U.S.S. HELENA
CL50/A16-3 10-s
November 15, 1942.
From: Commanding Officer.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Action off North Coast Guadalcanal, Early Morning of
November 13, 1942, report of. (3rd Savo Island Night
Action.)
References: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920, Arts. 712 and 874(6).
(b) PacFlt Conf. ltr 24CL-42 of June 21, 1942.
(c) USS HELENA Secret Airmailgram 140001 to CTF 67.
(d) USS HELENA secret Airmailgram 152121 to CTF 67.
(e) CTF 67 Secret 151012 to ComSoPac.
(f) USS HELENA Secret Ltr. CL50/A16-3(005) of Nov. 14,
1942, on sinking of JUNEAU.
(g) CTF 67 Secret dispatch NPM 225 - 120133.
(h) NPM 387 - 130200.
(i) USS HELENA Secret dispatch 121610 to Radio Tulagi.
(j) USS HELENA Secret dispatch 122005 to ComAirSoPac.
(k) USS HELENA Secret ltr. CL50/A16-3(004) of Oct. 20,
1942 on Action Night 11-12 October.
Enclosures: (A) Track Chart of HELENA.
(B) Extracts from TBS Log.
(C) Copy of Report of Lieutenant Roger W. O'Neil,
MC-V(G), USNR, senior survivor JUNEAU.
(D) Copy HELENA BT to B-17 Plane on Nov. 13, 1942.
(E) Sail George Radar Officer's Report.
1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) the following report
is submitted following the sequences given in enclosure (A) of reference (b).
(1) Comments on and summary of outstanding events.
As stated in the HELENA's report of the Night Action off Savo
Island on 11-12 October, reference (k) par. 1(1) and 1(5-c), the value of the
a Sail George Radar cannot be overemphasized. It was invaluable, and was the
sole means of keeping the OTC informed of the enemy prior to sight contact.
The OTC was informed of the approximate formation, general size of ships
(large or small), bearing, distance, course and speed. This information
started at about 31,900 yards on true bearing 310°, as is shown in Enclosure
(B). It was necessary to send this in voice code via TBS as the flagship was
not equipped with SG Radar and therefore must rely on outside information..
With this invaluable instrument available every possible effort should be
made to at least equip flagships with it.
An enemy cruiser illuminated this ship by searchlight,
simultaneously opening fire, prior to our force commencing fire, two hits
doing minor material damage were at once registered. Size of projectile
fragments and base plug, height and size of searchlight, and radar image
confirm this.
The enemy were very evidently equipped with bombardment
ammunition for that mission, or it is believed much greater material damage
would have resulted to us. Parts of projectiles recovered on board this and
others of our ships verify this statement.
As the main battery of the HELENA was tracking the target
that illuminated it, and was completely ready to open fire with fire control
problem solved by radar, our fire was effective at once and large fires with
quick sinking resulted. This burning ship illuminated others in this force
and greatly assisted the destroyers in directing torpedo fire on major ships.
This is the ideal method of Night Illumination.
Four important decisions were involved in this action, and its
aftermath, which the commanding officer of this ship had to make.
(l) The ship was illuminated and under fire of the enemy.
When should fire be returned as no orders to "commence firing" had been
Received? Just "stand-by to open fire".
This ship had furnished most of the information on the
enemy and had a very good picture of them showing our force surrounded on
three sides, or soon would be. The enemy was hitting us at once and a delay
might be fatal. See reference (k), paragraph 1 (7-b). This was discussed at
the preliminary conference with Rear Admiral Callaghan prior to sailing. I
opened fire at 0148.
(2) At about 0218 the PORTLAND appeared to be out of control
and on questioning reported a torpedo hit jamming her rudder. They asked for
a tow at 0231. Should the HELENA stop and do this under the circumstances?
Action was still taking place. The position of our forces
was not definitely known. Every effort was being made to close the SAN
FRANCISCO. The PORTLAND and JUNEAU had been torpedoed, and from previous
observation probably the ATLANTA. Enemy destroyers were in all directions
and a grave danger of torpedoing existed. See reference (k) paragraph 1
(7-d). I tried to contact the OTC by TBS and to find the SAN FRANCISCO
visually. After the action described in reference (k), Rear Admiral Scott
emphasized the desirability of all remaining forces keeping closed up and
assembling for possible further action. (At about 0228 the only ship that
would answer on TBS were the O'BANNON and FLETCHER). Returning to the area
of the PORTLAND was not considered justified. At 0240 the SAN FRANCISCO was
contacted by blinker tube on our port bow and instructed us to take charge.
