mean Draft: |
13' 6" |
| Standard Displacement tons: |
1,840 |
| Normal tons: |
2,060 |
| Designed Complement: |
Off.: 20; Enl.: 309 |
| Armament: |
Primary: (4) 5"/38 caliber DP |
| Armament: |
Secondary: 5 40mm twin
4 20mm; 4 1.1" |
| Torpedo Tubes: |
2x5 21" |
| Designed Speed: |
35.2 knots |
| Designed Shaft Horse Power: |
50,000 |
| Screws: |
2 |
| Engine Manufacturer: |
Four Babcock & Wilcox boilers |
| Type: |
geared turbines. |
| Fuel (oil) tons |
450 - 500 |
WAR DIARY of the U.S.S. AARON WARD Nov.1 to 30,
1942
Action Report
on the Night of Nov. 12-13, 1942" of USS AARON WARD
War Diary
U.S.S. AARON WARD DD-483
NOVEMBER 1, 1942.
(a) Task Group 64.2. Task Force 64.
(b) CTF 65 dispatch 291300, of Oct. 1942, and annexes A, B, and C to
that dispatch.
(c)
(d) Positions:
0800 - Anchored in Segond Channel.
1200 - Anchored in Segond Channel.
2000 - Lat. 14°29'00" S., Long. 166°53'00" E.
(e) At 0522 finished obtaining ammunition replacements, cleared port side
off S.S. Hinton Helper, and proceeded to anchorage in Segond Channel.
Anchored at 0536. At 1500 got underway with other ships of Task Group
64.2 and proceeded to sea.
NOVEMBER 2, 1942.
(a) Task Group 65.3. Task Force 65.
(b) CTF 65 dispatch 291300 of Oct., 1942, and annexes A, B, and C to that
dispatch.
(c) Comgem Cactus dispatch 020621 of October 1942 reported large enemy
force approaching Cactus. Comsopac dispatch 020759 of October ordered
all transports to retire toward Button at best speed. Comsopac
dispatches 021220 and 020825 directed task force 65, less the
transports and screening destroyers, to join forces at the earliest
possible time and proceed to destroy enemy force reported in the
vicinity of Cactus.
(d) Positions:
0800 - Lat. 11°41'00" S., Long. 164°11'00" E.
1200 - Lat. 10°37'00" S., Long. 162°58'00" E.
2000 - Lat. 09°15'00" S., Long. 160°27'00" E.
Course - Speed -
(e) Proceeding to Guadalcanal to intercept enemy force. Operated in
vicinity of Guadalcanal during the night and no contact with the enemy
was made. At 2000 U.S.S. FULLER and CONYNGHAM in collision close to our
formation.
NOVEMBER 3, 1942.
(a) Task Group 65.3. Task Force 65.
(b) CTF 65 despatch 291300 of Oct., 1942, and annexes A, B, and C to
that despatch.
(c)
(d) Positions:
0800 - Lat. 10°52'00" S., Long. 161°25'00" E.
1200 - Lat. 11°15'00" E., Long. 162°26'00" E.
2000 - Lat. 09°57'00" E., Long. 161°53'00" E.
Course and speed made good since previous noon:
Course 219° Speed 2.4 knots.
(e) All general quarters stations manned as ship still in Cactus area.
Task Force steaming in company retiring toward Espiritu Santo until
0500 when course was reversed and the force proceeded back toward
Guadalcanal in accordance with Comsopac despatch 021232 of Nov., 1942.
NOVEMBER 4, 1942.
(a) Task Group 65.3. Task Force 65.
(b) CTF 65 despatch 291300, of Oct., 1942, and annexes A, B, and C to that
despatch.
(c)
(d) Positions:
0800 - Lat. 09°21'00" S., Long. 160°05'00" E.
1200 - Lat. 09°30'00" S., Long. 160°05'00" E.
2000 - Lat. 09°18'00" S., Long. 160°34'00" E.
Course and speed made good since previous noon:
Course 307° Speed 7.5 knots.
(e) All general quarters stations manned proceeding in to immediate
vicinity of Cactus. At 0500 arrived off Beach Purple and transports
commenced unloading troops and supplies, this ship operating as one of
screening units for transports throughout day. At 1055 all task force
got underway due to air raid alarm. No planes come over and transports
anchored again at 1300 and continued unloading. At 1800 all ships
cleared Cactus area and retired for night through Sealark Channel.
N0VEMBER 5, 1942.
(a) Task Group 65.3. Task Force 65.
(b) CTF 65 despatch 291300, of Oct., 1942, and annexes A, B, and C to that
despatch.
(c)
(d) Positions:
0800 - Lat. 09°23'00" S., Long. 160°03'00" E.
1200 - Lat. 09°14'00" S., Long. 160°13'00" E.
2000 - Lat. 10°05'05" S., Long. 161°57'00" E.
Course and speed made good noon to noon:
Course various Speed -
(e) All general quarters stations manned, proceeding into immediate
vicinity of Cactus. At 0530 entered Sealark Channel. At 0700 transports
arrived off Beach Purple and commenced unloading. At 1000 received word
from Radio Guadalcanal of approach of enemy bombers. Transports got
underway and joined screening ships in formation. Ships maneuvered on
signal from CTF 65. At 1140 enemy planes came over bombing Henderson
Field, Guadalcanal, but did no damage to ships. At 1210 received all
clear signal from Radio Guadalcanal. Task Force proceeded to eastward
out of Cactus area enroute Button.
NOVEMBER 6, 1942.
(a) Task Group 65.8. (ATLANTA, HUNTER, LIGGETT, PRESIDENT HAYES, BARNETT,
AARON WARD, FLETCHER, LARDNER, and McCALLA). Task Force 65.
(b) CTF 65 despatch 291300 of Oct., 1942, and annexes A, B, and C to that
despatch.
(c)
(d) Positions:
0800 - Lat. 11°50'00" S., Long. 164°07'00" E.
1200 - Lat. 12°24'00" S., Long. 164°45'00" E.
2000 - Lat. 13°36'00" S., Long. 165°56'00" E.
Course and speed made good noon to noon:
Course 122° Speed 15.4 knots.
(e) Exercised at general quarters from one hour before sunrise until
sunrise, simulating gun, engineering, and damage control casualty
drill while at general quarters stations. Maintained station in screen
with other ships of Task Group 65.8 throughout day and night.
NOVEMBER 7, 1942.
(a) Task Group 65.8. Task Force 65.
(b) CTF 65 despatch 291300 of Oct., 1942, and annexes A, B, and C to that
despatch.
(c)
(d) Positions:
(e) Exercised at general quarters stations from one hour prior sunrise
until sunrise, simulating gun, engineering, and damage control drill
while at general quarters. At 0900 arrived Button and proceeded
alongside tanker. At 0907 moored alongside Lackawanna and commenced
fueling. Completed fueling and got underway at 1135 and proceeded to
anchorage. At 1159 anchored in Berth D2. Provisioned ship from
Aldebaran. Comsopac 061212 of November, 1942, assigned ATLANTA, AARON
WARD, LARDNER, McCALLA, and FLETCHER to operational control of CTF 62,
these ships to comprise Task Group 62.4.
NOVEMBER 8, 1942
(a) Task Group 62.4 (ATLANTA, AARON WARD, McCALLA, FLETCHER, LARDNER,
LIBRA, BETELGEUSE, and ZEILIN).
