| Destroyer Class: | Benham |
|---|---|
| Commissioned | 08/15/1939 |
| Length Overall | 341' |
| Extreme Beam: | 35'6" |
| Mean Draft: | 10'9" |
| Standard Displacement tons: | 1859 |
| Normal tons: | 1728 |
| Designed Complement: | Off.: 9; Enl.: 175 |
| Armament: | Primary: (4) 5"/38 cal. |
| Armament: | Secondary: (4) .50 cal. |
| Torpedo Tubes: | (16) 21" |
| Designed Speed: | 38.5 kts. |
| Designed Shaft Horse Power: | 50,000 |
| Screws: | 2 |
| Engine Manufacturer: | Wstsh. |
| Type: | Turbine |
| Fuel (oil) tons | 483 |
WAR DIARY
U.S.S. STRERETT (DD-407) South Pacific Force
From November 1, 1942 to November 30, 1942
November 1
Enroute Efate to Guadalcanal with Task Force 65.
0800 Lat. 14-31.7S; L. 167-17.6E.
1200 Lat. 14-04.5S; L. 166-34.2E.
2000 Lat. 12-52.2S; L. 165-13.8E.
Noon to noon - 248 miles - course 329° T.
Task Force 65 - Organization:
C.T.F. 65 - Rear Admiral - Callaghan.
T.G. 65.1 - Captain Reifsnider.
HUNTER LIGGETT BARNETT PRES. HAYES
T.G. 65.2 - Col. Jeschke.
Landing Group - Eighth Marines.
T.G. 65.3 - Rear Admiral Scott.
Screening Group:
ATLANTA FLETCHER AARON WARD
LARDNER BENHAM STERETT
GWIN WALKE McCALLA
T.G. 65.4
Support Group.
SAN FRANCISCO HELENA BUCHANAN
LAFFEY
T.G. 65.5 - Captain Ashe.
Eastern Transport Group.
NEVILLE HEYWOOD FOMALHAULT
MANLEY McKEAN
T.G. 65.6 - Col. Sturgis
Eastern landing group:- Fifth Marines ( detachment ) of.
147th Infantry.
246th Field Artillery.
500 Acorn personnel.
Two (2) companies - 2nd Raider Battalion.
T.G. 65.7 - Rear Admiral Tisdale.
PENSACOLA - Eastern Screening Group.
CUSHING
PRESTON
MUSTIN
ANDERSON
Mission - Reinforce Guadalcanal Garrison and establish new beachhead
at Aola Bay.
November 2
0800 Lat. 11-05S; L. 163-31.4E.
1200 Lat. 10-20.7S; L. 163-20.7E.
2000 Lat. 10-33.3S; L. 162-35.3E.
Noon to - 300 miles - course 318 T.
1600 Task Group 65.7 joined.
1700 Formed approach disposition with HELENA, WALKE and STERETT
in van.
2000 Received radio report that a Japanese force of 4 cruisers and 17
destroyers were headed for Indispensable Straits. The transports
screened by destroyers were ordered to retire.
HELENA, PENSACOLA, SAN FRANCISCO and six destroyers, including STERETT
(screen commander) proceeded at 22 knots to intercept the enemy.
Heavy rain most of night.
November 3
Japanese force retired, contact not established. The enemy, however,
landed troops and equipment at Koli Point, Guadalcanal Island.
Task Force 65 ordered to rendezvous and carry out mission on morning of
November 4th.
1600 Entire Force, less one transport and one destroyer formed up and started
approach with STERETT in van. Passed crippled CONYNGHAM that had been
in collision with FULLER.
Support Group now composed of HELENA, SAN FRANCISCO, BUCHANAN, LAFFEY
and STERETT.
2000 Went to General Quarters and so remained until 0600 Nov. 4th.
0800 Lat. 10-59.9S; L. 161-17.9E.
1200 Lat. 11-10.1S; L. 162-17.8E.
2000 Lat. 09.58.5S; L. 161-46.8E.
November 4
Operating with Support Group in Indispensable Straits covering approach
and entrance of our Force.
0630 Entered Sealark Channel.
0810 Went to General Quarters, enemy shore battery at Kokumbona opened A/A
fire on our planes and enemy shore batteries at Koli Point opened fire
on our landing boats, loaded with troops. Our destroyers bombarded Koli
Point. SAN FRANCISCO, screened by STERETT, proceeded to Kokumbona and
shelled area for 35 minutes, silencing battery and starting fires. Then
proceeded to Koli Point.
1008 SAN FRANCISCO, HELENA and STERETT opened fire on enemy positions at
Koli, each ship had its own plane for spotting.
1048 Ceased firing, having expended 503 rounds, 5"/38, no casualties.
Large fires were started and our spotters repeatedly reported direct
hits on enemy concentrations, dumps and buildings. Fires burned
throughout day.