Reference (i) was then sent to Radio Tulagi requesting tow and air coverage
for the PORTLAND.
(3) When should the night action be broken off and a
retirement started?
At about 0214 while attempting to get the course of
the rest of the ships in the force I received no answer. As I knew the
PORTLAND was damaged, the ATLANTA appeared to have been hit, the SAN
FRANCISCO was known to have been hit, and the JUNEAU was not seen. I called
all ships and at about 0226 attempted to assemble what forces remained.
Firing then was sporadic and numerous ships were burning. The O'BANNON and
FLETCHER only were contacted. Course 092, speed 20 knots and form 18 was
given in code by TBS to all ships, and destination Sealark. Soon after this
the SAN FRANCISCO was contacted ahead on our port bow headed for Sealark
Channel and some idea of her crippled condition was obtained. SAN FRANCISCO
asked HELENA to lead her out. This together with the few ships contacted
caused my decision to retire with the remaining forces via Sealark Channel,
which was done with the aid of the Sail George Radar. The FLETCHER preceded
us, and the O'BANNON joined to the eastward having transited Lengo Channel.
At 0420 the STERETT having transited Lengo and being damaged joined near Nura
Island at the rendezvous I had given for 0425. At 0455 sighted JUNEAU ahead
on the port bow. At 0526 the JUNEAU was directed to join us.
(4) At 1101 the JUNEAU was torpedoed as reported in reference
(f). Should an attempt have been made to search the area for
survivors?
The SAN FRANCISCO and HELANA were screened by the
STERETT (damaged) and the FLETCHER, as the O'BANNON was at about 0815 sent to
send reference (j), and it rejoined at 1530. Due to the small screen, the
crippled condition of the ships, and the devastating nature of the explosion,
it was not considered that the risk of further torpedoing was justified. No
sound or sight contact was made. The hope that a plane would soon appear was
held, as the message sent by the O'BANNON asking for air coverage had been
already received by us on the Fox Schedule. At 1121 a B-17 did appear and
Enclosure (D) was the message transmitted to him for forwarding. This
message was acknowledged for by the plane, but apparently not forwarded to
Commander South Pacific Force.
(2-a) Enemy forces:
#1 See NPM NR 205 D/T 120030.
#2 See NPM NR 232 D/T 120625.
#3 See NPM NR 200 D/T 112345.
#1 Concerning 2 BB or 2 CA.
#2 Concerning 2 CV.
#3 Concerning 5 DD.
See Enclosure (E) for general disposition of enemy.
(2-b) Own formation entered the area via Lengo Channel in battle
disposition "Baker One". Order of ships as follows: Column of station units
van unit Commander Stokes CUSHING, LAFFEY, STERETT, O'BANNON; Base unit
ATLANTA, SAN FRANCISCO, PORTLAND, HELENA, JUNEAU; Rear units Captain Tobin
AARON WARD, BARTON, MONSSEN, FLETCHER. Distance in yards Destroyers 500,
Cruisers 700. Distance between rear and first ship adjacent units 800 yards.
(Refer CTG 67.4 despatch 120615 of November).
(2-c) Wind from 120, 9 knots; sea smooth swells from 125; Sky partly
cloudy but clear overhead. Jagged lightning over land areas especially in
mountains on Guadalcanal and Florida Island.
(3-a) While our forces was steaming on course 280° T, speed 18, in
special battle disposition (column with four destroyers leading in column,
five cruisers (HELENA fourth cruiser in column), followed by four
destroyers), off Guadalcanal between Lunga Point and Cape Esperance, Radar
Plot reported a contact at 0124, bearing 312° T, range 27,100 yards. One or
two minutes after this Radar Plot reported that three separate groups of
targets were distinguishable, two at 27,000 yards, and one at 32,000 yards.