(b) CTF 62 despatch 070430 of Nov., 1942; CTF 67 Operation Plan A23-42 and
CTF 67 despatch 100400 of Nov., 1942.
(c)
(d) Positions: Anchored in Segond Channel, Espiritu Santo, throughout the
day.
(e) At anchor all day. Continued to provision ship and replenished general
stores supplies.
NOVEMBER 9, 1942.
(a) Task Group 62.4. Task Force 67.
(b) CTF 62 despatch 070430 of Nov., 1942; CTF 67 Operation Plan A23-42, and
CTF 67 despatch 100400 of Nov., 1942.
(c)
(d) Positions:
1200 - Lat. 15°17'00" S., Long. 167°20'00" E.
2000 - Lat. 13°51'00" S., Long. 166°03'00" E.
Course - Speed -
(e) Underway at 0910 with other ships of Task Group
62.4 and proceeded out of harbor. Screened ATLANTA
and cargo ships throughout day and night, screening
on 4,000 yard circle during day and moving out to
5,000 yards at night.
N0VEMBER 10, 1942.
(a) Task Group 62.4. Task Force 67.
(b) CTF 62 despatch 070430 of Nov., 1942; CTF 67 Operation Plan A23-42, and
CTF 67 despatch 100400 of Nov., 1942.
(c)
(d) Positions:
0800 Lat. 11°39'00" S., Long. 163°39'00" E.
1200 Lat. 11°03'00" S., Long. 163°16'00" E.
2000 Lat. 09°57'00" S., Long. 161°47'00" E.
Course and speed made good since previous noon:
Course 315° Speed 14.8 knots.
(e) Exercised crew at general quarters stations from one hour prior sunrise
until sunrise, simulating gun, engineering, and damage control casualty
drills while at general quarters stations. Screening ATLANTA and cargo
ships enroute Cactus. At 1145 sighted an unidentified aircraft,
apparently enemy, shadowing this task group. At 1815 manned all general
quarters stations and maintained this status throughout the night.
NOVEMBER 11, 1942.
(a) Task Group 62.4. Task Force 67.
(b) CTF 62 despatch 070430 of Nov., l942; CTF 67 Operation Plan A23-42, and
CTF 67 despatch 100400 of Nov., 1942.
(c)
(d) Positions:
0800 Lat. 09°24'00" S., Long. 160°03'00" E.
1200 Lat. 09°25'00" S., Long. 160°04'00" E.
2000 Lat. 09°18'00" S., Long. 160°28'00" E.
Course and speed made good since noon preceding day:
Course 298° Speed 10 knots.
(e) Units of task group proceeding in company into Cactus area, all general
quarters stations manned. Units of Task Group 62.4 proceeding in
company. At 0340 entered Sealark Channel, proceeding to Lunga Point to
unload transports, FLETCHER proceeding ahead to make radar search of
area. At 0540 transports commenced unloading and disembarkation of
troops. Destroyers formed screen on 5,000 yard circle, patrolling
sectors. At 0930 enemy planes in sight. At 0938 enemy planes made 45°
glide bombing attack on transports. Approximately two close misses made
on ZEILIN. At 1125 sighted large flight of enemy planes (27). At 1128
commenced firing on planes. Enemy delivered high level (25,000 feet)
horizontal bombing attack on Henderson Field. At 1155 Transports stood
in towards beach and continued unloading. At 1230 McCALLA left screen
and proceeded to investigate submarine contact 12 miles East of Lunga
Point. At 1535 McCALLA returned, having picked four (4) enemy aviators
up out of the water. At 1540 McCALLA transferred prisoners to ZEILIN.
At 1605 ZEILIN having completed unloading, departed for Espiritu
Santo, escorted by LARDNER in accordance CTG 62.4 110330 of November,
1942. At 1800 ATLANTA, FLETCHER, McCALLA, Libra and Betelgeuse got
underway and retired through Sealark Channel in accordance CTF 67
100400 of Nov. 1942. At 2045 ATLANTA, FLETCHER, AARON WARD, and
McCALLA departed to Join Task Group 67.4 in accordance CTF 67 100400 of
November, 1942. Proceeding to cover Task Group 67.4 from enemy approach
from Eastward of Florida Island. At 2048 ATLANTA, AARON WARD, FLETCHER,
and McCALLA changed course to the right, Betelgeuse and Libra
proceeding independently in accordance instructions issued in CTF 67
100400 of November, 1942. At 2200 Joined units of TG 67.4
units in column in following order: BUCHANAN, LAFFEY, STERRETT,
CUSHING, SAN FRANCISCO, PORTLAND, HELENA, JUNEAU ATLANTA, AARON WARD,
McCALLA, FLETCHER, this task group proceeding through Sealark Channel
and patrolling area bounded by Guadalcanal, Savo, and Florida Islands
until daybreak.
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS
LOCATION OF SHIP: LUNGA ROADS (Guadalcanal Area) USS AARON WARD
DATE November 11, 1942
NOTES:
(a) REPEL ATTACK FIRST - Then collect data for this report.
(b) Do not "Gun Deck" this report - if data cannot be estimated with
reasonable accuracy enter dash in space for which no data is available.
(c) These sheets are to be filled out immediately after action is completed
with available data from ship's log, memory, and consultation with
ship's officers. Information is essential in order that the
effectiveness of our equipment can be determined. Where data is of
doubtful accuracy fill in with general terms. The obtaining or this
information must not be allowed in any way to adversely affect the
handling of equipment during action.
1. SURPRISE ATTACK (Yes or No): No
2. METHOD PICKING PLANE UP (Radar, binoculars, naked eye): Binoculars.
(if by radar state type of set) - - -
3. RANGE PLANE WAS PICKED UP (50 miles, 30 miles, 10 miles, less 5 miles):
10 MILES
4. Number of planes: 9
5. Type of plane (fighter, Scout, dive-bomber): Dive Bombers.
Type of attack: Dive Bombing
6. Speed & Altitude (High and fast, intermediate and fast, low and fast,
high and slow, intermediate and slow, low and slow): Low and Fast
7. Guns Firing: All Size: 5", 1.1", 20mm Number: 4-5", 4-1.1", 5-20mm
Method of control: - - - Method spotting: - - -
8. Ammunition expended: 20 rounds - 5"
9. Percent service allowance expended: 1%
10. Approximate time tracking to first shot: - - -
11. Approximate time of first hits: - - -
12. Approximate time first shot to last shot: - - -
13. Approximate position angle open fire: 40°
14. Approximate position cease fire: 5°
15. Approximate bearing first shot: 135°
16. Approximate bearing last shot: 90°
17. Approximate range first shot: 2,000 yards
18. Approximate range last shot: 2,000 yards
19. Approximate altitude of bomb release: 200 feet
Type of bomb: 500 pound
20. Approximate Range Torpedo Release: - - - Size: - - -
21. Hits on ship: None Was ship strafed: No
22. Number near bomb misses: None Casualties from near misses: - -
23. Planes shot down: (Sure) 1 (Possible) - - (Damaged) 2
24. Details of damage to target by gunfire if available: 20mm shells
observed going through wings.
25. Performance of ammunition (excellent, good, bad, poor): Excellent
26. Pattern sizes (large, small excessive): Large
SKETCH
(a) Indicate direction of attack relative to ship's bearing.
(b) Show relative position of sun.
(c.) Indicate own maneuvers..