1100 Secured from G.Q. and set 2 MS and Baker.
1150 Went to General Quarters and screened transport group. Received report
12 enemy planes headed for this vicinity.
1310 Resumed "2 MS", attack failed to materialize.
1800 Stood out through Sealark Channel, patrolling Indispensable Straits.
November 5
Operating in STRAITS with support group.
Received word a Japanese force of 27 bombers and 24 fighters were headed
this way. No air coverage is available for our transports.
1050 went to G.Q. and formed close A/A screen about our transports group off
Aola Point.
The enemy bombed our air field at Lunga but did not approach this force.
1225 Secured from air alarm and transports resumed unloading.
1230 Task Group 65.1 screened by T.G. 65.3 departed.
1330 GWIN reported to this group.
Patrolled Indispensable Straits.
November 6
0215 Went to General Quarters and Support Group, with STERETT in van, took
approach disposition and headed for Sealark Channel.
Report received that two enemy cruisers were headed for Guadalcanal from
westward and enemy planes were headed for Henderson Field.
Our Support Group and motor torpedo boats headed for enemy, who retired
before we could make contact. Shore battery played searchlights and
opened fire on planes. One of our planes dropped one 500 lb. near CL,
no damaged claimed.
0330 All clear.
0400 Mission completed, Task Force 65 departed for Espiritu Santo.
The Support Group five miles astern, toward possible enemy.
0800 Lat. 09-52S; L. 161-35.7E.
1200 Lat. 10-09.9S; L. 162-32.2E.
2000 Lat. 11-46.6S; L. 162-56.2E.
November 7
0800 Lat. 14-07.6S; L. 163-19.2E.
1200 Lat. 14-14.1S; L. 164.12.6E
2000 Lat. 14-22.5S; L. 166-19.8E.
Noon to noon - 264 miles - course 158 T.
November 8
0600 Entered Segund Channel, following heavy units. Fueled from tanker.
1000 Anchored in berth C-1
Received ammunition and provisions.
1700 Held C.O.'s conference.
November 9
1200 STERETT and six other DDs in "C' berths dragged. GWIN and LAFFEY had
minor collision. GWIN's bow was dished in and her wildcat was disabled.
2000 CO's conference in CUSHING (CDD-10).
November 10
0520 Task Group 67.4 Sortied.
SAN FRANCISCO; T.G.C. Rear Adm. CALLAGHAN.
PENSACOLA HELENA CUSHING (CDD10)
PRESTON BUCHANAN LAFFEY
GWIN STERETT
0800 Lat. 15-51S; L. 167-07.SE.
1200 Lat. 15-22S; L. 166-09.5E.
2000 Lat. 14-13.7S; L. 164-39.1E.
1800 PENSACOLA, PRESTON, and Gwin departed to join T.F. 16.
November 11
0500 Rendezvoused with remainder of Task Force 67.
Task Force Commander - Rear Admiral Turner.
Transports - 67.1
McCAWLEY (Flag) PRES. JACKSON
CRESCENT CITY PRES. ADAMS
Landing Group 67.2
ATLANTA - R. Adm SCOTT.
MAURY - AARON WARD (CDS12)
BARTON - FLETCHER
LARDNER - McCALLA
Support Group 67.4
See November 10 plus PORTLAND, JUNEAU, SHAW.
Mission to reinforce our land forces in Guadalcanal, protect our
transports and destroy enemy forces as opportunity offers.
1135 Went to General Quarters - Japanese reconnaissance planes sighted our
force but remained out of range.
1200 Secured.
1840 General Quarters, Condition Afirm.
2000 Formed battle disposition.
2200 Support Group 67.4 entered Sealark Channel and headed Westward toward
SAVO Island in search of enemy forces.
0800 Lat. 11-39.8S; L. 162-56.9E.
1200 Lat. 11-25.8S; L. 162-23.9E.
2000 do
Noon to noon - 324 miles - course 316 T.
November 12
STERETT in Support Group in Battle Formation searching SAVO Island
area for enemy forces.
Order in column: BUCHANAN, CUSHING, LAFFEY, STERETT, SAN FRANCISCO,
HELENA, PENSACOLA, PORTLAND, JUNEAU, AARON WARD, FLETCHER AND LARDNER.
500 yards between DD's, 700 yards between types and cruisers.
0550 BUCHANAN had sound contact and delivered attack.
0600 Secured from night general quarters, Transports anchored and began
unloading, screened by cruisers at 3,000 yards, and by DDs plus ATLANTA
and JUNEAU at 6,000 yards.
0730 Enemy shore batteries began firing on our HIGGINS boats loaded with
troops. No direct hits observed. HELENA, SHAW, and BARTON were
designated and began shore bombardment.
1010 SOME of our cruisers and destroyers opened fire on Douglas transport and
8 grumman fighters.
1230 CUSHING and BUCHANAN ordered to destroy enemy landing boats to westward.
They destroyed about 25 craft. BUCHANAN was hit in after stack by a
5"/38 during the T.B. attack killing 5 men and damaging stack.