At about 0130 Radar Plot reported that target course was approximately 134°
T, speed 20. Between 0125 aand 0130 our course was changed to 000 and speed
increased to 20 knots. At about 0135 range to left closest target group was
15,000 yards, bearing 324° T, and tracking gave enemy course 120°, speed 20.
According to plotting room at about 0137 we changed course to 315° T and
speed to 25 which was directly toward the farthest of the three enemy groups
and between the two closest enemy groups.
(3-b) The forward FC radar picked up one target group at about
18,000 yards and in conjunction with radar plot tracked this group. It was
the left hand group of the two closest groups of targets. It never appeared
to change course or speed. At a range of about 6000 or 7000 yards the
Gunnery Officer checked and found that we were not on the left hand ship of
this group and by use of "SG" radar shifted to a ship farther to the left in
this group. This enemy group passed ahead of and crossed to port of our
leading destroyers which had at about 0140 changed course to about 270° T.
(3-c) Director I was tracking the target using the Forward FC radar
for range and train. Director II was doing likewise. All turrets were
loaded and in automatic train and elevation. Director I controlling in
train, Director III in elevation. At about 0148 we were illuminated by a
searchlight bearing about 285° relative and exactly in line with the train of
Director I. Commence firing was ordered immediately and the main battery
opened fire in continuous fire at a range of about 4200 yards. Rapid
continuous fire was maintained for about two minutes using a 200 yard rocking
ladder. Almost at the same time that we opened fire we started our turn to
the left following in column the ships ahead which had changed course to
about 270° T. The searchlight on the target (which appeared too high and
large to be on a destroyer) was immediately turned off or shot away. Spot I
reports that the target was visible to him, that our tracers appeared to be
perfect in deflection and that practically all of our shots appeared to hit,
and that before cease firing the target was afire forward and amidships and
was sinking. Cease firing was given as ordered by Task Force Commander and
Commanding Officer after about two minutes of firing at which time the range
was about 3000 yards. At about the moment of opening fire on this target a
large and compact salvo was seen to hit directly in our wake and 50 to 100
yards astern. During this firing we received two hits in the vicinity of the
stacks and searchlight tower, one of which has been definitely determined to
have been eight inch. It is also probable that the hit we received on the
airplane crane was received at this time. It is believed that our target was
an eight inch cruiser and that it was sunk. Two destroyers, the O'BANNON and
the FLETCHER, both report that it was a cruiser and both report seeing it
sink. Its burning silhouetted a BB target for the O'BANNON.
(3-d) The forward Fox Dog picked up the target at about the same
time as the Fox Cast and tracked a target ship in the same group obtaining
the same enemy course and speed as did the main battery. The 5" battery was
in automatic using radar train. Upon opening fire the 5" was on a target
slightly to the left of the main battery target and at a range of 6200 yards.
The director control officer and spotter reports seeing hits on this target.
The 5" battery ceased firing at the same time as the main battery.
(3-e) During this first phase of the action the main battery
expended about 175 rounds, the 5" battery about 20 rounds.
(3-f) The succeeding few minutes were mostly absorbed in avoiding
damaged ships and identifying own vessels on most of which before challenging
the batteries were trained. During this period we almost rammed but managed
to avoid by about 100 yards a large capsized vessel bottoms up, the beam of
which I am certain was greater than that of this vessel. (It appeared to the
Gunnery Officer just like the OKLAHOMA did on December 7th at Pearl Harbor).
Within about 2000 yards of this a vessel with outlines aft generally similar
to that of the SAN FRANCISCO was burning fiercely and completely from bow to
stern. It was at first thought to be the SAN FRANCISCO but the SAN FRANCISCO
was then sighted nearby and definitely identified. With both in sight it was
obvious that the burning vessel was definitely larger than the SAN FRANCISCO.
It is not considered possible that the burning vessel could have survived as
it was already well down. During this period there was considerable firing
between vessels mostly to the southwestward. Also during this period we
narrowly avoided being rammed on the starboard side by the ATLANTA or JUNEAU.
(It is believed to have been the ATLANTA.