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS
LOCATION OF SHIP: LUNGA ROADS (Guadalcanal Area) USS AARON WARD
DATE November 11, 1942
NOTES:
(a) REPEL ATTACK FIRST - Then collect data for this report.
(b) Do not "Gun Deck" this report - if data cannot be estimated with
reasonable accuracy enter dash in space for which no data is available.
(c) These sheets are to be filled out immediately after action is completed
with available data from ship's log, memory, and consultation with
ship's officers. Information is essential in order that the
effectiveness of our equipment can be determined. Where data is of
doubtful accuracy fill in with general terms. The obtaining or this
information must not be allowed in any way to adversely affect the
handling of equipment during action.
1. SURPRISE ATTACK (Yes or No): No
2. METHOD PICKING PLANE UP (Radar, binoculars, naked eye): Binoculars.
(if by radar state type of set) - - -
3. RANGE PLANE WAS PICKED UP (50 miles, 30 miles, 10 miles, less 5 miles):
15 MILES
4. Number of planes: 27
5. Type of plane (fighter, Scout, dive-bomber): Bomber.
Type of attack: High level Bombing
6. Speed & Altitude (High and fast, intermediate and fast, low and fast,
high and slow, intermediate and slow, low and slow): High and Fast
7. Guns Firing: Main Batt. Size: 5"/38 Number: 4
Method of control: Director Method spotting: Direct
8. Ammunition expended: 80 rounds
9. Percent service allowance expended: 5%
10. Approximate time tracking to first shot: 5 minutes
11. Approximate time of first hits: - - -
12. Approximate time first shot to last shot: - - -
13. Approximate position angle open fire: 40°
14. Approximate position cease fire: 5°
15. Approximate bearing first shot: 135°
16. Approximate bearing last shot: 90°
17. Approximate range first shot: 2,000 yards
18. Approximate range last shot: 2,000 yards
19. Approximate altitude of bomb release: 25,000 feet
Type of bomb: 500 to 1000 pound
20. Approximate Range Torpedo Release: - - - Size: - - -
21. Hits on ship: None Was ship strafed: No
22. Number near bomb misses: None Casualties from near misses: - -
23. Planes shot down: (Sure) - - (Possible) - - (Damaged) - -
24. Details of damage to target by gunfire if available: Target out of
range, but shots fired to keep them from coming down.
25. Performance of ammunition (excellent, good, bad, poor): Excellent
26. Pattern sizes (large, small excessive): Unable to observe. All were
aimed at shore installations.
SKETCH
(a) Indicate direction of attack relative to ship's bearing.
(b) Show relative position of sun.
(c.) Indicate own maneuvers..
November 12, 1942.
(a) Task Group 67.3 (Screening group - ATLANTA, AARON WARD, FLETCHER,
McCALLA, O'BANNON, and BARTON). Major task force to which
assigned - Task Force 67.
(b) Comtaskfor 67 despatch 100400 of November, 1942.
(c)
(d) Positions:
0800 - Lat. 09°21'00" S., Long. 160°06'00" E.
1200 - Lat. 09°21'00" S., Long. 160°05'00" E.
2000 - Lat. 09°17'00" S., Long. 160°21'00" E.
(e) Proceeding with following ships in column in Indispensable
Straits and area to Southward of the Straits searching for enemy
forces that may approach Guadalcanal area: BUCHANAN, LAFFEY,
STERRETT, CUSHING, SAN FRANCISCO (Admiral Callaghan), PORTLAND,
HELENA, JUNEAU, ATLANTA (Admiral Scott), AARON WARD, McCALLA, and
FLETCHER. At 0515 President Jackson, President Adams, McCawley,
Crescent City stood in towards Lunga Point, screened by MONSSEN,
0'BANNON, SHAW, and BARTON. Betelgeuse and Libra stood in.
FLETCHER and McCALLA detailed to screen. Upon arrival Libra and
Betelgeuse anchored East of Lunga Point; President Adams,
President Jackson, McCawley, and Crescent City anchoring at
Kokum, SAN FRANCISCO, HELENA, and PORTLAND formed on 3,000 yard
circle; ATLANTA, JUNEAU, STERRETT, MONSSEN, FLETCHER, O'BANNON,
LAFFEY, SHAW, CUSHING, AARON WARD, BUCHANAN, McCALLA, and BARTON
forming A/S screen on circle eight. During the forenoon HELENA,
SHAW, and BARTON left stations in screen to bombard enemy shore
battery at Kokumbona. At 1000 one transport, 6 Avengers, and 3
Wildcats stood in towards Henderson Field. At 1318 received air
raid alarm. Transports got underway, and combatant ships formed
screen for repelling of aircraft attack. At 1407 enemy planes
sighted over Eastern tip of Florida Island. At 1413 opened fire
on enemy torpedo planes. Attack delivered, but only damage
sustained by own forces was due to plane crashing into secondary
conn in SAN FRANCISCO. At 1418 attack completed. Four knocked
down by our fighters and 8 by gun fire from surface ships.
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS
LOCATION OF SHIP: LUNGA ROADS (Guadalcanal Area) USS AARON WARD
DATE November 12, 1942
NOTES:
(a) REPEL ATTACK FIRST - Then collect data for this report.
(b) Do not "Gun Deck" this report - if data cannot be estimated with
reasonable accuracy enter dash in space for which no data is available.
(c) These sheets are to be filled out immediately after action is completed
with available data from ship's log, memory, and consultation with
ship's officers. Information is essential in order that the
effectiveness of our equipment can be determined. Where data is of
doubtful accuracy fill in with general terms. The obtaining or this
information must not be allowed in any way to adversely affect the
handling of equipment during action.
1. SURPRISE ATTACK (Yes or No): No
2. METHOD PICKING PLANE UP (Radar, binoculars, naked eye): Binoculars.
(if by radar state type of set) - - -
3. RANGE PLANE WAS PICKED UP (50 miles, 30 miles, 10 miles, less 5 miles):
15 MILES
4. Number of planes: 21
5. Type of plane (fighter, Scout, dive-bomber): Bombers.
Type of attack: Torpedo
6. Speed & Altitude (High and fast, intermediate and fast, low and fast,
high and slow, intermediate and slow, low and slow): Low and Fast
7. Guns Firing: All Size: 5", 1.1", 20mm Number: 4, 4, 5
Method of control: Director Method spotting: Direct
8. Ammunition expended: 80 rounds 5"
9. Percent service allowance expended: 5%
10. Approximate time tracking to first shot: 2 minutes
11. Approximate time of first hits: - - -
12. Approximate time first shot to last shot: - - -
13. Approximate position angle open fire: 40°
14. Approximate position cease fire: 5°
15. Approximate bearing first shot: 135°
16. Approximate bearing last shot: 90°
17. Approximate range first shot: 2,000 yards
18. Approximate range last shot: 2,000 yards
19. Approximate altitude of bomb release: 50'
Type of bomb: - - -
20. Approximate Range Torpedo Release: 1000 Size: - - -
21. Hits on ship: None Was ship strafed: Yes
22. Number near bomb misses: - - - Casualties from near misses: - -
23. Planes shot down: (Sure) 2 (Possible) - - (Damaged) 2
24. Details of damage to target by gunfire if available: One plane shot
down by 5" battery, one with 20mm gun.
25. Performance of ammunition (excellent, good, bad, poor): Excellent
26. Pattern sizes (large, small excessive): No hits obtained on our
forces.
SKETCH
(a) Indicate direction of attack relative to ship's bearing.
(b) Show relative position of sun.