1320 Air alarm - general quarters - condition afirm - transports got
underway, formed 3 columns, base course 340 T. Combatants ships formed
close screen 1,000 yards. Maneuvered by turn signals.
1406 Sighted formation of 21 enemy bombers standing in from north over
Florida Island. STERETT reported sight contact to O.T.C. over T.B.S.
Attacking planes made one circle over Florida Island, then fanned out
and started approach 50 to 100 feet off water. STERETT was in perfect
position in direct line of approach between planes and our transports.
Began tracking and had fire control solution well before planes came in
range.
During the approach our fighter planes destroyed some of the attackers.
One of our Higgins boats hit one plane with .50 cal. machine gun fire.
1413 Surface craft opened fire. STERETT shot down two with 5"/38 and two
with 20 mm. machine gun fire. These four are definite. We most
probably damaged a fifth with 20 mm.
1417 ceased firing. 20 of the 21 torpedo bombers were shot down.
Many of them before they could release their torpedoes. Three torpedoes
were sighted by us and easily avoided. We had to maneuver radically to
miss hitting one plane that crashed and went up in flames close aboard.
One burning plane crashed into SAN FRANCISCO and did minor damage.
One of our fighters crashed in sea close to our formation, pilot was
rescued.
No other damage was sustained by surface units.
At same time a formation of high level bombers and Zero fighters headed
for this force were engaged by our fighters. They never reached their
objective.
All told 52 enemy planes were engaged and 32 of them shot down. The
water was one mess of burning planes.
STERETT suffered two personnel casualties, not critical, one from
shrapnel, one from bullet wound in chest.
1450 Secured from air attack and transports resumed unloading.
1830 transports got underway and stood out through Lengo Channel.
Task Group 67.4 covered sortie, departing through Sealark Channel.
Covered transport group until 2200 in Indispensable Straits then we
reversed course, through south to west and headed for Lengo Channel and
the enemy. PENSACOLA, GWIN and PRESTON were sent ahead of transports to
protect them and then join Task Force 16.
2000 Task Group 67.4 went to General Quarters and formed battle
disposition. Order in column: - CUSHING (CDD1O), LAFFEY, STERETT,
O'BANNON, ATLANTA (R. Adm. Scott), SAN FRANCISC0 (R. Adm. Callaghan
O.T.C), PORTLAND, HELENA, JUNEAU, AARON WARD(CDD 12), BARTON,
MONSSEN and FLETCHER.
November 13
1700 Conducted Burial at sea services. Buried 28 late shipmates.
0800 Lat. 09-51S; L. 161-06E.
1200 Lat. 10-52.1S; L. l61-12.8E.
2000 Lat. 12-27.5S; L. 162-51E.
November 14
0800 Lat. 13-52.5S; L. l66-08.9E.
1200 Lat. 14-40.3S; L. 167-02.2E.
Noon to noon - 377 miles - course 123 T.
0955 HELENA reported periscope.
1016 STERETT had sound contact.
1352 FLETCHER had sound contact.
1635 Stood in to Segund Channel and fueled from tanker.
2030 Minor fire on tanker - sent our fire and rescue party and
prepared to cast off.
2040 Secured.
November 15
0130 Received orders from Comairsopac, to report on board CURTISS.
The "Staff", despite the fact that they had a despatch report on the
battle damages to STERETT, wanted to know if vessel could return
to Guadalcanal and join R. Adm. Lee's force.
0400 Returned on board ship.
0800 Cast off from tanker and moored alongside TANGIER for emergency
battle repairs.
1100 Transferred 13 seriously wounded cases to SOLACE.
1330 Attended conference held by R. Adm. Turner in McCAWLEY,
regarding engagement November 13th.
2030 Went to General Quarters - Jap submarine shelled harbor
leisurely for half hour. No damage, nuisance value only.
November 16
Undergoing emergency repairs alongside TANGIER.
Transferred all unsafe (overheated and flooded ammunition to shore
station).
U.S.S. STERETT
November 20, 1942.
From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HELENA (Senior Officer
Task Group 64.7).
(2) The Commander, South Pacific Force.
Subject: Report of Action on Night of November 12-13, 1942.
Reference: (a) U.S. Navy Regs., 1920, Arts. 712 and 874(6).
(b) PacFltConf.Ltr. #24CL-42.
1. As directed by references, the following is submitted:
I. COMMENTS ON AND SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING EVENTS:
Task Group 67.4, consisting of thirteen ships listed below, on the night
of November 12-13, 1942 stood in from the Eastward through Lengo
Channel, Guadalcanal Island area to contact and destroy a Japanese force
reported standing in from the Westward. The immediate mission of the
enemy force was to bombard our forces on Guadalcanal Island, preparatory
to landing large troop reinforcements and to recapture this vital air
base.