(3-g) At about 0203 radar plot reported at least six enemy ships on
our starboard hand heading in northerly direction. While putting the main
battery on one of these targets one was observed to be firing on the SAN
FRANCISCO then on our starboard bow. Both FC radars got on this target and
at 0204 opened fire with the main battery in full automatic using forward FC
radar in train. Opening range was 8800 yards. Fired for approximately 1 ½
to 2 minutes and ceased firing at range of 9400 yards when SAN FRANCISCO on
our starboard hand came in line of fire. Approximately 125 rounds were
expended in this phase and were believed to be very effective.
(3-h) At the same time the 5" battery was getting on the enemy ships
to starboard as coached by radar plot it picked up a destroyer on our
starboard quarter firing at us and opened fire on it at a range of 7200
yards. About 40 rounds were fired and cease firing ordered when SAN
FRANCISCO came into line of fire, this fire was also most effective.
(3-i) During the above firing of the main and 5" batteries the
automatic weapons control officer observed between the lines of fire of the
batteries and at about 3000 yards, a vessel with four stacks passing on
diverging course. Fire was opened with the forward starboard 40mm mount on
this vessel and 159 rounds expended. This firing was very effective being
directly in the bridge area, and at least 2/3 were seen to hit. Cease firing
was ordered at the same time as the other batteries. During this phase of
the action two hits were received, one on the face plate of turret four and
one on the forecastle deck by a large projectile.
(3-j) Results of the above firing in the second phase are not
definitely known but both spotters report that hits were being obtained and
it is believed both main battery and 5" targets were on fire. The automatic
weapons control officer reports observing about two thirds of all shots fired
hitting in the area of the forward stack and bridge structure.
(3-k) After clearing several of own vessels the main battery again
opened fire on a vessel of the same group as before. The opening range was
16,400 yards, target course 330, speed 17. It had been tracked out from
about 10,000 yards by radar plot and the main battery and FC radars. Rapid
continuous fire was maintained for about one minute at a very high rate of
fire when the range was again fouled and ceased firing given. About 60
rounds were fired. The target appeared to be on fire.
(3-l) At about the same time during this third phase the 5" battery
fired about 40 rounds at a target believed to be a destroyer just forward of
starboard beam at a range of about 5000 yards. Cease firing was ordered when
the range was fouled by own vessel. This target also appeared to be in
flames.
TIME SCHEDULE - NIGHT ACTION
Task Group 67.4 - Early morning November 13, 1942. (All time
Love). Times and data collected from Quartermaster's Log, Signal Log, and
TBS Log kept by Navigation.
TIME EVENT
November 12, 1942
2214 Changed course to right to 270° T.
2218 Changed speed to 18 knots (187 rpm).
2236 Changed speed to 15 knots (155 rpm).
November 13, 1942
0010 Changed course to left to 180° T.
0013 Changed course to right.
0024 Changed course to right to 280° T.
0040 Changed course to left to 270° T.
0108 Changed course to right to 280° T.
0122 Changed speed to 18 knots (187 rpm).
0124 Radar contact (SG Radar) bearing 312° T, distance 27,100 yards.
0125 Radar contact (SG Radar) bearing 310° T, distance 31,100 yards.
(Note - above two contacts appeared to be several large ships with
screen).
0135 Changed course to right to 310° T.
0137 Changed speed to 20 knots (208 rpm).
0138 HELENA steering 315° T, speed 10 knots.
0139 Four targets on port bow. HELENA course 315° T, speed 10 knots.
0140 Changed speed to 18 knots (187 rpm).
0141 Leading destroyer reported seeing ships dead ahead and on port
bow.
0142 Changed course to right to 000° T.
0143 HELENA making 18 knots.
0143.5 Leading destroyer told to fire torpedoes.
0145 Prepared to open fire. HELENA course 015° T.
0146 HELENA course 010° T.
0147 HELENA course 000° T.
0148 Commenced firing. Opening range 4300 yards. Fired on furthest
target to left. Fired two or more minutes after target
illuminated ship and hit our searchlight platform. (Clock in D/F
shack stopped at 0148).
0149 Changed course to left. Hard left rudder.
0149 Changed speed to flank (Maximum speed).
0150 HELENA stopped all engines.
0151 HELENA increased speed to maximum.
0152 HELENA swinging past 250° T.
0153 Changed course to right to 000° T. Rudder hard right
own course 000° T. Speed 17 knots.