(c.) Indicate own maneuvers..
NOVEMBER 13, 1942.
(a) Task Group 67.4 - SAN FRANCISCO (Admiral Callaghan), PORTLAND,
ATLANTA (Admiral Scott), HELENA, JUNEAU, GUSHING, LAFFEY,
STERRETT, O'BANNON, AARON WARD, BARTON, MONSSEN, and FLETCHER.
Major task force to which assigned - Task Force 67.
(b) Comtaskfor 67 Operation Plan A23-42; Comtaskfor 67 despatch 100400
of Nov., 1942; Comtaskgroup 67.4. despatch 120615 of November,
1942; and Comsopac despatch 120133 of Nov., 1942.
(c)
(d) Positions:
0800 - Lat. 09°06'00" S., Long. 160°11'00" E.
1200
2000
Course - Speed
(e) Proceeding in company with other ships of Task Group
67.4. through Lunga Channel in search of enemy force reported
approaching area. At 0140 joined in battle with enemy force in
area north of Guadalcanal and to Eastward of Savo Island. Details
of battle are given in action report attached hereto.
At 0630 taken in tow by YP boat from Tulagi and assisted to
anchorage off Macombo Island, Tulagi Harbor. Doctors and hospital
attendants from Tulagi removed seriously wounded to hospital at
Tulagi. At 0830 anchored off Macombo Island. At 1330 deceased
members of crew taken ashore for burial. At 1500 Chaplain
Fitzgerald officiated at burial services for the 14 deceased men
of the ship's crew killed in the action with the enemy. Our men
were buried in Cemetery No. 1, Old Radio Station, (White Beach),
Tulagi, Solomon Islands.
November 14, 1942
(a) No task unit designation. Task Force 67.
(b)
(c)
(d) At anchor.
(e) Underway at 0800 being assisted by YP boat in shifting berths. At
0845 anchored astern of MacFARLAND with port side nearest the
beach. Secured bow and stern to trees on beach using manila
lines. Put out kedge anchors on starboard quarter. Covered over
ship with green branches out from trees along beach to camouflage
ship and conceal it from easy view of enemy planes. Continued
overhaul and repair of boilers and auxiliary machinery, and
welding over holes in hull.
November 15, 1942
(a) No task unit designation. Task Force 67.
(b)
(c)
(d) At anchor.
(e) Anchored throughout repair and overhaul over holes in hull.
day continuing with necessary work on machinery and welding
Continued camouflaging ship.
November 16, 1942
(a) No task unit designation. Task Force 67.
(b)
(c)
(d) At anchor.
(e) Anchored throughout repair and overhaul over holes in hull.
day continuing with necessary work on machinery and welding
Continued camouflaging ship.
November 17, 1942
(a) No task unit designation. Task Force 67.
(b)
(c)
(d) At anchor.
(e) Anchored throughout repair and overhaul over holes in hull.
day continuing with necessary work on machinery and welding
Continued camouflaging ship.
NOVEMBER 18, 1942.
(a) Task Unit 62.5.8, (AARON WARD, HOVEY, and Kopara). Task Force
62.
(b) Comtaskfor 62 despatches 162030 and 152346, both of November,
1942.
(c)
(d) Positions:
2000 Lat. 09°20'08" S., Long. 160°31'03" E.
(e) Continued repairs to machinery and hull. At 1330 survivors from
the WALKE and PRESTON and several ambulatory patients came aboard
for further transfer to Button. Underway at 1540 being assisted
by tug in unmooring. Tug cast off her lines at 1550 and ship
proceeded to anchorage in Tulagi harbor. Anchored at 1600.
Underway at 1650 with HOVIT and Kopara proceeding to Button,
HOVEY and AARON WARD screening Kopara.
NOVEMBER 19, 1942.
(a) Task Unit 62.5.8 (AARON WARD, HOVEY, and Kopara). Task Force 62.
(b) Comtaskfor 62 despatches 162030 and 152346, both of Nov. 1942.
(c )
(d) Positions:
0800 - Lat. 10°53'00" S., Long. 16l°40'00" E.
1200 - Lat. 11°12'00" S., Long. l62°23'00" E.
2000 - Lat. 1l°55'00" S., Long. 163°54'00" E.
Course Speed
(e) Exercised the crew at general quarters stations, gun, engineering
casualties, and damage control drills while at general quarters
stations. HOVEY and AARON WARD screened Kopara throughout day and
night.
NOVEMBER 20, 1942.
(a) Task Unit 62.5.8. Task Force 62.
(b) CTF 62 despatches 162030 and 152346, both of Nov., 1942.
(c)
(d) Positions:
0800 - Lat. 13°01'00" S., Long. 165°25'00" E.
1200 - Lat. 13°27'00" S., Long. 166°09'00" E.
2000 - Lat. 14°27,00" S., Long. 167°03'00" E.
Course and speed since previous noon:
Course 121 Speed 11.3. knots.
(e) Exercised crew at general quarters stations, gun, engineering and
damage control casualty drills from one hour prior sunrise until
sunrise. AARON WARD and HOVEY screened Kopara throughout day and
night proceeding to Button.
NOVEMBER 21, 1942.
(a) Task Unit 62.5.8. Task Force 62.
(b) CTF 62 despatches 162030 and 152346, both of Nov., 1942.
(c)
(d)
(e) Exercised crew at general quarters stations, gun, engineering and
damage control casualty drills from one hour prior sunrise until
sunrise. At 0520 stood into Bruat Channel, proceeding to anchorage at
Button. At 0600 entered Segond Channel and was directed to fuel from
Sabine. Went alongside Sabine at 0635 and commenced fueling ship.
Completed fueling at 0845. Personnel from repair ship came aboard at
1015 and surveyed the battle damage. At 1125 got underway and
proceeded to mooring along Rigel's port side. At 1210 moored starboard
side to alongside Rigel. Tender commenced emergency battle damage
repairs. Survivors were all transferred to the Rigel.
N0VEMBER 22, 1942.
(a) No task unit designation. No task force assignment.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) Alongside tender at Button undergoing emergency battle damage repairs.
N0VEMBER 23, 1942.
(a) No task unit designation. No task force assignment.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) Alongside tender at Button undergoing emergency battle damage repairs.
N0VEMBER 24, 1942.
(a) No task unit designation. No task force assignment.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) Alongside tender at Button undergoing emergency battle damage repairs.
N0VEMBER 25, 1942.
(a) No task unit designation. No task force assignment.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) Alongside tender at Button undergoing emergency battle damage repairs.
N0VEMBER 26, 1942.
(a) No task unit designation. No task force assignment.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) Alongside tender at Button undergoing emergency battle damage repairs.
N0VEMBER 27, 1942.
(a) No task unit designation. No task force assignment.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) Alongside tender at Button undergoing emergency battle damage repairs.
NOVEMBER 28, 1942.
(a) No task unit designation. No task force. assignment.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) Alongside tender at Button. Tender completed emergency battle repairs.
Underway from alongside tender at 1008. Proceeded alongside Sabine.
Moored to her port side at 1029 and commenced fueling. Completed
fueling and cleared tankers side at 1100. Moored to starboard side of
Zane at 1120
NOVEMBER 29, 1942.
(a) No Task Unit designation. No major Task Force assignment.
(b) Comsopac despatch 272332 of Nov., 1942.
(c) Departed with Task Unit 62.4.2, consisting of Betelgeuse and MUSTIN
enroute White Poppy.