The STERETT, equipped only with F.D. and S.C. radars made contact with
only two enemy groups, estimated course about 110 speed 23 knots. These
later proved to be the right and center units of three groups. Sight
contact revealed two cruisers (probably both CL's) and three destroyers
in the right wing. The center force was later estimated to consist of
two battleships and two or three heavy cruisers.
During the battle, the STERETT engaged three enemy vessels; a light
cruiser, a battleship and a destroyer. Numerous 5 inch direct hits were
made on the bridge and forward structure of the cruiser. Fires were
started. This cruiser was later destroyed by other unit or units of our
force. The STERETT fired a salvo of four torpedoes at the battleship
scoring two positive hits. Bridge structure of battleship was hit with
several salvos of 5 inch. The enemy destroyer was blown up by two
torpedoes and two 5 inch salvos. This destroyer did not get a chance to
fire a single shot at STERETT and was seen to sink.
The explosion on the enemy destroyer illuminated the entire area. This
occurred about 0220 and caused resumption of heavy cross-fire from sharp
on our starboard bow and on our port beam. It was during the next few
minutes that the STERETT received most or her damage. It is believed
that all our units had started retirement prior to this last engagement
and it is quite definitely established that the enemy ships at this
time, were confused and fired at their own units. At 0230 the STERETT
was burning fiercely aft, both after guns were disabled and when it was
certain that the two remaining torpedoes could not be fired the STERETT
retired at high speed.
The STERETT had received eleven direct hits and fragments from several
near misses. Serious fires had started in #3 and #4 handling rooms and
up through the mounts; several compartments were on fire. Over twenty
percent of our ship's company had been killed or seriously wounded. Yet
the STERETT managed to retire at flank speed (a short time later boilers
#1 and #2 had to be secured and speed was limited to 23 knots) and about
0615 joined up with remainder of our retiring force. This can be
attributed only to the high state of training for battle; the prompt
action on the part of the gunnery officer in flooding all magazines aft
and ordering all power to mounts #3 and 4 cut; to the prompt and
efficient action of the damage control officer and his repair parties
and the coolness and efficient co-operation of every officer and man in
the ship.
II. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS:
(a) Air reconnaissance indicated that a strong Japanese force from the
West would arrive Guadalcanal area about midnight November 12-13,
1942. Contact was first made by S.C. radar in HELENA.
(b) See below.
(c) Wind was force 1. Sea was smooth (area nearly landlocked).
Visibility about 5000 yards for ships; about 15,000 for prominent
land objects. This was before any fires or firing. Moonset was at
0248 this morning, but the sky was 8/10 overcast.
III CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF BATTLE:
November 12
2000 Ship at General Quarters; Material Condition Afirm.
2203 Task Group 67.4 completed covering retirement of transports
group Reversed course through South and headed for Lengo
Channel, course 270° T, speed 18 knots.
In battle formation, in column in following order van to rear:
CUSHING (Comdr. Stokes), LAFFEY, STERETT, O'BANNAN, ATLANTA,
SAN FRANCISCO, (Admiral Callaghan, 0.T.C.), PORTLAND, HELENA,
JUNEAU, AARON WARD (Capt. Tobin), BARTON, MONSSEN, FLETCHER.
Distance between DD's 500 yards.
Distance between types 700 yards.
Distance between cruisers 700 yards.
November 13.
Served hot soup and coffee to all hands in relays.
Making transit of Lengo Channel.
0026 Changed course to 275° T.
0028 Changed course to 285° T.
Received "Condition Red" over warning net from Guadalcanal.
Enemy planes coming in from North, Distant 26 miles.
0130 Received T.B.S. report of contact with enemy ships.
Picked up enemy ships on our F.D. radar on our port bow, 14,500 yards,
and began tracking nearest large unit.
0148 Received order to commence fire, odd numbered ships to starboard, even
to port. Had a complete fire control solution of heavy unit on port bow
but immediately ordered action starboard in order to avoid any confusion
or undue concentration of targets. Our course was then 000° T, speed
18 knots. We had sight contact of three ships on our starboard bow
and one to port. One of the ships to starboard appeared to be the size
of a cruiser. Shortly after sight contact ComDesDiv 10, in CUSHING,
leading destroyer, turned to left apparently to parallel enemy track.
LAFFEY followed and STERETT had started left when O.T.C. ordered
ComDesDiv 10 to resume column formation. Some ships commenced fire
immediately. One enemy ship to port played searchlight on our
formation.
0149 Opened fire on largest vessel in starboard group, range 4,000 yards,
opening. This target was sharp on bow and silhouette too vague for
torpedo attack, The order for leading destroyer to resume column
prevented this unit from making a co-ordinated torpedo attack at this
time. Shortly after STERETT opened fire to starboard, an enemy
large ship on port hand began firing at our cruisers and opened a
searchlight. This made it more difficult, to see our target. Fire
control radar was of great assistance at this time. Thirteen salvos
were fired at this target. Fire broke out on target illuminating
forcastle of cruiser. Two turrets could be definitely seen: forward of
Several observers insist they saw three turrets forward. Only two
stacks were sighted but there could have been three. Best estimate is
that this was of the NATORI class.