0153 Ceased firing.
0154 Changed speed to full (18 knots).
0155 Large explosion (off port bow). Considered target
fired at by HELENA and sunk.
0156 Planes reported overhead (/) 355° T,
0157 Hard right rudder to avoid ship which passed from
starboard to port at right angles. Ship either ATLANTA or
JUNEAU. (Believed ATLANTA). Very close call.
0158 Changed course to 000° T.
0159 More gunfire reported {Where?).
0200 Ship ahead of HELENA illuminating.
0201 Heavy cruiser (believed PORTLAND) turning to right.
0202 Large explosion to starboard.
0203 Changed course to left to 290° T. HELENA making 16 knots.
0204 Commenced firing. Opened fire at range 9200 yards.
0206 Ceased firing.
0206.5 "6 enemy ships over 5000 yards on starboard side."
0207 Changed course to left. Hard left rudder. HELENA making
20 knots.
0210 Changed course to right. JUNEAU or ATLANTA (believe
ATLANTA) on fire on starboard beam (by 160°T).
0211 Changed course to left to 120° T. HELENA making 15 knots.
0212 "Enemy cruiser on starboard bow."
0213 Hard right rudder.
0214 Took position astern of PORTLAND(?).
0215 Commenced firing. HELENA on course 115° T. "Hard right rudder".
Opened fire at 16,300 yards bearing approximately 1100 rel.
Enemy course 330° T. Enemy speed 17.
0216 Ceased firing; changed course to right to 230° T. HELENA
making 10 knots.
0217 Changed course to left to 092° T,
HELENA increased speed to full.
0218 PORTLAND lost steering control.
0220 HELENA making 18 knots.
0221 HELENA streeing course 092° T.
0224 HELENA illuminated by srewach light.
0226 Changed speed to flank (28 knots).
0027 Small boat reported off starboard bow.
0230 Changed couirse t oleft to 090° T.
0231 Received message from PROTLAND requesting tow.
0232 HELENA on course 050°
0234 HELENA on course 090°
0237 HELENA on course 100°, speed 27 knots.
0238 Changed speed to 17 knots.
0239 HELENA making 20 knots on course 090° T.
0240 SAN FRANCISCO on port bow.
0240 SAN FRANCISCO told this vessel to take charge.
0244 Changed course to right to 100° T.
0249 Changed speed to 25 knots,
0255 Changed course to left to 080° T. HELENA making 20 knots.
0259 Changed speed to 15 knots.
0300 Changed course to 090° T. Speed 10 knots,
0301 Changed speed to 20 knots. HELENA on course 090° T.
0302 Changed right to 098° T.
0307 Changed speed to 10 knots.
0310 HELENA on course 098° T. Speed 15 knots,
0312 Changed speed to 15 knots. Large explosion bearing about 278° T.
0318 Changed course left to 075° T.
0321 Changed course right to 080° T.
0325 Changed course right to 090° T.
0332 Changed course left to 081° T.
0344 Changed speed to full (20 knots).
0345 Passed clear of Sealark Channel.
0354 Changed course right to 110° T.
0422 Changed speed to 15 knots.
0430 Changed course to 135° T.
0432 Changed speed to 20 knots.
0458 Changed couree to 100° T
0520 Changed course to 145° T.
0523 Changed course to 130° T.
(4-a) Reference (e) gives an estimate of enemy forces
involved and their losses. Three groups definitely existed as shown by
Enclosure (D). The center group appeared as four or five large ships
(BB's, CA's or Battle Cruisers) and perhaps two transports or smaller
ships a distance astern, The left (nearest) and right hand groups
contained from five to eight ships each, and were in the nature of a
screen having destroyers and two or more cruisers in each.
(4-d) Illuminated and opened fire before we did. Only search
light noted was the first one opening on the HELENA. It soon went out
or was turned off. Starshells and possibly flares were in the sky.
Enemy planes were overhead and may have dropped flares. Some of our
destroyers and the SAN FRANCISOO are known to have fired starahella
which appeared well placed.
Bombardment ammunition used by the enemy is believed to
have reduced their effectiveness.
(4-e) See reference (e) and RDO Guadalcanal NPM 416 - 130428.