(d) Positions:
0800 - Lat. 15°33'0l" S., Long. 167°13'03" E.
1200 - Lat. 16°09'00" S., Long. 167°44'01" E.
2000 - Lat. 17°48'08" S., Long. 167°26'04" E.
(e) At anchor in Segond Channel, Espiritu Santo. Underway at 0742 in
accordance with Comsopac despatch 272332, Nov., 1942 and proceeded out
of harbor. At 0905 AARON WARD and MUSTIN formed screen on Betelgeuse
and set course for Noumea, New Caledonia. Maintained screening position
on Betelgeuse's starboard bow throughout the day and night.
NOVEMBER 30, 1942.
(a) No Task Unit designation. No major Task Force assigned.
(b) Comsopac despatch 272332 of Nov., 1942.
(c)
(d) Positions:
0800 - Lat. 20°35'07" S., Long. 168°12'02" E.
1200 - Lat. 21°23'04" S., Long. 168°32'00" E.
2000 - Lat. 22°59'00" S., Long. 167°58'03" E.
Course and speed made good since noon preceding day:
Course 165° Speed 13.3 knots.
(e) Exercised crew at general quarters stations from one hour prior sunrise
until sunrise. Simulated gun and engineering casualties, and damage
control drills while at general quarters stations. AARON WARD and
MUSTIN screening Betelgeuse enroute Noumea, New Caledonia, and
continued in this status throughout the day and night.
Back to the top
ACTION REPORT
USS AARON WARD DD-483
SERIAL 003 20 NOVEMBER 1942
REPORT OF ACTION, NIGHT OF 12-13 NOVEMBER 1942.
REPORT OF PARTICIPATION IN CRUISER
NIGHT ACTION PHASE OF BATTLE WITH
THE ENEMY OFF SAVO ISLAND NIGHT
12-13 NOVEMBER 1942. SHIP HIT NINE
TIMES-AND TOWED TO TULAGI FOLLOWING
THE ACTION WITH 12 KILLED AND 60
WOUNDED.
DD483/A16-3(1)
Serial # SD/TS133
Care Postmaster,
San Francisco, Calif.
November 20, 1942.
From: Commanding Officer.
To: Commander SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE.
Via: (1) Commander Destroyer Squadron 12.
(2) Commander Task Force 67.
Subject: U.S.S. AARON WARD (DD483) - Report of Action,
Night of November 12-13 1942.
Enclosure: (A) Track of U.S.S. AARON WARD,
1. This action report is divided into the following headings:
(a) Composition of Force.
(b) Chronological order of events, as observed by this
vessel.
(c) Damage inflicted upon ARRON WARD.
(d) Casualties.
(e) Comment.
(f) Recommendations.
A. COMPOSITION OF FORCE.
1. This vessel was assigned to Task Force 67.4, and other vessels in
the force were as follows: Group 1 - CUSHING, LAFFEY, STERRETT,
O'BANNON, under Commander Stokes; Group 2 - SAN FRANCISCO,
(Admiral Callaghan), ATLANTA (Admiral Scott), PORTLAND, HELENA and
JUNEAU; Group 3 - AARON WARD, BARTON, MONSSEN, and FLETCHER under
Captain Tobin; entire Task Force under Admiral Callaghan
2. Just before the action, vessels were in battle formation in the
following order: CUSHING, LAFFEY, STERRETT, O'BANNON, ATLANTA, SAN
FRANCISCO, PORTLAND, HELENA, JUNEAU, AARON WARD, BARTON, MONSSEN,
FLETCHER.
B. CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS AS OBSERVED BY THIS VESSEL.
1. The times given below are in some oases approximated, but it is
believed that they are close to times at which events were
observed
0125 - Vessels of Task Force 67.4 were in one single column, on course
280° T., speed 18, in order shown above
0129 - Changed course to 310° T. Numerous radar contacts ahead were
reported by other vessels of our formation.
0145 - Changed course to 000° T. Enemy ships reported on each bow
ahead. This ship obtained radar range bearing 315° relative,
distant 12,000 yards, by use of FD Radar.
0149 - Commenced firing on enemy vessel believed to be a battleship,
bearing 310° relative, distant 7,000 yards. Observed many small
fires and explosions, but it is not certain whether they were
started by this vessel.
0153 - Checked fire as sky was illuminated and it appeared that our
cruisers had changed course to the left. The area was fairly
well illuminated for a short while. Ship had fired
approximately ten salvoes at this time
0155 - Stopped and backed both engines. Immediately after checking
fire, the director was trained ahead in order to get ranges so
as to avoid collisions. This ship was closing in first upon a
vessel, and when the radar range became 1200 yards, the engines
were stopped and backed.
0156 - Two torpedoes were observed by the men on the torpedo tubes to
pass under this ship, from port to starboard.
0157 - A destroyer, apparently the BARTON, blew up and sunk
immediately. She was close on our starboard side, distance
about 1000 yards, bearing 130° relative.
0158 - Another ship, forward of the starboard beam, apparently a
cruiser, rolled over on her side and sank, distance about 1,500
yards.
0159 - Prepared to fire torpedo battery on a battleship or heavy
cruiser to port, bearing about 265° relative, target angle 180°
T., but did not fire due to sighting cruiser believed to be SAN
FRANCISCO, bearing 280° relative, target angle 270° distance
about 1500 yards.
0204 - Destroyer, believed to be STERRETT, was observed heading
directly toward our port side. Went ahead flank and applied
hard left rudder to avoid being hit. When clear, resumed course
000° T., speed 18.
0206 - Commenced firing on a large destroyer or light cruiser, distance
3,000 yards. This ship is believed to have been a cruiser of
the "KATORI" class. Ship was showing fighting lights of a
single cluster, white over red over green. On "commence
firing", the relative bearing was 010°. Course was changed to
left to approximately 315° in order for battery to bear. Fired
about 25 salvoes before "checking fire" in order to shift to new
target. This ship definitely was seen to blow up and sink.
0209 - Immediately after the above ship was sunk, shifted to a
searchlight bearing 340° relative. Course was changed to right
in order for guns to bear, and ship opened fire. This
searchlight had been trained on us for about two minutes, and it
appeared ship was distant about 3,000 yards. Four salvoes were
fired from the director control, which was then hit. Guns
continued to fire in local control by manual, firing
approximately seven salvoes. This target was believed to a
destroyer. Fires were started, and small explosions were noted.
0213 - Guns 2 and 4 then opened fire on another searchlight bearing
about 120° relative, range about 3,000 yards. This searchlight
had been trained on us for about three or four minutes. Small
fires were observed to start. Guns 1 and 3 continued fire on
search light first observed.
0214 - Searchlights went out and guns ceased firing.
0215 - This vessel was brilliantly illuminated by star shells and a
searchlight on the port quarter. More shells started falling
close aboard us. We could not identify ships near us as our
own, so went ahead flank speed to clear this immediate area as
enemy had apparently identified us.
0216 - Observed torpedo crossing about 50 feet ahead, passing from port
to starboard.
0225 - Lost steering control and attempted to change course to,
steering with engines.
0230 - Battle was over.
0235 - Lost all power; ship dead in the water.
0235 - During this period the ship was dead in the water. The forward
to engineroom was flooded with salt water and feed water was gone.
0500 Salt water was pumped into tanks by means of gasoline pump, and
boilers were again lighted off.