0151 Received hit on port quarter cutting starboard cable to steering gear
and rudder was momentarily jammed. Ship was maneuvered by engines.
During this period 0'BANNON came up on our starboard hand and STERETT
checked fire. The cruiser was burning fiercely forward at this time.
Several minutes later there was a heavy explosion in this cruiser. It
is believed she blew up, probably due to fire from some other ship in
our group. The CUSHING and LAFFEY were under heavy cross fire during
this period and sight contact of them was lost.
0155 Received order over T.B.S. from 0.T.C. to "Cease Fire".
0205 Under heavy fire from port. Numerous near misses and many shells passed
overhead. About this time foremast was hit disabling S.C. radar,
emergency identification lights, and T.B.S. transmitting antenna, and
wounding 1 officer and 2 men in gun director. Temporary emergency
lights and antenna were rigged. Ordered action port and designated
KONGO class battleship as target. This target was plainly visible,
Illuminated by starshells and by flare from a burning ship to the
southward. Closed range to 4000 yards, then 2000 yards. Fired full
salvo of four torpedoes, normal Spread shortly thereafter, and opened
fire with 5"/38 on bridge structure. Two torpedoes were seen to hit,
causing two explosions aft. A number of direct 5" hits were observed.
This battleship had been under fire by other ships in our force. A few
minutes later, saw men abandoning battleship going over the side fore
and aft. STERETT was then within 2000 yards of battleship and under
heavy cross fire.
0220 (approx). A Jap destroyer of the FUDUKI class was silhouetted, 1000
yards on STERETT's starboard bow, target angle 120°. Immediately
ordered torpedo battery to fire two torpedoes and 5 inch battery to open
fire on destroyer. Two torpedo hits were definitely scored. Only two
salvos of 5 inch had been fired and were hitting squarely when the
torpedoes hit the destroyer causing large explosions lifting ship out or
water and starting fires forward and aft. This destroyer positively
sank almost immediately.
0227 Received numerous hits on port quarter. STERETT was thoroughly
illuminated when enemy destroyer to starboard exploded. Enemy salvos
from relative bearing 280° (approximate) struck port side of #3 handling
room, gun shelter and #4 handling room. These hits started fires in
each of the stations noted, causing detonation of several 5# ready
service powder tanks in each handling room and inflicting severe
casualties to both material and personnel. Both after guns were thus
put out of action. Later inspection revealed two 4 or 5 inch shell hits
in the hull which passed through #4 handling room, one hit of the same
size in #3 gun shelter and three hits closely grouped in #3 handling
room. These latter were of undetermined calibre, the holes made by
their entry measuring 15 inches across the smallest diameter; only small
fragments of these were recovered. A second salvo of 5 inch struck the
ship in the quarterdeck area, one pierced the corner of the port inboard
torpedo tube, while the others passed through the midships clipping
room, causing 6 personnel casualties, but little material damage other
than holes in. the superstructure and damage to the starboard torpedo
tube nest. This hit also caused a fire on the quarterdeck. Nearly
complete 4 inch projectile was recovered in #4 upper handling room.
Word was passed immediately to guns #3 and 4 to flood both magazines and
handling room, and the repair party was dispatched to the scene of the
fires. Power was ordered cut out to guns #3 and #4 in order to prevent
fires and explosions from severed electrical leads. Ready service
ammunition, much of it on the verge of explosion from the heat of the
fires, was dumped overboard from both handling rooms. Hoses and C02
extinguishers were quickly brought into action and the fires brought
under control. Personnel casualties were then carried to the battle
dressing station and turned over to the Doctor.
0230 STERETT was burning fiercely aft and was at this time completely
separated from own force. Colors and after part of ship were
illuminated. Only two guns were serviceable. Two torpedoes were still
in the starboard nest but one 5 inch hit had put this battery out of
commission. When torpedo officer stated that it was impossible to fire
this battery, STERETT retired at high speed, slowing from time to time
to reduce 'draft' when fire appeared to be getting out of control.
Remainder of our force had already retired. D.R.T. had been disabled
during afternoon air attack. Ship was headed east to clear area then
South until close to Guadalcanal shore.
0255 Headed for Lengo Channel course 090° T.
0258 Avoided what nay have been a torpedo that crossed our bow port to
starboard. Increased speed to 23 knots to clear area then maneuvered
toward Lengo Channel running at 10 to 23 knots depending on condition of
fire art. Boilers #l and 2 were secured about this time due to failure
of firemain forward and loss of cooling water to forced draft blowers
and loss of ventilation blowers in this fireroom. Transformers had been
grounded when firemain carried away. Temporary firemain jumper was
quickly rigged
0311 Heard and sighted heavy explosion in large ship bearing 345° T. That
ship was burning from stem to stern but did not sink at this time. Six
or seven burning ships were in sight during our retirement.