(5-a)(1) Performance of the batteries. The performance of all
batteries is considered to have been excellent. There were no material
casualties which in any way affected the firing except two and possibly
three misfires in turret one, both of which were immediately fired by
percussion, and the failure of the center gun of turret four to return
to battery after a hit sustained on the face plate of that turret.
Fire was continued by the wing guns of this turret. Damage to search
lights resulted in one light being put out of commission and one
operative by local control only. However there was never any need for
the use of searchlights. Damage to wiring to forward FC antenna level
control did not affect the operation of the radar since automatic level
was not being used during the action.
(5-a)(2) A very high degree of fire discipline was imperative
throughout the action due to rapid and frequent maneuvers and close
proximity of own vessels which frequently blanketed line of fire.
There was also the necessity frequently to point the batteries on ships
believed to be our own as a precautionary measure before attempting to
identify by challenge or recognition. The fire discipline maintained
throughout was most gratifying and there is complete confidence felt
that at no time was a friendly ship fired upon. In the opinion of the
Gunnery Officer this action has again demonstrated that with our
present equipment illumination of the target by searchlight or star
shell is not necessary and that the use of searchlights serves to draw
enemy fire.
(5-b) The effectiveness of tie radar installation and its
performance cannot be praised too highly. Everything said in reference
(k) was doubly confirmed again in this Night Action.
(5-c) Summary of damage - location cause, effect. (Include
photographs.
Five hits were sustained during the engagement, details
as follows: (Hits numbered from forward aft).
No. l. - One major caliber (assumed to be 14 inch) hit
waterway lip at frame 29 and main-deck over pyrotechnic locker and
officers' suitcase room. The shall presumably exploded after hitting
deck, scattering fragments over face of No. 1 turret, which was
pointing about 150° relative, and various deck fittings. The wooden
deck was splintered 8' x 4' across run of deck planking. The steel
deck was torn-and folded down 6' x 1 ½". Watertight bulkhead, frame 27,
starboard, upper quarter torn out and cracked.
The pyrotechnic locker sprinkling system broken.
Number one turret gas send punctured over an arc of about 60
degrees (about 25 feet) by fragments. Although fragments
punctured at intervals repairs should include entire arc of 60 degrees
rather than intermittent patching. Pointer's check sight port out and
jammed by fragment. Check sight itself broken. Bloomer of left gun,
turret one out and torn. Steel bloomer securing rim broken. Many
gouges on face it plate.
Effect: Rendered pyrotechnic locker untenable as such; dumped
small remaining supply of pyrotechnics overboard. Turret one continued
firing without difficulty.
No. 2 - Hit on port forward part of forward stack, penetrating,
and exploding while going through after part, tearing out a section of
the steam exhaust pipe and diesel exhaust pipe. Fragments also damaged
the searchlight platform n follows:
Radio Direction Finder loop punctured
Power cable FE-176-DO feeder to #4 searchlight
punctured.
Ventilating motors of $1 and 4 36" searchlights slightly
damaged.
Lenses on #2 and 3 searchlights cracked.
Various lighting boxes and cable destroyed.
Searchlight control cable GE- 32 partly damaged.
Individual leads may be spliced to repair.
Various holes in searchlight platform, and radio
direction finder.
Effect: Broke 14 searchlight power supply. Broke remote controls
of #2 and 3 searchlights. Rendered Radio direction finder useless.
No. 3 - Major caliber hit (assumed 8" or larger) in port after
legs of searchlight platform. Angle bar supporting #2 40MM director
stand torn away. After stack punctured by fragments. One piece, base
plug of shell, pierced stack and hit starboard forward section of
secondary conn tearing out a section about 12" long and 5" wide. The
fragment hit the steering control stand, puncturing the case and
breaking electrical leads. Port boat crane structure pierced by
numerous fragments; wire cable broken by fragment. #1 motor launch and
#1 motor whaleboat hulls punctured. The two stack guys from the after
stack leading forward were out and broken by fragments, The port
forward mainmast guy was likewise broken.
Effect: Rendered two boats useless until patched; boat crane out
of commission. Secondary conn steering telegraph and rudder angle
indicator useless.