0500 - Underway at about five knots, headed in the direction of Sea
Lark Channel. This speed was maintained for about half an hour,
at which time ship was dead in the water again.
0510 - Our PT boats came close and this ship signaled them by blinker
tube to ask Tulagi for a tug to stand by us.
0600 - Sighted an enemy battleship between Savo and Florida Island,
distant about 26,000 yards. This ship was slowly steaming in
circles. Also sighted ATLANTA, PORTLAND, CUSHING and MONSSEN.
These ships were still afloat and were in the direction of
Guadalcanal. MONSSEN and CUSHING were burning. There was also
an enemy destroyer near Cape Esperance which was burning and
which was later sunk by PORTLAND.
0618 - Got underway again at about 5 knots.
0620 - BOBOLINK arrived and signaled to her to stand by to take us in
tow.
0630 - Enemy battleship fired a total of four 2-gun salvoes at us.
Enemy was using an up-ladder and third salvo straddled the ship.
After fourth salvo, friendly planes started working on
battleship and she fired no more at this ship.
0635 - Lost power again, and BOBOLINK took us in tow.
0650 - BOBOLINK cast off and YP took us in tow.
0830 - Anchored in Tulagi Harbor near Makambo Island.
C. DAMAGE INFLICTED ON AARON WARD.
1. Nine direct hits were received in the following locations, principal
damage incurred by each hit being listed below. Amount of damage as
listed is not complete, as in all probability, as other equipment is
placed in commission and further inspection made, other damage will be
discovered:
(a) Director.
Shall come from port side, hitting director near radar antenna.
Shrapnel holes torn through top, back and sides of director,
rangefinder, range spot transmitter, FD radar antennas, FD control
indicator, FD control unit, receiver unit and coaxial lines. Some
cables cut. Fire started. Estimated size of shell - 5".
(b) Base of director.
Shell entered from port side, pierced cleanly through to starboard
side and through lookout shield, exploding after passing through
this point. Damaged 24" searchlight and cut some telephone
cables. Size of shell estimated to be 5".
(c) FRAME61-64, port side, at stateroom 0101.
A hole approximately 30" x 30" was scored in the outboard
bulkhead. Furnishings in the room were demolished. Fire started.
Shrapnel pierced chart stowage, bulkhead of radar room, vent duct
at frame 51, port and starboard bulkheads along passage A-0103-CL,
transmitter trunks to Radio 1, TBK and TBL transmitters, RSB and
crew's broadcast receiver, and caused many shrapnel holes in deck
of bridge. This hit cut the major portion of OCL and OCJ power
cables, fire control cables to main battery director, torpedo
director, telephone circuits, and steering control circuits in
trunk line. Estimated size of shell - 14" bombardment.
(d) Foremast.
Shell came from port side. The foremast was sheered off above
stay ring; SG radar antennae demolished, all antennae carried
away. Damaged port 24" searchlight. Flag bag riddle with
shrapnel. Estimated size of shell - 5".
(e) Frames 57-60. outboard of galley. port side.
Hole 30" in diameter between frames 57-60. Shrapnel holes in deck
and all bulkheads of galley. Water lines were broken, causing
plotting room to flood to 10". Shrapnel holes in galley sinks,
galley lower half-door, inboard center-line galley bulkhead and
through wardroom pantry door. Fire control cables to main battery
director, telephone circuits, CCL and QCJ cables in trunks were
broken. Damaged galley control and wiring circuits. Estimated
size of shell - 14" bombardment.
(f) Frame 67, port side, just aft of galley.
33" hole in weather bulwark aft of frame 67. Shrapnel holes in
after bulkhead of galley, galley ranges, midships deck house,
laundry extractor and drier. Wrecked potato locker. Broke
hydraulic line for remote control gear to depth charge racks.
Broke fire control cable to torpedo director. Estimated size of
shell - 14" bombardment.
(g) Stern of Gig. Port side.
Stern compartment demolished. Shrapnel holes in #1 stack and
midships deck house. Estimated size of shell - 5".
(h) Frame 95-100, port side, hitting main weather deck
above engineroom and torpedo workshop.
This hit cut fire control cables to torpedo tubes, telephone
circuits and firing circuits. Shrapnel holes were sustained in
two torpedo tube barrels, dents in all barrels. Holes were made
in watertight door to torpedo workshop, bulkheads of diesel
generator room, and vent set 1-97-2 was demolished. In the
engineroom, rivet heads were driven inward against A.C. bus bars
on forward distribution board, shorting out the forward boards.
Small fires were started in mattresses in diesel generator room.
Estimated size of shell - 8" high explosive.
(i) 1.1 Gun.
All four breech mechanisms and all ready service boxes were
destroyers, shell coming from port side. Shrapnel holes were
sustained in deck and shield, frames 130-136, starboard. Damaged
TBL transmitter and control gear, carried away emergency
transmitting and receiving antennae, and cut all cables to gun.
Fire started around gun and on main deck. Estimated size of shell
- 8" high explosive.
2. In addition, many items of equipment, too numerous to mention, were
destroyed.
3. In the engineroom, electric power was lost when the shell hit on top of
the compartment. During the firing before this, three pipe plugs were
blown out, one on the main condenser injection line, one on the outlet
line to generator oil cooler, and one on suction line to evaporator
feed pump. Salt water entered the forward engineroom from these and
flooded the engineroom 3 feet above the floor plates. At the time of
last hit before going dead in the water, the ship was making 30 knots.
When steering failed, there was 15° right rudder applied, and ship was
steaming in circles. Attempt was made to maneuver ship by engines.
During these speed changes it was it was necessary to open atmospheric
exhaust, thereby losing the feed water, as the auxiliaries were still
running at maximum speed. After this, the ship lost all power and it
was necessary to pump salt water into the feed system in order to
attempt to move.
D. CASUALTIES.
1. Twelve men were killed in action; two died on way to hospital.
2. Seven men were wounded, one of them died after arrival at hospital.
3. Nineteen men were wounded and twenty-four had superficial wounds.
4. Among the officers, two were wounded and six had superficial wounds.
5. Total casualties.
Killed in action 12
Died as results of wounds 3
Seriously wounded 6
Wounded 21
Superficial wounded 30
TOTAL 72
6. The men were killed in the following locations:
1.1 - 5 Emergency Radio - 1
Director - 2 Galley - 2
Torp. Tubes - 1 W.R. Pantry - 1
#2 20-mm. - 1 Repair Party - 2
7. Men were wounded as a result of every hit.
E. COMMENT.
1. General Situation.
Our force had been screening our own transports who had been unloading
at Guadalcanal during the previous day. At 1830 on November 12, 1942,
our forces retired to eastward through Sea Lark Channel. About 2217
reversed course and stood back through Lengo Channel in order to
intercept any Japanese force that might attempt to attack Guadalcanal
that night. About 0130 our forces received numerous radar contacts
ahead. The Japanese force consisted of one or two battleships, several
cruisers and destroyers.
2. It is believed that the enemy was taken completely by surprise.
3. This ship had no previous indication that the large enemy force was in
the near vicinity.
4. The enemy force apparently used principally bombardment ammunition. It
is believed they expected no opposition that night, and had this
ammunition set up for bombardment of the Marine position on Guadalcanal
and other shore installations.
5. The enemy used both starshell and searchlights. Searchlights were kept
on for comparatively long periods of time, which gave us an opportunity
to get accurate ranges and a good point of aim.
6. The enemy firing was not as accurate as our own. Many near misses fell
around the ship.