0300 Reported by T.B.S. to HELENA.
0327 Rudder jammed at full right. Backed full both engines to avoid going
ashore on Guadalcanal Island.
0332 Went ahead using trick wheel and rudder director from bridge.
0345 Entered Lengo Channel.
0415 Proceeded at 23 knots to overtake own forces which had gone out Sealark
Channel.
0425 Crossed 100 fathom curve to eastward of Leugo Channel.
0600 Joined HELENA, SAN FRANCISCO, JUNEAU, O'BANNON and FLETCHER.
IV. SPECIAL COMMENTS ON ENEMY FORCES:
(a) STERETT encountered two groups of enemy ships, on roughly easterly
heading making twenty three knots. These groups consisted of two
battleships, five cruisers, two or three were heavy, and about
three or four destroyers. One or more searchlights were used first
by the enemy, then several starshells or aircraft flares high over
the area between the forces, and thirdly a form of firecracker or
sparkle effect with brilliant white flashes fired low between the
two forces with apparent intention of blinding our cruisers.
(b) -
(c) -
(d) When STERETT was under heavy fire, the majority of shells fell over
or short or astern. No hits were received below waterline. What
hits were received were quite effective except for low order burst
in one 4. inch projectile recovered (see above), and two 5 inch
projectiles which went through ship without exploding.
(e) Unable to estimate total damage to enemy. A cruiser and a
destroyer were seen to explode. Two battleships were seriously
damaged. When STERETT left area seven ships were seen burning
fiercely.
V. SPECIAL COMMENTS ON OWN FORCES:
(a) See paragraph 3 above for number and type.
(b) Communications were all via TBS. Our transmitter was disabled by
hit on mast. Almost impossible to hear TBS on destroyer bridge
during height of battle.
(c) No smoke was used.
(d) Torpedo battery functioned perfectly until disabled by enemy gun
fire. All six torpedoes wore fired with 45 knot speed setting.
Gun performance was excellent. Fire control radar was of
invaluable assistance against light cruiser. Also 5" ammunition
was very effective.
(e) No criticism of gunnery.
(f) Following ammunition was expended:
5"/38 common - 90 rounds
Mk XV torpedoes - 6
(g) Radar search was with FD radar only as directed by Task Group
Commander. Two groups at enemy ships were located, first at 14,500
yards.
(h) Engineering department answered every bell at once, including 1
emergency full astern to avoid ramming own destroyer.
Performance of medical department was outstanding. Three leg
amputations were performed, and one splint compound fracture treated
shortly after the battle. Only one wounded man was lost after he had
reached the doctor's care, and he had been nearly torn in two.
(i) Summary of own damage:
STERETT received eleven direct hits and fragments from several near
misses.
Three hits were from major calibre shells set with instantaneous fuses,
possibly for shore bombardment, Two or three hits were 4", source not
known. All others are believed to have been 5". Two 5" shells pierced
ship completely from port to starboard without exploding.
Hit #1 pierced the hull, port side, at frame 159 about one foot below
the main deck and passed through ship diagonally and pierced the
starboard hull at frame 166 just below the main deck without exploding.
This shell severed the starboard steering gear cable which was then in
use. Fragments from bulkheads pierced the starboard degaussing gear
cable. Other damage was of minor nature to centilating system and
lookers.
The second shell hit the fore mast below the yard arm, gouging a 6 inch
hole in mast. Fragments severed the main stays and cut the mast ladder
in two. Several fragments hit the director and slightly wounded five of
the personnel. This hit demolished the emergency recognition lights,
the S.C. radar antenna and the TBS transmitting antenna.
The third shell, believed to be in the same slave, hit above the yardarm
bending the ladder and flying fragments knicked the yardarm and stays.
The fourth shell went through the port side of the hull frame 160,
through compartment C-203-L, damaging lockers and exploding 5 or 6 tanks
of 5" ready service powder killing six men by burns, concussion and
shrapnel. This hit also severed all power leads to #4 handling room,
and fragments entered the power panel at the bottom of the shell hoist.
The fifth hit (a 15" hole) pierced the port bulkhead of the crews'
washroom, frame 155, destroying the urinals, damaging the flushing
system, and piercing the ventilation system, twisting and bending the
forward frame to #3 handling room fragments pierced the prophylactic
station and sheet metal partitions in head. This hit killed two men.
The sixth hit, a 15" diameter hole through port side #3 handling room,
frame 157 caused the ignition of 5 tanks of 5" ready service powder
creating fierce fires, bending and gutting the C-103-L bulkhead by the
gun crews' passageway. Fragments and shrapnel tore and twisted a
transverse frame, pierced holes in after deck house; severed battle,
lighting general power and general lighting cables. The ammunition
joist and bulkhead were pierced by numerous pieces of shrapnel. The
center column cable trunk and projectile hoist were also pierced by
fragments. This hit killed about five men.