No. 4 - Hit on face plate of turret four, 9 inches directly
below center gun port. At the point of impact the face plate is dished
in 11/64 inch; area of dished surface about 12 inches in diameter. On
back of face plate a crack 4 inches long has been noted 5 1/2 inches above
point of impact Paint cracked and weld apparently broken around entire
periphery of face plate both inside and out (water leaking through
gives evidence of such a crack). Securing weld cracked on bolts
holding angle iron to face plate on inside under center gun. Rivets
securing face plate to top of turret appear to be loose. The gas seal
protector guard demolished throughout, arc subtended by face plate
(about 5 feet). Gas seal itself twisted and torn. Three gun bloomers
demolished and retaining rime twisted and torn. Numerous deck fittings
such as ventilator cowls and #3 20mm gun gunshield pierced by fragments.
Three fire hoses out up by fragments.
Effect: Other than damage to guns, no effect other than a light
inconvenience caused by hit. Turret face plate damage may, in time, be
serious but does not impair military efficiency at present.
No., 5 - A section of the starboard brace of aviation crane
pierced by direct hit of 5 to 8 inch shell. Shell exploded after
hitting; no fragmentation damage.
Effect: Rendered aviation crane useless.
Damage sustained to guns during action.
1. 6"/47 cal. Gun No. 10.
Lower side of chase, five minor gouges about half inch diameter,
maximum depth .062 inches,
2. 6"/47 cal. Gun No. 11.
Lower side. of chase, eight gouges over area ten by thirteen
inches, depths vary .125. to .375 inches.
3. 6"/47 cal, Gun No, 12,
Lower side of chase, twelve superficial gouges plus three of
about one inch diameter, maximum depth .125 inches,
4. 6"/47 cal. Gun No. 3.
Lower side of chase, two gouges, each about one inch diameter,
depths .125 inches.
5. 5"/3S cal. Gun No. 1.
One gouge 100 inches from muzzle, 1/2 inch by 2 1/2 inch, depth .375
Inch.
6. Face plate turret four dented about two feet below center
gun, dent about 3 inch diameter. Maximum depth about .125 inches.
7. Slide bushing 6"/47 Gun No. 11, deeply scored and grooved on
recoil. subsequent to gouging of gun.
(5-d) The following casualties incurred as a result of
actions:
(a) Number killed 1
(b) Number requiring hospitalization (stretcher) 2
(c) Number remaining on board for treatment 20
total casualties 23
(6} Once more the performance of all officers and men has
been magnificent and inspiring without exception. Of particular note
should be the most courageous performance of our searchlight crews,
many of whom, though wounded, stayed at their stations and maintained
their lights ready for instant use, Several men of the 40mm crews,
though wounded, did likewise. Following the hit on turret four a small
fire was started among life jackets, etc, at No. 7 20mm mount.
ROBINSON, E. C., AOMM, USN, and MULLER, P.L., AMM1c, USN, proceed to
the spot and, extinguished the fire although turret four was at the
time trained out over this mount ready to fire. The steersman STEWART,
E. L., QM1c, USN, has performed in exemplary fashion in both the Night
Action of 11-12 October and 12-13 November, being of enormous
assistance in con-ning the ship under most difficult conditions while
under fire at night.
The following officers are especially worthy of commend
action for their performance of duty during this and the previous Night
Action of 11-12 October:
Lieut. Cmdr. Elmer C. Buerkle,. USN - Ship's Material Officer
Lieut. Comdr. Rodman D. Smith, USN. - Gunnery Officer.
Lieut. Comdr. Charles L. Carpenter, USN. - Navigator.
Lieut. Comdr. John L. Chew, USN. - Assistant Gunnery Officer.
Lieutenant Michael T. Tyng, USN - Communication Officer.
Lieut. (jg) Russell W. Gash, USNR - Radar Officer.
Lieut. (jg) William D. Fisher, USNR - Signal Officer.
History of the U.S.S. HELENA CL-50
Links to other web-sites with information on the
U.S.S.
HELENA
U.S.S. HELENA
NavSource Online Has photos of CL-50
Naval Historical Center Has info. and photos of the U.S.S. HELENA
Home of U.S.S. HELENA Has info. and photos of the U.S.S. HELENA
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