7. FD Radar only was used. The SC Radar was not used as ranges are not
considered satisfactory below 2000 yards.
8. The use of the FD Radar, trained dead a head during lulls in firing,
was a large factor in avoiding damage by collision.
9. No torpedoes were fired. This vessel was in the after group of
destroyers. During the first part of the action, no suitable target
could be found. During the latter part of the engagement, the position
of all our forces was not definitely known, and it was therefore
considered inadvisable to fire.
10. The torpedo officer, due to his location, is frequently blinded by
flashes from the forward guns, and it is sometimes very difficult for
him to identify targets.
11. This vessel went through the entire enemy formation. Many shells
passed overhead, indicating the enemy ships were firing at each other.
12. While the enemy cruiser was being sunk by this ship, it is evident that
we were recognized as unfriendly by others of the enemy, as we were
brilliantly illuminated after this and then received a major part of
the damage. Going ahead 30 knots at this time apparently saved the
ship.
13. Another factor instrumental in saving the ship after the night action
was the fact that the engineers force got the ship moving ahead slowly
just before daylight. This increased the range from the enemy
battleship, making her fire less effective.
14. Starshells are considered to be of little use if the range can be
obtained by radar or other means. Hitting the other ship first not
only creates confusion, puts some of their equipment out of commission,
but also starts fires which provide the necessary illumination.
15. The volume of fire of our ship was much greater than that of the enemy.
16. During the action there was so much conversation coming over the TBS,
and the noise was so great, that very little of the information reached
the commanding officer. However, it is believed most all of the
important information was obtained.
17. Communications on this vessel between different ship's stations was
considered excellent.
18. The performance of the officers and crew during and following the
action was considered excellent. Separate letters of recommendations
for awards are being forwarded.
19. Our recognition lights are considered to be superior to the enemy
lights.
20. After losing electric power below, the heat in the enginerooms was
almost unbearable.
21. Kapok life jackets were some protection against shrapnel, but a few
caught fire in spite of having previously been fire-proofed.
22. The need for two or three long telephones leads with handsets already
made up was again evident.
23. The auxiliary ladder outside the bridge to the main deck was also found
to be necessity, as one of the ladders leading below was severely
damaged, and it would have been practically impossible to get below any
other way.
24. No major fires were started on this vessel. The few which were started
were quickly extinguished by the repair parties before reaching any
major proportions. The largest fires were located near the 1.1 gun,
where some of the ammunition blew up and two depth charges were blown
open.
25. Total rounds fired from 5" guns was 215.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS.
1. A radar should be installed for conning use only, capable of taking
short ranges.
2. A splinter shield should be placed on torpedo tubes around the trainers
seat and controls.
3. A suitable type of director should be mounted on the torpedo tubes for
use in night action.
4. Any time night action may even be suspected, the ship should be at
general quarters.
5. In the engineroom, the electric motors on the lower level, which were
under water, were all made inoperative by the flooding. It is
recommended that all these motors be made watertight. Flooded motors
were:
Evaporator system 4
Auxiliary Circulating Pump 1
Aux. Condensate & Booster 1
Cruising Conens. & Booster 1
6. It is recommended that emergency generators be reinstalled. There
should be some method of supplying power to the engineroom blowers;
also steering gear, and other essential equipment.
7. It is recommended that the old system of bell-pulls be reinstalled.
During the time in which the ship had power and steering by engines,
word was passed to the engineroom by forming a chain of men. The power
cables were cut, and engine telegraphs were out of commission.
8. Feed water manifolds should be in the engineroom instead of the
fireroom. This will give the engineroom control over the tanks. As it
is now stands, if a tank becomes dry and communication is lost, it is
necessary to send a man to the fireroom to cut in another tank.
9. Nearly all power cables for the bridge and director run up through a
single trunk, near the center-line of the ship. Practically all of
these cables were severed by hits (c) and (e) above. It is recommended
that as many cables as possible be divided, or that trunk be armored.
KILLED IN ACTION
BENEGAR, Ivory H., CCStd 346-48-58, USN
BRISSON, Kenneth C., Sea.2c 606-26-51, USNR
COFER, John J., Sea.1c 268-98-31, USN
HESS, George B., F.2c 614-18-07, USNR
LESNESKI, Martin, E., SC 3c 250-71-88, USN
MANN, Earl W. H., F.1c 283-54-24, USN
MORRIS, Charles E., RM 3c 658-00-71, USNR
POYTHRESS, Joseph E. Jr. GM2c 268-22-39, USN
RAVIN, Tohn C., TM1c 393-27-30, USN
RUDOLPH, Henry F., F. 1c 266-31-12, USN
SCHNIEDER, Paul B., Sea.1c 620-03-22, USNR
SEALE, J. (n), Sea.2c 622-54-46, USNR
WALLNER, Frank L., Sea.2c 610-77-90, USNR
DIED AS RESULT OF WOUNDS
RIVERA, Timoteo (n), OS2c 497-97-01, USN
SCHLEHER, Paul A., FC1c 316-52-28, USN
SERIOUSLY WOUNDED
ASERCION, Anselmo (n) OS1c (F4D) l0l-19-50, USN
COFFMAN, William T., TM2c 321-30-14, USN
GREEN, Marion (n) OC1c 261-88-57, USN
GRIFFIN, Melvin R., SM2c 279-60-47, USN
HAINES, George E., RM1c 375-85-99, USN
MOODY, Theodore J., Sea.1c 202-20-94, USN
WOUNDED
BOWEN, James W., FC2c 266-18-22, USN
COWART, John L., SOM3c 636-10-90 USNR
COX, Thomas, J. Jr., Sea.2c 283-69-17, USN
DRILCOLL, Edward F., F.2c 200-36-03, USN
ENGSTER, Alfred H., Sea.2c 283-69-17, USN
ESSLINGER, Robert J., Lieut-Comdr., USN
EYLAR, Allen A., SC2c 356-05-80, USN
FERGUSON, Roy W., MM1c 283-16-41, USN
FETZER, Ralph A. Jr., Sea.1c 614-17-35, USNR
FISH, Walter G., F.1c 214-77-36, USN
FLUHART, Bernard F., Sea.2c 614-16-85, USNR
FOSTER, Antonio L., Sea.2c 606-25-04, USNR
HAGEN, Robert Chris, Lieut.(Jg), D-V(G), USNR
HAINES, George E., RM1c 375-85-99, USN
JONES, Junius C., Sea.1c 262-63-54, USN
LANDRUM, Otis H. TM3c 265-94-14, USN
MacCORMACK, John E., Jr., Sea.2c 600-03-76, USNR
MANSFIELD, Richard G., SOM3c 640-11-59, USNR
MC GRADY, John S., CTM(AA) 265-60-42, USN
NIGLIO, Albert M., SM3c 243-53-78, USN
PICHETTE, Paul E., SC3c 666-10-20, USNR
QUINN, John Henry, CWT(AA) 261-30-00, USN
REYNOLDS, Murry W., CEM(PA) 201-23-59, USN
BITTER, Charles, (n) CTM(PA)F-4-D 183-62-23 RET., USN
SMITH, Luther L., TM3c 337-44-98, USN
WEBER, Nathaniel M., F.3c 620-40-31, USNR
WESPETAL, Stephen 0. Sea.2c 610-71-74, USNR
WICHMANN, Ernest C., SF1c 375-70-41, USN
WINGATE Virgil R., SOM3c 269-11-52, USN
WRAY, Alford K., WT1c 346-42-31, USN
ZELIFF, Donald F., F.1c 223-33-69, USN
SUPERFICIAL WOUNDS TREATED ON BOARD SHIP
BANE, C.L. CCStd. (PA).