The seventh hit shattered the port side superstructure deck after deck
house piercing the armor shield of gun mount number 3 in numerous
places, killing and severely burning several men.
The eighth hit pierced the port side of gun mount #3 and continued on
through the starboard side, fragments damaging rammer motor and killing
one man.
The ninth hit pierced the lower after corner of the amidships clipping
room, making a hole about 14" in diameter, severed upright in clipping
room, cut the sprinkling system pipe from #1 engine room, bent frame of
WT door, fragments setting off numerous pieces of small calibre and 20
mm ammunition. Fragments passed through clipping room and carried away
roller path shield to #1 torpedo tube.
The tenth hit shattered the shield and O.D.D. desk destroying it and
fragments hitting the starboard torpedo tube killing one man.
The eleventh hit pierced door and adjacent section or inboard barrel of
port torpedo tube, fragments piercing machine shop, #4 barrel and
torpedo airflask in starboard tube, damaging trainers seat of starboard
tube, and severing gland exhauster line from forward engine room. It
killed two men and seriously injured two men.
Many fragments or shrapnel also pierced the trainer's sight window on
gun #4, shattering the telescope glass. Origin of these fragments is
undetermined. Probably they came from a near-miss.
At the close of the action the conditions on board the ship were as
follows:
1. Gun #3 and 4 were out of commission.
2. Fires burning in #4 handling room, compartment
O-203-L, #3 handling room and O-103-L.
3. S.C. radar out of commission.
4. Starboard torpedo tubes out of commission.
5. Port torpedo tubes empty.
6. Engineering plant was intact.
7. Starboard steering gear cable severed.
8. Degaussing cable starboard side severed.
9. T.B.S. antenna severed temporarily out of
commission.
10. The emergency power cable to the steering motors
was severed.
Following the battle, damage control measures as outlined below were
taken. Fires were fought in C-203-L, #3 and 4 handling rooms with C02
extinguishers and hose led into compartment C-203-L to extinguish
burning clothing and mattresses. The after magazines had been flooded.
The four holes in the ship's side were plugged and shored. The water
was drained from compartment into magazine below and from here pumped
out with a portable submersible pump to maintain proper level. About
two inches of water was bailed out of compartment C-203-L and #4
handling room.
(j) Casualties to Personnel:
The following named men were burned and jumped overboard to
extinguish the flames:
GODECKER, Hubert T. RM2c
SIMMONS, Clarence M. GM2c
GRANN, James I. Jr, Sea1c
CARTWRIGHT, William H. GM3c
DAVIS, Scott E. Sea1c
VI. C0MMENDATI0NS WHERE MERITED:
During the entire action and subsequent fires all officers and men
conducted themselves with the utmost coolness and bravery. There was no
panic. There was no confusion, and every officer and man proceeded to
do his own job regardless of personnel risk.
The medical department was remarkable for the efficiency with which it
functioned under difficult conditions. The medical officer and his staff
could not have done a better job. They were assisted by CONN, G.E.,
Y2c, HAMMACK, W.R., SF2c, LOVAS, C.R., MM2c, and BOUDREAUX, F.A., F2c,
who cared for the wounded voluntarily in addition to their regular
duties and watches until reaching port, getting no sleep for at least 48
hours.
The following officers are deserving of special commendation:
Lieutenant C.H. Calhoun, U.S.N., gunnery officer, for the accuracy of
his control of the gun battery, and the fact that, as we were retiring
from tile battle area, he proceeded aft and personally checked the work
of fire fighting parties. At great risk he entered the smoke filled
handling rooms #3 and 4 and saw that the after magazines were properly
flooded.
Lieutenant (jg) G.W. Hanna, USNR, first lieutenant and damage control
officer, for the manner in which he directed the damage control parties
and the removal of the wounded, without thought to his own safety.
Ensign P. Hall, U.S.N., assistant first lieutenant for his courage in
personally supervising the fire fighting below decks, despite the
dangers of smoke, gas, and overheated powder.
The following men are especially deserving of commendation:
ROBINSON, J.A. SFlc - During action #3 handling room was hit and set on
fire and 4 shell holes put in compartment C-203-L. ROBINSON led fire
party to extinguish fire and later patched holes and shored up
bulkheads. He worked continuously all night and the next day
reinforcing shores and operating pumps. It is recommended that this man
be advanced to Chief Shipfitter for his efficient work in handling men
and directing the repair party under dangerous conditions.
MORRIS, D.B. MM2c - for heroic action under extremely hazardous
conditions helping fight fire and shoring bulkheads.
BLANKENSHIP, H. CCM(AA) - for his cool and efficient work in fighting
fires in #4 handling room and his leadership in directing the fire party
to successfully extinguish the fire which helped the ship continue its
fighting efficiency.