BECK, F.E. RM3c
DEITZ, W.B. F.2c
EWING, G.E. F.3c
FARNSWORTH, M.C. GM2c
HART, F.T. SM1c
HENSEL, A.W. CMsmth. (AA)
LASKOWSKI, J.S. BM2c
MANGERIAN, H.J. Sea.2c
MARSHALL, J. CRM.(AA)
MARSHALL, W.L. F.2c
MC GINNIS, T.E. Sea.1c
MC NULTY, A.J. CMM. (PA)
ROY, A.W. CPhM(PA)
SEHLER, C.T. CY (PA)
CONANT, E.R. Lieut (jg) D-V(G) USNR
HILL, F.C. Ensign. USN
LE BARON, W.F. Ensign. D-V(G) USNR
MOLITOR, C.M. Lieut. D-V(G) USNR
TRUESDELL, S.S. Lieut. E-M USNR
WEATHERUP, R.A. Lieut. USN
WESTPHALL, J.A. Ensign. E-V USNR
U. S. S. AARON WARD
DD483/A16-3
Serial #007
C/c Postmaster,
San Francisco Calif.,
December 30, 1942.
From: Commanding Officer.
To : Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: USS AARON WARD - Night Action of November
12-13, 1942 - Recommendations regarding.
Reference: (a) Verbal conversation with Cincpac.
1. In accordance with reference (a), the following information is submitted:
(A) COMMENTS ON EVENTS AS OBSERVED RECOMMENDATIONS.
(B) RECOMMENDATIONS.
(A) COMMENTS ON EVENTS AS OBSERVED.
1. On the afternoon preceding the action, at about 1800 local time, the
orders stating the battle formation, as used during the night, were
received. At about 1830 our ships took this formation, and held this
formation until the action. No other orders were received prior to
this time and none were received later.
2. No reports of the enemy were received on board during the day, except
the advance notice that planes were coming down. The first
indications of the presence of the enemy were known about 0130. These
were broadcast over the TBS by the HELENA.
3. In this particular engagement, it is believed that the surprise
element was a large factor in accomplishing the mission. Due to all
of our forces in this area having been seen, by the Japanese who were
to the westward of Lunga, during the preceding day, it is thought
they believed our forces too small to attempt to stop their forces.
4. In night actions among the islands, there is a question whether to
keep some destroyers well advanced of the formation or close to the
main body. Due to the limited size of this particular area, where the
enemy forces were expected, it is not considered that scouts were
necessary here. Enemy vessels coming into this area would normally
have one of two objectives: Either to land troops or bombard the
airfield and would therefore probably head for one of these two
positions. If some of the destroyers are well advanced, their area of
operation must be known and the remainder of our ships should keep
out of this area, due to the danger of firing on our own forces. In
this particular place, if advanced destroyers were used, it is
believed they should have been kept outside of Savo Island. From
here, they could have delivered a torpedo attack and retired in a
northerly or southerly direction. Likewise, if PT Boats are , they
must have a definite area to operate in and our other ships should
keep out of this area.
5. If there is any chance oft success, torpedoes should be used to the
fullest extent. The destroyers should go in as close as possible, for
the torpedoes to be effective. The ideal condition, if the night were
dark, would be for the destroyers to stay outside the visible range
and deliver their attack. This distance might be too far on a very
clear night. In any case, it is believed that the destroyers should
close to about 5000 yards before delivering their attack. After
delivering their attack, the destroyers should retire in a direction
away from that necessary for the cruisers to deliver their attack. If
the situation is such that it is not considered that a destroyer
attack would be effective, then the destroyers should follow the
heavier ships in after they have completed their attack, bearing it
in mind that it is extremely difficult to identify ships after action
has begun.
6. The only destroyers present equipped with SG Radar were the FLETCHER
and the O'BANNON. The SC and FID radars are not considered to be good
search radars in this area due to the proximity of land.
7. During the action there was and is always likely to be very much
conversation on the TBS. After commencing firing there is always so
much noise, that important messages may be missed.
8. Fire was opened using radar ranges, which was considered to be the
proper procedure. If early hits are obtained fires will usually be
started and additional illumination may not be necessary.
9. Our fighting lights are not considered to be satisfactory under many
conditions. They are very bright and may quickly reveal the identity
of the ship to the wrong ships.
10. Although no rendezvous after the battle was given, it was customary
for our ships to retire to the eastward through Lengo or Sealark
Channels.
(B) RECOMMENDATIONS.
This attack might have been better accomplished If the following areas
had been assigned to different forces:
AREA "A" - Destroyers;
O'BANNON (Leader) CDD-9
CUSHING
STERRETT
MONSSEN
AREA "B" - PT Boats - 5 were available at the time.
AREA "C" - Destroyers and cruisers in the formation as shown below:
FLETCHER BARTON AARON LAYFEY HELENA SAN FRAN- PORT- JUNEAU ATLANTA
CDS-12 WARD (Adm. CISCO. LAND
Callaghan)
1. The advantages of this are as follows:
(a) If the destroyers are able to deliver a satisfactory torpedo
attack in the Area "A", this will cripple some of their ships
and throw them into some confusion. Not as many ships would
therefore get through.
(b) The PT Boats with 4 torpedoes each should be able to do some
effective work as the ships passed on either side of SAVO
ISLAND. Even though some of the enemy ships were damaged by the
initial torpedo attack, the others would have doubtlessly stood
on in to accomplish their mission.
(c) The destroyers and cruisers in Area "C" would be in position to
attack the remaining forces coming in. It is considered that the
ideal situation to be obtained here would be for the destroyers
to be in position to deliver a torpedo attack at the same time
that the cruisers opened fire. This would create confusion in
the enemy ranks, forcing him to cut down his maneuvers to avoid
torpedoes. It is realized that this situation is sometimes very
difficult to obtain and may not be obtained if there is a heavy
screen around the large ships, or if our ships are surprised.
(d) All leaders would be on ships with the better radars. This would
allow them to get a better picture of the situation without too
much conversation over the TBS, and deliver their attacks using
this information.
2. If the forces are kept together during the search and it is not
desired to use advanced units, it is believed the following formation
might be more satisfactory for the following reasons:
(a) The formation is more compact, keeping the forces closer
together while maneuvering around the islands.
(b) Both groups of destroyers are in position to deliver torpedo
attacks if this is desired. One group may follow the other group
in on the side in which it is desired to deliver the attack or
more than one group of enemy ships may be attacked
simultaneously by torpedoes.
(c) Either group may quickly take position astern by use of turn
signals.
The principal disadvantage of this formation is that in case of surprise
fire by enemy forces on our own forces, half of the destroyer fire would
be blanked off. It is not believed that this would happen with the use of
SG Radar.
3. If the information is available, all ships should be informed of the
possible enemy forces that may be encountered during the night. Also,
as far as practicable, our own units should know in general what out
other units might expect to do.
4. It is believed that the TBS should be augmented with an additional
keyed circuit. All important messages should be sent over this
circuit also. It is not considered that a light in any form would be
satisfactory for maneuvering.
5. It is considered that fighting lights should be portable and
directional. In case of damage around the bridge, the lights probably
could not be turned on.
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