SPENCE, M.R. Sealc - for his assistance in removing casualties from gun
#3 and getting #7 life raft into water for men from gun #4 who were
thrown over the side.
MAYEFSKY, Jospeh, Sea2c - for assistance in removing casualties from gun
#3 and getting #7 life raft over the side to men of gun #4.
KOEAK, J.J. Sea2c - for assistance in removing casualties from gun #3 to
wardroom and assisting in getting life raft #7 overboard.
TALBOT W.W. CEM(AA) - for his tireless effort and continued excellent
performance of duty which was responsible for repairing the sick bay and
other electrical units necessary to carry on the fighting efficiency of
the ship.
WELLER, L.A. Sea1c - for gallant action under extremely hazardous
conditions. After #3 handling room was hit he led hose into #4 handling
room and shoring bulkheads.
DEAN, J.D. MM2c - rendered valuable aid in putting out fire in
compartment C-203-L and handling room or No. 4 gun.
KELLY, B.A. Sea1c - for fine assistance in handling casualties of gun
#3 and getting life raft over the side.
WHOLLEY, J.B. F3c - for assistance in handling casualties of gun #3 and
getting life raft over the side.
HODGE, H.J. CGM - for his immediate courageous and efficient action
after the ship was hit by enemy shells. HODGE immediately ascertained
the damage done, took charge in the vicinity of #3 and 4 handling rooms,
fought the fire, removed wounded, and personally removed ready service
ammunition which was sizzling hot and on the point of exploding (some of
this powder did explode in mid-air after it was thrown overboard).
FRAY, V.W. WT2c - for his assistance in righting the fires in handling
rooms #3 and 4, including his help in removing burning mattresses,
clothing, and overheated ready-service powder.
BURRIS, G. Sea1c, LASTRA, L.J. Sea2c, and HOMER, F.A. Seac2c - for their
assistance in running hoses into #1 handling room, for removing burning
material from vicinity of fires, and for assisting HODGE in handling
ready-service powder which was close to the point of explosion.
KENNUM, L.G. CTM(AA) - for his assistance in fighting the fire on gun #3
and in #3 handling room, and for his heroic action in entering the
flames from this handling room in order to operate the magazine flooding
valves, which operation doubtless saved the ship.
SEYMOUR, H.A. Jr. Sea1c - for his courageous and unselfish action when
after being severely burned in gun #4. he immediately, with complete
disregard for his own safety, broke out fire hose, coupled it together
(judging from the present condition of his hands this was really
remarkable) and fought fire on #3 mount. He also helped extinguish
fires on clothing of SEUTLEY and NORCROSS, and assisted in removal of
wounded from gun #3.
SKELTON, J.W. FC1c - for his cool and efficient performance of duty as
rangefinder operator when after being painfully struck by shrapnel he
(although he could in no way determine the extent of his wounds except
to feel flood soaking his shirt) calmly identified silhouettes as they
appeared, gave target angles and speeds, and ranged under the most
trying conditions.
BYERS, R..O. BM1c - for his cool and efficient performance of duty as
director trainer when after being struck in the neck by shrapnel he
stuck to his post until ordered by the gunnery officer to leave during a
lull in the action.
VII. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
It is recommended that: All TBS orders be paralled by C.W. radio.
A spare temporary emergency identification light string be ready to run
up with a halyard for night action.
A cease firing gong contact maker be installed on the bridge for use of
the captain in stopping gun fire, with a sounder in the gun director in
addition to those already mounted in gun shields.
The flagship must be equipped with the most modern radar.
Consideration should be given to locating remote control release to
magazine flooding and sprinkling valves on the top aide. It is very
difficult to operate them in smoke and flames.
J. C. COWARD
Copy to: Cominch (direct)
Comdespac (direct)
U.S.S. HELENA 10-s
FIRST ENDORSEMENT
CL50/A16-3/(SD/TS133)
November 21, 1942.
From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HELENA.
To : The Commander south Pacific Force.
1. Forwarded.
/s/ GILBERT C. HOOVER
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE A16-3/(90) Serial 00151b November 29, 1942. SECOND ENDORSEMENTT TO CO USS STERETT Secret ltr. DD407 A16-3(005) dated November 20, .1942. From: The Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force. To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Subject: Report of Action on Night of November 12 - 13 1942. 1. Forwarded. 2. Another splendid example of the fighting spirit of bhe men in our destroyer force. Only after having afl offensive armament except forward 5" guns put out of action and being completely ablaze aft did the STERETT retire. Fire control and damage control are considered outstanding. 3. Specific comments are as follow: (a) F.D. radar proved invaluable. (b) Attention invited to possible enemy use of a new type pyrotechnic reported on page 7, par.l IV (a). (c) Another instance when the TBS could not be heard during gunfire./s/ W.F. HALSEY. Copy to: CO USS STERETT CTG 64.7 Comdespac Cominch
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